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PREFACE 
Information integration models used by industrial buyers in forming 
their risk perceptions in single, policy, and mixed decision situations 
were investigated to test the validity of expectancy theory as a 
descriptive model of buyer behavior in decisions under uncertainty. 
Single decisions were defined as those in which the decision is applied 
just once. Policy decisions were defined as those in which the 
decision, once made, is applied repeatedly a large number of times to 
identical situations. All other decisions which do not fall in the 
first two categories were defined as mixed decisions. Two experiments 
with simulated gambling and industrial buying situations were conducted 
in a laboratory setting using 75 graduate students as the subjects. 
The study showed that in policy decision situations, the subjects 
tended to use the multiplicative expectancy model in forming their risk 
perceptions. In single decision situations the subjects tended not to 
use the multiplicative model. In mixed decision situations the subjects 
tended to use a multiplicative model of information integratio~, but to 
a lesser extent as compared to the policy decisions. The study also 
investigated the relative levels of perceived risk in the three types of 
decision situations. The findings showed that the subjects perceived 
the highest risk in single decisions, moderate risk in policy decisions, 
and the lowest risk in mixed decisions. The results also indicated that 
the process of information integration is primarily dependent on the 
type of decision and is not affected, in a significant way, by the type 
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of experimental setting used. However, the actual level of perceived 
risk is significantly affected by the experimental setting. The 
findings have several implications for researchers and managers in the 
marketing field. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Iaportance of Perceived Risk in Marketing 
Marketing aims at understanding, explaining, predicting, and 
influencing the process of exchange in human society (Bagozzi 1975; Hunt 
1983; Kotler 1972). All exchanges are based on the expectations of the 
parties concerned about the outcomes of the exchange (Adams 1963; Fisk 
1982; Walster, Walster, and Bersheid 1978). Because the outcomes 
temporally succeed the process of exchange itself, an inherent 
uncertainty exists about how well the actual outcomes will match the 
expectations. Risk originates from the uncertainty about the actual 
outcomes of the purchase decisions faced by the customers. Therefore, 
all exchange decisions in general and all customer purchase decisions 
(which are a subset of the former) in particular are choice situations 
involving risk. 
Even though necessary, the presence of risk is not a sufficient 
condition by itself to influence purchase behavior. If an individual is 
unaware of the risk, the risk is nonexistent as far as that choice 
situation is concerned, and it will have no effect on that person's 
behavior. Thus, in addition to the existence of risk, it is important 
that the customers have a prior knowledge of and concern for the risk. 
In other words, the customer must perceive the risk and be concerned 
about it. Thus, "perceived risk" originates from the concern felt by 
1 
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customers about the uncertainty of the actual outcomes of their purchase 
decisions. Moreover, it is not the risk itself but the perceived risk 
which has a major influence on the decision process and the final choice 
of the customers. As such, perceived risk is a fundamental construct 
present in all marketing situations. 
Literature on Perceived Risk 
Even though mathematicians and psychologists realized the 
importance of perceived risk in human behavior much earlier, Bauer 
(1960) was the first marketer to formally propose the conceptualization 
of consumer behavior as risk taking. Subsequent research has 
investigated the formation of perceived risk and its effect on various 
aspects of buyer behavior. The literature on perceived risk can be 
organized in three areas: how risk perceptions are formed, how various __ _ 
factors influence the perception of risk, and how perceived risk, in 
turn, affects buyer behavior. Given below are the highlights of the 
research in each of these areas. 
The Formation of Risk Perceptions 
Several researchers have proposed different algebraic models which 
describe how buyers process the information on the two basic components 
of risk--the uncertainty and the values of the outcomes--to form their 
perceptions of the risk involved in choosing an alternative. These 
models can be grouped into two broad categories: the multiplicative 
expectancy models and the other nonmultiplicative decision heuristics 
models. The expectancy models (Coombs, Bezembinder, and Goode 1967; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) propose 
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that the people evaluate risky alternatives by computing the expected 
value of all possible outcomes of the alternative. The decision 
heuristics models (Anderson 1974a, 1974b, 1974c; Coombs 1975; Loomes and 
Sugden 1982; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1968a, 1968b) suggest that the 
uncertainty and the outcomes act as independent dimensions contributing 
separately to the total risk perceived in an alternative. Empirical 
research shows that both categories of models have met with mixed 
success in explaining buyer risk perceptions and behavior in real life 
situations. 
The Effect of Personality, Environmental, and 
Situational Factors on Perceived Risk--- -----
The second important area of research concerns the effect of 
various factors on perceived risk in different choice situations. These 
factors can be classified into three groups: personality factors, 
environmental factors, and situational factors. 
Brody and Cunningham (1967), Howard and Sheth (1969), Schaninger 
(1976), and Zikmund and Scott (1973b) found that perceived risk is 
positively related to anxiety, and negatively related to confidence, 
self-esteem, and risk taking. Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956), Bruner 
and Tajfel (1961), Pettigrew (1958), Popielarz (1967), and Schiffman 
(1972) found that individuals exhibit consistency in their preference 
for certain types of outcomes and in their tolerance for certain levels 
of uncertainty. 
Lichtenstein et al. (1978) and Slovic and Lichtenstein (1980) 
showed that environmental factors such as the freque~cy of occurrence of 
the risk, the availability or the familiarity of the decision maker with 
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the risk through experience, and the judged seriousness of the 
consequences, simultaneously affect large segments of the population and 
have a positive effect on the level of risk perceived. 
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1979) and Starr (1969) found 
that voluntary risks are more acceptable than involuntary risks. 
Spence, Engel, and Blackwell (1970) found that people perceived higher 
risk in mail order shopping as compared to retail store shopping. 
The Effect of Perceived Risk on Prepurchase 
Activities and Purchase Behavior 
The third area of research on perceived risk investigates the 
effect of perceived risk on various prepurchase activities and the 
actual purchase decisions. 
Brown and Gentry (1975), Cooper (1969), Lutz and Reilly (1973), 
Roselius (1971), and Sheth and Venkatesan (1968) studied a variety of 
risk reduction strategies used by consumers across a range of choice 
situations. Berlyne (1960), Copeley and Collom (1971), Hawkins and ~ 
Lanzetta (1965), and Lanzetta and Driscoll (1968) studied the effect of 
risk components on information search, which is a common factor of I 
several risk reduction strategies. Reingen (1974) and Woodside (1972, I 
1974) found that group interactions cause a shift in the acceptable__. .. ) 
levels of risk toward its mean value. , _ 
Perceived risk has an inhibiting effect on the consumer purchase 
behavior. As such, consumers tend to choose the alternative which has 
minimum perceived risk. This has been confirmed in numerous empirical 
studies conducted in different settings covering a wide variety of 
purchase situations (Barach 1969; Bearden and Shimp 1982; Cox and Rich 
1964; Schiffman 1972; Woodside and DeLozier 1976). 
This dissertation focuses on the first stage of the formation of 
risk perceptions by customers in purchase decisions involving 
uncertainty and, hence, risk. 
Purpose of the Study 
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The basic purpose of this study was to develop and test hypotheses 
about the circumstances under which industrial buyers will use or not 
use multiplicative expectancy model to form their risk perceptions. In 
other words, the study tested the applicability of expectancy theory as 
a descriptive model of buyer risk perceptions across different types of 
purchase decisions. 
One of the important questions in understanding the role of 
perceived risk in buyer behavior relates to how risk perceptions are 
formed in the first place. Risk originates from two basic components: 
the values of various possible outcomes (V) and the uncertainty of their 
occurrence (P). Customers comprehend and perceive these components and 
through some process combine them to form an overall evaluation of the 
undesirable aspects of an alternative--which is the perceived risk. 
Several information integration models have been proposed by 
researchers to explain how people combine these inputs to form risk 
perceptions. Among these, an important group of models based on various 
expectancy theories (Coombs, Bezembinder, and Goode 1967; Edwards 1955; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) has 
traditionally dominated the research. The expectancy approach suggests 
that individuals will evaluate an alternative with uncertain outcomes, 
by computing its expectancy--a generic term used to refer to such 
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constructs as expected value (EV), expected utility (EU), subjective 
expected value (SEV), subjective expected utility (SEU), and the value 
of a prospect. Expectancy is computed by multiplying the outcomes by 
their respective uncertainties and adding the product over all possible 
outcomes. Thus, expectancy theories use multiplicative models based on 
the two basic risk components--uncertainty and the values of the 
outcomes. 
Using the expectancy concept as the basis, some researchers 
(Bettman 1975; Hansen 1972; Jacoby and Kaplan 1972) have defined 
perceived risk in the following way: 
Perceived Risk = Expected Utility of the Undesirable Outcomes 
= - [ y ( UNCERTAINTYy * CONSEQUENCEy ) 
Where y refers to one of the several dimensions of risk identified 
by the researchers (Jacoby and Kaplan 1972; Peter and Ryan 1976; Zikmund 
and Scott 1973a). 
The above discussion indicates that perceived risk can be related 
to subjective expected utility by the following equality: 
Perceived Risk Involved in an Alternative 
= - Subjective Expected Utility of the Alternative 
However, in practice, expectancy theories have met with a mixed 
success (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Certain types of consumer 
behaviors, like the purchase of new products or brands, the choice of 
stores, and such other decisions which are applied repeatedly, have been 
explained and predicted by expectancy approach (Anderson and Shanteau 
1970; Bettman, Capon, and Lutz 1975; Jacoby and Kaplan 1972). However, 
other types of decisions, such as the purchase of life or property 
insurance, lottery tickets, assets like house and car involve very high 
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values of positive or negative outcomes resulting from one single 
decision. In such decisions the expectancy theories often fail to 
explain the risk perceptions and behavior (Lanzetta and Driscoll 1968). 
Some of the reasons identified in the literature for such failure of the 
expectancy theories are: individual preferences for different ranges of 
outcomes (Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin 1956; Bruner and Tajfel 1961; 
Pettigrew 1958; Popielarz 1967; Schiffman 1972), and individual 
tolerances for different levels of uncertainty (Slovic and Lichtenstein 
1968b; Svenson 1979; Weinstein 1979). 
With a view to overcoming the inadequacies of the expectancy 
models, several other theories have been proposed as alternatives. 
Portfolio theory, as proposed by Coombs (1975), suggests that the 
choices are made as a compromise between expected value and optimization 
of risk in accordance with its preferred levels. Loomes and Sugden 
(1982) proposed regret theory which suggests that customer choices will 
aim at maximization of utility and minimization of regret as the twin 
objectives. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a) suggested that individuals 
weight the risk components--uncertainty and outcomes--as independent 
dimensions and then combine the information to form an overall 
evaluation of the alternatives. Thus, in a specific situation an 
alternative may be chosen primarily because one or more of its possible 
outcomes are attractive irrespective of their extremely low probability 
of occurrence or vice versa. Anderson (1974a, 1974b, 1974c) proposed 
information integration theory to describe the way individuals use the 
e 
information about the probabilitis and the outcomes in making decisions. 
The research on alternative models of risk perceptions and behavior 
brings out two important points. First, it shows that expectancy 
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theories cannot explain risk perceptions and behavior in several real 
life situations. Second, it identifies ways to overcome the 
inadequacies of expectancy theories. These include modifying the model 
algebra from multiplicative to additive models and modifying the 
objective function from maximization of SEU to optimization of risk, 
minimization of regret, etcetra. 
Despite the observed inadequacies of expectancy theories, no 
research to date has investigated the question of when and why 
expectancy models are satisfactory in explaining buyer risk perceptions 
and under what circumstances the expectancy models fail. This question 
of the suitability of the expectancy approach in explaining buyer risk 
perceptions across a variety of real life situations forms the core of 
the dissertation. 
Development of the Hypotheses 
In order to understand the mixed success of expectancy theories in 
explaining choice behavior in real life situations, it is necessary to 
go to the basic logic and justification behind the use of the expectancy 
theory as an evaluative criterion by buyers. The intuitive 
justification for using expectancy as the choice criterion is the law of 
large numbers (Borch 1972). In a large number of trials, the 
probabilities of the various possible outcomes represent the relative 
frequency with which the outcomes will actually occur. Thus, if a 
gamble is played a large number of times, the actual average outcome in 
the long run will equal the expected value. Therefore, a rational 
decision maker will base his choice on what will be the actual outcome 
in the long run, i.e. the expected value. In effect, the expected value 
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reduces a decision under uncertainty involving several repeated \ 
\ 
applications of the chosen alternative to a decision with a sure outcome \ 
I 
(Borch 1972). The other expectancy theories i.e. expected utility (EU),) 
subjective expected value (SEV), subjective expected utility (SEU), and I 
prospect theory, are also based on the same basic principles. They , 
differ from the EV theory by taking into account the nonlinear 
I 
I 
i 
I perceptions of the decision makers of the two risk components-- I 
uncertainty and outcomes. Thus, the extent of acceptance and use of the 
I 
I 
expectancy theories by buyers will depend upon whether or not the chos~n 
alternative is to be applied repeatedly a large number of times to 
identical situations. 
The preceding discussion indicates that real world decisions under 
uncertainty can be differentiated on the dimension of "repeated 
applications of a decision", that is, the number of times the decision 
is applied repeatedly to identical situations. Single decisions are 
defined as those in which the decision is applied just once. Policy 
decisions are defined as those in which the decision is made once and is 
applied repeatedly a large number of times to identical situations. 
However, many real life decisions do not fall in either of these 
two categories and can be called "mixed decisions". One important 
segment of mixed decisions includes the repeat purchase decisions for 
items such as raw materials, supplies, and services by industries and 
households, which are implemented over time. These are decisions in 
which the buyer has an option to either treat each repeat purchase 
situation separately as a single decision or to give up this freedom to 
choose everytime in favor of a policy decision. 
Several important hypotheses about the formation and the level of 
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perceived risk can be developed on the basis of such classification of 
the decision situations. These are presented as Hypotheses Al to A4 
below. 
Much of the experimental research done on expectancy theories as 
descriptive models of human choice behavior has used simulated gambling 
alternatives as the setting. Unfortunately, as discussed later in the 
Literature Review chapter, the choice among gambles has little 
resemblance to the purchase decisions faced by buyers. Bettman and 
and Schoemake~ Kakkar (1977), Dawes (1975), and Hershey, Kunreuther, 
--~! 
(1982) have shown that the information integration is significantly I i 
! 
i 
influenced by the nature of tasks involved. As such, it can be expected\ 
i 
i 
that the perceived risk in otherwise identical dec is ions will be · · 1 
different in the two settings. 
Among several risk dimensions identified by the researchers (Jacoby 
and Kaplan 1972; Zikmund and Scott 1973a), financial and social risks 
often play dominant role6in influencing buyer behavior. Of these, 
financial risk often plays a more important role, especially in 
industrial purchasing behavior. Moreover, of the two, only the 
financial risk can be quantified. Such quantification was essential in 
order to test the hypotheses concerning the use of expectancy theories 
by buyers. Therefore, the dissertation focused only on one dimension of 
perceived risk--the financial risk. 
This study tested the above ideas in the form of five hypotheses, 
which are presented below: 
HYPOTHESIS Al : In purchase situations involving policy decisions 
(Situation 2 and Situation 4 of Table I), consumers will tend to use a 
multiplicative expectancy model in forming their risk perceptions. 
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HYPOTHESIS A2 : In purchase situations involving mixed decisions 
(Situation 5 of Table I), consumers will tend to use a multiplicative 
expectancy model to a lesser extent as compared to the policy decisions, 
in forming their risk perceptions. 
HYPOTHESIS A3 : In purchase situations involving single decisions 
(Situation 1 and Situation 3 of Table I), consumers will tend not to use 
a multiplicative expectancy model in forming their risk perceptions and 
instead will tend to use other nonmultiplicative decision heuristics and 
choice criteria. 
HYPOTHESIS A4 : Consumers will perceive the highest risk in single 
decisions, moderate risk in policy decisions, and the lowest risk in 
mixed decisions with equal expected values as shown by the following 
enequality: 
Perceived Risk 
(Single Decisions) 
> Perceived Risk 
(Policy Decisions) 
> Perceived Risk 
(Mixed Decisions) 
HYPOTHESIS AS : In respect to decisions under uncertainty which are 
CL 
identical in all other respects, consumers will perceive different 
amount of risk in the gambling setting as compared to the risk perceived 
in the industrial purchasing setting. 
Research Methodology 
The dissertation tested theory based hypotheses about the causal 
relationship between the construct of repeated applications of a 
decision under uncertainty (single decision versus policy decision 
versus mixed decision) and the risk perceived by the decision maker. 
Therefore, an experimental study was performed in a laboratory setting, 
using homogeneous subjects and strong manipulations of the independent 
variables (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1981). The research had two 
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objectives. One was to make the findings of the study comparable with 
earlier research using gambling settings. This was accomplished by 
operationalizing the variables in a gambling setting. The second 
objective was to partially overcome the inadequate generalizability of 
the gambling settings to draw inferences about buyer behavior. This was 
accomplished by also operationalizing the variables in an industrial 
purchasing setting. Thus, the study involved two experiments in two 
settings. As explained in the section on the development of hypotheses, 
the study concentrated only on one dimension of risk--the financial 
risk. Table I presents the details of the experimental designs. 
Each experiment was designed as a "Repeated Applications of a 
decision by Probability (P) by Value (V)" full factorial experiment. 
The repeated applications construct was manipulated at two levels in the 
gambling experiment: single decision and policy decision and at three 
levels in the industrial purchasing experiment: single decision, policy 
decision, and mixed decision. The mixed decision was not 
operationalized in the case of the gambling setting because, given the 
freedom available in the mixed decisions, the respondents would tend to 
stop playing the gamble which had one negative and one null outcome and 
no positive outcomes. The two levels of the repeated applications 
construct in the gambling experiment, and its three levels in the 
industrial purchasing experiment formed five unique situations as shown 
in Table I. 
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the five situations. 
It was planned to use 15 subjects in each of the five situations, thus 
making a total sample size of 75 respondents. The probabilities and the 
values of the outcomes each had four different levels. Thus, within an 
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TABLE I 
DESIGN OF THE TWO EXPERIMENTS OF THE STUDY 
EXPERIMENTS 
1. Gambling Experiment 
Probabilities (pi) 
Values (Vj) 
Number of Decisions 
2. Industrial Purchasing 
Experimant 
Probabilities (Pi) 
Values (Vj) 
Number of Decisions 
REPEATED APPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION 
Single 
Decision 
SITUATION 1 
4 Levels 
4 Levels 
16 Nos. 
SITUATION 3 
4 Levels 
4 Levels 
16 Nos. 
Policy 
Decision 
SITUATION 2 
4 Levels 
4 Levels 
16 Nos. 
SITUATION 4 
4 Levels 
4 Levels 
16 Nos. 
Mixed 
Decision 
SITUATION 5 
4 Levels 
4 Levels 
16 Nos. 
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assigned situation, each respondent was presented with sixteen decisions 
as stimuli, formed by the combination of four levels of P and V. 
The experimental tasks involved reading the narration of a decision 
situation, reading the characteristics of each of the sixteen decision 
stimuli, and then rating the perceived risk in each case on two risk 
scales. The narration of the decision situations was carefully designed 
to exercise effective control of personality, environmental, and 
situational factors which can affect the risk perceptions in the two 
experiments. The experiments required the respondents to simulate the 
role of the decision maker described in the situations and to record the 
responses. In view of the experimental tasks and the theoretical nature 
of the research, graduate students were used as the subjects. A 
nonprobability convenience sample of subjects was used for the practical 
reason of feasibility. The subjects were selected on volunteer basis 
and were compensated to obtain greater commitment. The instruments and 
the experimental procedures were pilot tested on a small sample drawn 
from the same population to ensure that no unforeseen problems existed. 
The functional measurement theory approach (Anderson 1981) ideally 
suited the objectives of the study. As such, the design of the study 
was chosen with a view to use this approach for data analysis and 
hypothesis testing. The computer program package FM#l developed by 
Shanteau (1984a, 1984b) was used for analyzing the data. 
Contributions of the Study 
A number of factors give the dissertation theoretical and practical 
value. In the past, expectancy theory has dominated the research in the 
area of perceived risk as the descriptive model of human behavior. 
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However, in practice, the expectancy approach has met with a mixed 
success in predicting consumer risk perceptions and behavior. Consumer 
purchase decisions can be differentiated on the construct of repeated 
applications of a decision as single decisions, policy decisions, and 
mixed decisions. The failure of expectancy approach to make correct 
predictions of risk perceptions and behavior in certain types of 
situations indicates the possibility that repeated application of a 
decision may be an important determinant of when expectancy models are 
used by buyers. The literature review revealed no evidence of empirical 
research investigating the dimension of repeated application of a 
decision. Therefore, the dissertation makes an important contribution 
by testing the hypotheses concerning the applicability of expectancy 
theory in purchase decisions differing on the construct of repeated 
application of the decision. 
Any purchase decision can be described as either a single, a 
policy, or a mixed decision depending on the number of applications of 
the decision involved. Therefore, repeated applications of a decision is 
a meaningful construct relevant to any purchase decision. As such, the 
study investigated an important determinant of customer risk perceptions 
and its effects on purchase behavior. 
Much of the experimental research done on expectancy theories as 
descriptive models of human choice has used simulated gambling 
situations as the experimental setting. Unfortunately, choice among 
gambles has little resemblance to purchase decisions faced by customers. 
This study conducted two experiments: one in the gambling setting and 
the other in an industrial buying setting. The use of two settings 
facilitates comparison of the findings with past research. In addition, 
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the use of two settings allows the investigation of the generalizability 
of the results of the gambling setting to a marketing setting. 
The study investigated the financial risk, which is an important 
dimension of perceived risk in a large number of industrial and consumer 
buying decisions, and as such, is of crucial importance to the marketers. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview 
This chapter seeks to review the literature found in various 
disciplines on the construct of perceived risk. Since marketers 
identified perceived risk as an important construct for study, 
researchers have used various conceptualizations to describe and model 
its multiple facets (Bauer 1960; Bettman 1973; Cunningham 1966; Jacoby 
and Kaplan 1972; Taylor 1974). However, despite the general consensus 
about the nature of the construct, no universally accepted definition of 
perceived risk exists in the marketing field. Moreover, the construct 
has not been given its due role and importance in the comprehensive 
theories of consumer behavior (Bettman 1979; Engel and Blackwell 1982; 
Howard 1977; Howard and Sheth 1969; Nicosia 1966; Sheth 1974). 
Among the various factors affecting the perception of risk by 
individuals in decisions under uncertainty, personality factors 
constitute an important group (Brody and Cunningham 1967; Schaninger 
1976). Various personality factors include constructs such as confidence 
(Howard and Sheth 1969; Zikmund and Scott 1973b) and motivation (Atkinson 
1957; Brown, Gentry, and O'Brien 1977). In addition, various internal 
factors have been found to influence risk perceptions, such as 
experience (Hynes and Vanmarcke 1976) and expertise (Lichtenstein et al. 
1978; Christensen-Szalanski et al. 1983). Personality factors are 
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extremely important in understanding behavior under uncertainty and risk 
at the individual level. However, these factors are not easily 
measurable at the aggregate market level. Therefore, only factors such 
as experience and expertise which can be related to measurable 
demographic variables can be used as predictors of market behavior. The 
rest of the personality factors, which remain individual specific random 
variables, contribute little to the understanding of the market 
behavior. 
Environmental and situational factors also have an important effect 
on the risk perceptions of individuals (Lichtenstein et al. 1978; Slovic 
and Lichtenstein 1980; Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974). At the 
individual level these factors give valuable insight into a person's 
choice behavior under risk. More importantly, these factors 
simultaneously affect large segments of the population. Therefore, 
can be used as predictors of group and mass behavior. For example, a 
person who has experienced an earthquake will be more willing to buy 
home insurance against such a calamity than a person who has never 
experienced it. Further, such calamities normally affect the whole 
population in a geogrephical area. Thus, all people from an earthquake 
prone area are likely to have a more positive attitude toward earthquake 
insurance than people from areas where earthquakes are rare. 
Perceived risk affects consumers throughout the decision process. 
At the prepurchase stage, perceived risk causes the consumers to engage 
in several risk handling strategies such as: (a) reducing the perceived 
risk (Copley and Collom 1971; Hawkins and Lanzetta 1965; Sheth and 
Venkatesan 1968) and (b) increasing or decreasing the acceptable level 
of risk (Popielarz 1967; Reingen 1974; Woodside 1972, 1974). At the 
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purchase decision stage, consumers choose that alternative which has 
minimal perceived risk (Barach 1969; Bearden and Shimp 1982; Schiffman 
1972). 
Perceived risk is a dynamic construct. The levels of perceived 
risk and acceptable risk change constantly during the decision process. 
Consequently, they exert varying amounts of influence on the behavior. 
However, most studies measure the risk perceptions only at one point in 
time and then investigate its relationship with the behavior. 
Therefore, these studies do not reveal the total dynamic role played by 
perceived risk in consumer behavior. 
One basic question relates to how risk perceptions are formed in 
the first place. In the first step, people comprehend and perceive the 
basic components of risk--the uncertainty and the values of the 
outcomes. These inputs are then processed and combined into perceived 
risk as the overall evaluation of the undesirable aspects of an 
alternative. Several information integration models have been proposed 
by researchers to explain how people combine these inputs to form risk 
perceptions. These can be grouped into two categories: models based on 
expectancy theories (Coombs, Bezembinder, and Goode 1967; Edwards 1955; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947) and those 
based on other choice heuristics (Anderson 1974a, 1974b, 1974c; Bruner 
and Tajfel 1961; Coombs 1975; Edwards 1953, 1954a, 1954b; Popielarz 
1967; Schiffman 1972; Slavic 1967; Slavic and Lichtenstein 1968a, 
1968b). 
The expectancy approach evaluates an alternative with uncertain 
outcomes by computing its expectancy--a generic term used to refer to 
such constructs as expected value, expected utility, subjective expected 
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value, subjective expected utility, and the value of a prospect. 
Expectancy is computed by multiplying the outcomes by their respective 
uncertainties and adding over all possible outcomes. Thus, all 
expectancy theories use multiplicative models based on the two basic 
risk components. The choice heuristics models use adding, averaging and 
other alge~raic models to explain the integration of basic risk 
components into perceived risk. The existence of multiple models shows 
the inadequacy of using either approach by itself to explain actual 
choice behavior. 
Despite the existence of the two distinct approaches of expectancy 
theories and other choice heuristics, no research so far has 
investigated the question of when and why the expectancy models should 
be satisfactory in describing consumer risk perceptions and under what 
circumstances they would fail. This question of the suitability of the 
expectancy approach in explaining consumer risk perceptions in a variety 
of real life situations forms the core of the dissertation. 
The chapter is organized into several sections. The first section 
discusses the discovery of perceived risk in marketing, its various 
conceptualizations, and the manner in which the construct has been 
integrated into the comprehensive models of consumer behavior. The 
section concludes by presenting a definition of perceived risk which 
will be used consistently in this dissertation. The second section 
discusses the the various factors which affect the level of risk 
perceived by people in different choice situations. These factors 
include personality, environmental, and situational factors. 
The third section discusses the dynamics of perceived risk and its 
effect on prepurchase and purchase behavior. The fourth section covers 
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the more basic question of how risk perceptions are formed in the first 
place. Several theoretical models are discussed and grouped into those 
based on the expectancy principles and those based on other 
conceptualizations. Further, the basic assumptions implicit in the 
expectancy logic are discussed with a view to identify situations in 
which the expectancy logic can be hypothesized to succeed and those in 
which it should fail to describe behavior. 
Using the first four sections as its foundation, the fifth and last 
section develops specific hypotheses which will be tested in this 
dissertation. 
Discovery and Conceptualization of Perceived 
Risk in Marketing 
This section reviews the literature on the discovery and 
conceptualization of perceived risk in the marketing field. The first 
subsection discusses how perceived risk has been conceptualized by 
various researchers in marketing. The second subsection presents how 
the construct of perceived risk was incorporated into the major consumer 
behavior theories. The third subsection presents literature that 
discovered another important construct of "willingness to take risk". 
The fourth subsection identifies the various definitions of the 
construct and the research from which these definitions emerged. The 
subsection then discusses several problems that have led to the absence 
of a universally understood and accepted definition of perceived risk in 
marketing. The section concludes by presenting a definition of the 
construct of perceived risk which will be used consistently in this 
dissertation. 
22 
Conceptualization of Perceived Risk in Marketing 
Even though mathematicians and psychologists had realized the 
importance of perceived risk in human behavior much earlier, Bauer 
(1960) was the first marketer to formally propose the conceptualization 
of consumer behavior as risk taking. Bauer also recognized the 
multi-dimensional nature of this construct, by identifying the two 
dimensions of risk: performance risk and psychological risk. Cunningham 
(1967) identified the two basic components of risk: the uncertainty of 
product performance and the seriousness of consequences, as the cause 
and the primary determinants of perceived risk. 
Jacoby and Kaplan (1972) took these developments a step further and 
identified five independent dimensions of perceived risk: financial, 
performance, physical, psychological or self-related, and social risk. 
They suggested that the risk perceived on these dimensions combines to 
form an overall perceived risk. Further, they measured each of these 
dimensions in terms of the two basic components: uncertainty and 
consequences. They replicated this study and validated its findings 
(Kaplan, Szybillo, and Jacoby 1974). Subsequently, Peter and Ryan 
(1976) added a sixth dimension of time risk to this conceptualization. 
Zikmund and Scott (1973a) provided empirical evidence of the 
~~ 
multidimensional nature perceived risk through the factor analysis of 
risk related variables. They identified performance risk, social risk, 
financial risk, and opportunity loss as the important factors affecting 
overall perception of risk by consumers. They also found that the 
relative importance of the factors changes for different types of 
products. The above literature collectively defines the construct of 
perceived risk as it is understood in marketing today. 
Perceived Risk and the Theories of 
Consumer Behavior 
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Realizing the importance of perceived risk in consumer behavior, a 
few researchers have suggested perceived risk as the central theory of 
consumer behavior (Bettman 1973; Taylor 1974; Woodside and Delozier 
1976). The comprehensive models conceptualizing consumer behavior as 
risk taking represent the dynamic effect of perceived risk as the major 
force directing and influencing the consumer decision process. 
Bettman (1973) defined the two separate constructs of inherent risk 
and handled risk to describe and investigate how consumer actions reduce 
the risk involved in a decision. Taylor (1974) made one of the early 
efforts to develop a comprehensive theory of consumer behavior under 
risk. He conceptualized risk at three levels. The "uncertainty/ 
perceived risk" represented the risk involved in a choice task 
independent of the person concerned. "Anxiety" represented the risk as 
perceived by an individual depending upon the person's general and 
specific self-esteem. Anxiety motivated the person to adopt several 
risk reduction strategies to bring it down to the "handled level of 
risk," when the final choice is made. 
Woodside and DeLozier (1976) proposed another comprehensive model 
depicting the role of perceived risk in word-of-mouth advertising. The 
model suggested that perceived risk acts as a major motivating force 
behind several risk reduction strategies adopted by consumers in the 
prepurchase stage. Further, it suggested that the consumer will not 
make a purchase decision as long as the decision is perceived as a risky 
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one. Though limited to just one aspect of consumer choice behavior, 
this model represents an important theoretical contribution to the field 
by recognizing the crucial role of perceived risk in influencing buyer 
behavior. 
Despite the realization that perceived risk has an important 
influence on consumer behavior, the construct has not been incorporated 
explicitly into the comprehensive models of consumer behavior. Some 
models have treated perceived risk as just one of the several 
determinants of behavior. For example, Sheth (1974) used perceived risk 
as a determinant of joint versus autonomous decision making in his 
theory of family decision process. In their models of consumer 
behavior, Howard and Sheth (1969) and Howard (1977) did not use 
perceived risk as an explicit construct. However, they used the 
construct of stimulus or information ambiguity, which can be viewed as 
covering one of the many sources of perceived risk. Other models of 
consumer behavior (Bettman 1979; Engel and Blackwell 1982; Nicosia 1966) 
have not employed any construct representing perceived risk. 
The Construct of Acceptable Risk 
While the above efforts led to the understanding and incorporation 
of the perceived risk construct in consumer behavior, other researchers 
identified another important and closely related construct--the 
acceptable risk. Popielarz (1967) investigated the relationship between 
perceived risk and acceptable risk at the individual level, and 
concluded that a major part of the acceptable risk is determined by the 
personality of the individual. Reingen (1974), Robertson (1968), and 
Woodside (1972, 1974) studied the effects of group interactions on 
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people's acceptable level of risk in purchase decisions. They concluded 
that group interactions can cause a shift in the acceptable risk. 
The preceding discussion suggests that people engage in activities 
aimed at perceived risk reduction and acceptable risk enhancement as the 
means of handling the risk involved in purchase decisions. Since 
consumer behavior may well be directed by the difference between the 
perceived and the acceptable risk levels, changes in the levels of both 
these constructs are important in understanding the consumer decision 
process over time. However, much remains to be done in exploring the 
interrelationships between these two types of prepurchase activities. 
Definitions of Perceived Risk in Marketing 
While a general consensus exists among marketers that risk 
influences buyer behavior, the term perceived risk is still not a 
clearly defined and universally understood construct. Some researchers 
have equated perceived risk with uncertainty (Peter and Ryan 1976, 
p.185), while others have equated it with uncertainties and the 
consequences (Cunningham 1967). Taylor (1974) used two different 
definitions of risk in the same article. At one point he stated, "Since 
the outcome of a choice can only be known in the future, the consumer is 
forced to deal with uncertainty or risk" (p.54) " ••• risk and uncertainty 
will be used as equivalent concepts" (p.56). However, at another point 
he stated, "The specific mechanism •••• is the ability to perceive the 
possibility of loss or the risk in a choice situation" (p.59). 
Commenting on this state of affairs, Kaplan, Szybillo, and Jacoby 
(1974) stated that, despite its use by many researchers, the construct 
of perceived risk has not been given a standard definition. Similarly, 
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Bettman (1975, p.354) commented, "At present perceived risk is an ill-
defined concept with ad hoc underlying component conceptualizations and 
assumptions. Future consumer research using risk seems fruitless unless 
some of the major conceptual problems raised are dealt with." 
Proposed Definition of Perceived Risk 
In a typical purchase situation, the consumer faces several 
alternatives from which to choose. Each alternative, if chosen, may 
result in several possible outcomes. The consumer may feel that the 
actual outcome will not be as good as expected, or feel that it will be 
bad in an absolute sense. In either case the concern is that the 
outcome may be less than desirable. 
1 
Perceived risk is proposed as 
originating from the consumer's concern for the uncertainty about the 
outcomes of his or her purchase decisions. The consumer makes an '~ !~' 
assessment of how undesirable each possible outcome is and what is the / 
I 
likelihood of its occurrence. Then the consumer combines this 
information to form an overall judgment about the risk involved in 
choosing that alternative. A definition which incorporates these ideas\ 
I 
I is: perceived risk is the overall concern felt by the consumer about t~~ 
undesirable aspects of all possible outcomes that may result from -/ 
choosing a specific alternative in a purchase situation. 
Effect of Personality, Environmental, and 
Situational Factors on Perceived Risk 
Effect of Personality Factors on Perceived Risk 
Personality is an important determinant of the extent of risk 
perceived by an individual in a decision situation. This section reviews 
the literature investigating the relationship between the different 
personality variables and perceived risk. 
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Among the early efforts, Brody and Cunningham (1967) defined four 
classes of variables which influence risk perceptions: personal system, 
social system, exogenous and risk reducing variables. Using consumer 
panel data, they found that the relative importance of these variables 
depends upon perceived performance risk, social risk, and specific 
self-confidence. They further showed that the personality variable of 
self-confidence is useful in explaining brand choice in situations 
involving high performance risk and high self-confidence. 
In another comprehensive effort, Schaninger (1976) investigated the 
relationship of state anxiety, trait anxiety, manifest anxiety, 
self-esteem, rigidity, and risk taking as personality variables, with 
confidence, danger, and perceived risk as the risk measures. The 
research indicated that perceived risk is positively related to anxiety 
and negatively related to confidence, self-esteem, and risk taking. 
Several research studies have investigated the relationship of 
confidence with perceived risk. Many of these studies use confidence as 
an inverse construct of (and a substitute variable for) the uncertainty 
component of perceived risk. Howard and Sheth (1969) suggested that 
confidence plays a central role in buyer behavior. They proposed that 
confidence is negatively related to arousal and overt search for 
information, and positively related to behavioral intention. Zikmund 
and Scott (1973b) found a negative relationship between confidence and 
perceived risk. 
Bennett and Harrell (1975) and Pras and Summers (1978) compared 
Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) behavioral intention model with the concept 
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of perceived risk. They argued that the belief component of the model 
corresponds to the outcome or consequences component of perceived risk. 
However, the model includes nothing corresponding to the uncertainty 
component of risk. By introducing confidence as a multiplier of the 
belief, they showed that the construct of perceived risk can be fully 
integrated with the behavioral intention model. They also showed that 
such integration enhances the predictive power of the model. Day (1970) 
suggested that confidence is a function of the ambiguity regarding the 
attitude object and the certainty of judgment. 
Among other studies exploring the relationship between perceived 
risk and individual specific characteristics, Atkinson (1957) studied 
motivation as a determinant of risk taking behavior and showed that 
willingness to take risk increases with motivation. Brown, Gentry, and 
O'Brien (1977) showed that achievement need and perceived risk are 
unrelated with each other; however, both affect the choice of risk 
handling strategies. Christensen-Szalanski et al. (1983) compared the 
judgments of students and physicians as to the risk associated with 
different diseases. They found that they both used the same thought 
process and both were equally influenced by external information 
sources. However, the expertise of the physicians resulted in more 
accurate judgments of risk. These findings were consistent with those 
by Lichte!J.§_k~iJl ___ et al. (1978J~iD their research on the judgments of the 
_.....------ - -... _ --~"··~~~~~---·~·-·· ~·---
frequency of lethal events. Fischhoff (1977), Fischhoff, Slovic, and 
Lichtenstein (1978) and Hynes and Vanmarcke (1976) showed that 
~-~--·-·~·----"~----·---.--"~- ------··· ~-~ ~--
experience increases the person's familiarity with certain types of 
risk and makes it possible for the person to understand and imagine the 
undesirable effects of such risk. This results in higher levels of 
perceived risk as compared to a person who has no understanding of a 
certain type of risk. 
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The preceding discussion shows that several personality variables 
and individual specific characteristics play an important role in the 
formation of risk perceptions at the individual level. However, 
personality variables are individual specific, and hence difficult to 
measure and predict for groups of individuals, i.e., at the aggregate 
market level. This difficulty can be overcome if a specific personality 
variable can be related to other demographic variables which are easy to 
measure and on which information is available at the aggregate level. 
Of the several personality variables discussed above, experience and 
expertise can be easily related to age, profession, education and such 
demographic variables. Therefore, these variables can be used to 
predict market behavior. On the other hand, individual specific 
characteristics like motivation and confidence can not be related to 
demographic variables. Therefore, these variables can not be used 
easily to predict behavior at the aggregate market level. 
Environmental and Situational Determinants 
of Perceived Risk 
Environmental and situational determinants of risk have attracted 
considerable attention due to their immediate relevance to the macro 
level market behavior. Environmental factors are those which influence 
the risk perceptions of large segments of population exposed to it in a 
similar manner. Therefore, these factors have a similar influence on 
all risky decisions of a certain type. Situational factors are those 
which vary from situation to situation and affect the perception of risk 
v 
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differently in each case. This section reviews the literature related 
to the environmental and situational factors affecting the risk 
perceptions. 
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1980) studied various environmental and 
situational determinants of the perceived risk in undesirable events 
affecting large sections of the population. These events included 
several natural calamities such as disease, floods, and earthquakes. 
They identified five classes of variables as playing a major role in 
determining the overall perception of risk: (a) frequency of occurrence, 
(b) perceived frequency, (c) potential for disaster, (d) judged 
seriousness of consequences, and (e) several qualitative 
characteristics. In the last category, they studied 18 qualitative 
characteristics and grouped them into three factors. The factor "dread" 
includes variables such as lack of control, involuntariness, severity of 
consequences, etc. The factor "familiarity" includes variables 
affecting availability or imaginability of risk. The third factor 
consisted of a single variable: the number of people exposed to the 
risk. These findings were supported by the research by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973, 1974) and Lichtenstein et al. (1978) on the 
"availability" of undesirable events. 
Among studies relating various situational variables to perceived 
risk, Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1979) and Starr (1969) found 
that voluntary risks are more acceptable to people than involuntary 
risks. Spence, Engel and Blackwell (1970) studied the effect of the 
method of purchase on perceived risk. They found that higher risk is 
perceived in mail order shopping as compared to retail store shopping. 
Most other empirical studies have used specific situational settings as 
31 
a control variable. Their findings therefore can be generalized only to 
similar situations. 
The uniqueness of the environmental and the situational factors 
lies in the fact that they affect large segments of population in a 
similar manner. Therefore, they are of special interest to marketers as 
predictors of aggregate level market behavior. 
Effect of Perceived Risk on Prepurchase 
Activities and Purchase Behavior 
Effect of Perceived Risk on Prepurchase Activities 
When faced with a decision involving uncertainty and risk, 
individuals engage in several activities directed at reducing the 
perceived risk or increasing the acceptable level of risk. This section 
reviews research done on the effect of perceived risk on such 
prepurchase activities. 
One common.reaction of individuals to the undesirable aspects of 
risk is to try to reduce the perceived risk. Brown and Gentry (1975), 
Cooper (1969), Lutz and Reilly (1973), Roselius (1971), and Sheth and 
Venkatesan (1968) studied a variety of risk reduction strategies used by 
consumers across a range of choice situations. Roselius (1971) ranked 
risk reduction strategies by their importance in handling risks due to 
time loss, physical hazard, ego loss, and money loss. He found 
consumers use (a) brand loyalty, (b) reliance on a major brand, (c) 
store image, (d) shopping, and (e) free samples as the most preferred 
risk reduction strategies across all types of risky situations. Deering 
and Jacoby (1972) argued that consumers use both risk reduction and risk 
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enhancement as strategies for handling perceived risk. 
It can be seen that each of these risk reduction strategies are 
closely related to the acquisition of additional information as its 
first step. Several researchers have focused their attention on the 
relationship between perceived risk and information search. Allport and 
Postman (1947) found that people's receptivity to rumors as external 
source of information increases with ambiguity and with the importance 
of the issue. This phenomenon is consistent with the idea that risk 
causes an increased desire for acquiring additional information. 
Berlyne (1960) and Lanzetta and Driscoll (1968) found that the 
information search was primarily a function of uncertainty and to a 
lesser extent a function of the outcomes. Hawkins and Lanzetta (1965), 
Miller, Galander, and Pribram (1960), and Newcomb, Turner and Converse 
(1965), on the other hand, found that the information search is a 
function of both the uncertainty and the consequences. This was 
supported by Copley and Collom's (1971) study of industrial purchase 
behavior. These studies thus provide important empirical evidence about 
the role of information search as a major prepurchase activity directed 
at reducing perceived risk. At the same time, the studies show that the 
findings about the causal relationship between the risk components and 
information search as a risk reduction activity are conflicting and 
hence, inconclusive. 
Another important prepurchase process in handling risk involves 
attempts to influence the acceptable level of risk. Only a few studies 
have recognized the "acceptable risk level " as an independent 
construct. As mentioned earlier, Popielarz (1967) investigated the 
relationship between perceived and acceptable levels of risk. Reingen 
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(1974) and Woodside (1972, 1974) studied the effect of group 
interactions in changing the willingness to take risk. They found that 
the level of risk has a negative effect on the willingness to take risk, 
whereas the group interactions have a positive effect on the willingness 
to take risk. Thus, in high risk situations, the willingness to take 
risk decreases after group interactions resulting in a conservative 
shift. On the other hand, in low risk situations, the willingness to 
take risk increases after the group interactions resulting in a risky 
shift. These findings may indicate the direction in which perceived risk 
would change with time at the aggregate market level as more information 
is transmitted and discussed among potential consumers. 
The preceding discussion shows that the constructs of perceived 
risk and acceptable risk have been investigated in independent studies. 
However, no study has explored their interrelationship. It can be 
argued that if the perceived risk is higher than the acceptable risk, a 
consumer will engage in various strategies to narrow the gap between the 
two. Such strategies could be directed at reducing the perceived risk 
level or increasing the ~~eptable risk level. Such efforts will 
continue until the perceived risk is lower than or equal to the 
acceptable risk level. Once this is achieved there will be no further 
motivation to engage in risk handling strategies, and the consumer will 
proceed to make the final choice. Thus, it can be argued that consumer 
behavior is influenced more by the difference between the perceived and 
acceptable levels of risk, than by perceived risk alone. 
Effect of Perceived Risk on Purchase Behavior 
Perceived risk reflects the consumers' concern about the 
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undesirable outcomes of their purchase decisions. As a consequence, 
consumers tend to choose the alternative which has minimal perceived 
risk. This outcome has been found by numerous researchers (Barach 1969; 
Bearden and Shimp 1982; Cox and Rich 1964; Hisrich, Dornoff, and Kernan 
1972; Perry and Hamm 1969; Perry and Perry 1976; Prasad 1975; Schiffman 
1972; Spence, Engel, and Blackwell 1970; Woodside and DeLozier 1976). 
These studies have used settings covering a wide variety of consumer 
purchase situations. Their findings confirm the fact that consumers 
consistently choose products which have minimal perceived risk. 
As discussed earlier, most of the theoretical models of perceived 
risk (Sheth 1974; Taylor 1974; Woodside and DeLozier 1976) reflect the 
realization that perceived risk is a dynamic construct that changes in 
its intensity and influence throughout the decision process. Despite 
this, almost all empirical research on the effect of perceived risk on 
purchase decisions cited above takes a snap-shot view of perceived risk 
and treats it as a static construct. Among the exceptions is the 
experimental research by Sheth and Venkatesan (1968). However, this 
study concentrated primarily on the dynamics of prepurchase activities 
in risky decisions. Therefore, it did not take any dynamic measurements 
of perceived risk during the experiment. The study concluded that the 
existence of perceived risk is a necessary condition for brand loyalty. 
The preceding discussion shows that substantial empirical evidence 
is available to conclude that perceived risk acts as a major determinant 
of the choice in consumer decisions. However, it is also clear that the 
dynamic nature of perceived risk throughout the decision process has 
still not been thoroughly investigated. Further, research is also 
lacking on the combined effect of perceived and acceptable levels of 
risk in consumer choice behavior. 
Formation of Risk Perceptions 
Introduction 
Most of the discussion to this point has concerned the various 
factors which affect and change the level of risk perceived by a 
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specific individual in a specific situation. Such risk perceptions in 
turn influence a consumer's prepurchase and purchase activities. 
However, a more basic question still to be addressed concerns how the 
risk perceptions are formed in the first place. This section will review 
the concepts developed and the research done by marketers on the 
formation of risk perceptions. 
This section is organized in several subsections. The first 
subsection reviews expectancy approach and shows that its various 
applications are all based on the same basic concept of "expectancy". 
The second subsection reviews several alternative theories and models 
proposed, which reveal the inadequacies of the expectancy models and 
suggest ways to overcome them. The third subsection shows the close 
relationship between utility and perceived risk, either of which can be 
conceptualized as a mediator between uncertainty and consumer behavior. 
The fourth subsection discusses the intuitive justification behind the 
use of expectancy approach as the evaluative criterion by buyers and 
presents a possible explanation of when and why the expectancy theories 
can be hypothesized to fail to predict buyer behavior. The fifth 
subsection defines the construct of repeated applications of a decision 
which can be used to identify situations where the expectancy logic will 
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apply and those where it will fail to describe buyer behavior. The 
sixth and last subsection states the specific hypotheses which will be 
tested in this dissertation. 
Development of Expectancy Theories 
In the area of perceived risk, expectancy theories have provided 
the basic foundation for most of the normative and positive models of 
behavior. One of the earliest conceptualizations of human choice 
behavior under uncertainty and risk was the classical normative theory 
of expected value (EV), based primarily on probability theory (Edwards 
1955). In a decision situation involving several alternatives to choose 
from, the expected value of an alternative is defined by the following 
equation: 
EV = Lx (px * vx> 
Where Px is the probability of the x'th outcome, Yx is the dollar 
value of the x'th outcome, and Lx Px equals 1. 
Because a decision maker would on average experience a resultant 
effect equal to the expected value, the normative theory asserted that 
an individual should choose the alternative with the highest EV (Borch 
1972). Despite its strength as a normative theory, maximizing the 
expected value was never taken seriously as a descriptive theory of 
decision making under risk (Coombs, Bezembinder, and Goode 1967). 
Bernoulli (1738) was probably the first theoretician to question 
both the normative and the descriptive correctness of EV theory. He 
introduced the concept of nonlinear utility for money through his 
discussion of the St. Petersberg paradox (Bernoulli 1738; Chernoff and 
Moses 1959) and suggested that people have diminishing marginal utility 
for money. As such, he suggested that individuals should choose the 
alternative with the highest expected utility (EU) rather than the 
highest expected value (EV). The expected utility was defined by the 
following equation: 
EU = ~x (Px * Ux) 
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Where Ux is the utility or subjective worth of the value Yx of the 
x'th outcome. 
Thus, this theory substituted the subjective worth or utility for 
the objective value of the outcome. However, it was only after its 
reformulation by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) that the theory was 
used as a descriptive theory about how people actually behave in 
decision situations involving uncertainty and risk. As a positive 
theory, EU theory has received substantial attention from researchers. 
The EU theory is also referred to as the EU hypothesis or the Bernoulli 
principle (Barch 1972, p.30). 
Just as EU theory substituted the objective value of the outcome 
with subjective utility, Preston and Baratta (1948) replaced the 
objective probability with its perceived value-- the subjective 
probability. They defined the subjective expected value (SEV) of an 
alternative by the following equation: 
SEV = Ex (SPx * Yx) 
Where SPx is the subjective probability. 
This was the formulation of the SEV theory. SEV theory was able to 
explain the findings of several experiments conducted by Edwards (1953, 
1954a) concerning probability preferences of individuals. Despite this, 
the SEV theory never really attracted much attention of researchers. 
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As a logical extension of these developments, Edwards (1955) 
proposed the subjectively expected utility (SEU) theory. In this 
comprehensive model he replaced both the objective value and the 
objective probability terms with their subjective values. Thus, the SEU 
was defined by the following equation: 
SEU = ~x (SPx * Ux) 
Where SPx is subjective value of Px and Ux is the utility of Vx• 
Edwards (1955) proposed SEU as a predictive theory rather than as a 
normative theory. This model was similar to the one proposed by Coombs 
and Beardslee (1954). The main difference was that the Coombs and 
Beardslee model assumed SP and U to be measured on a ratio scale, 
whereas the Edward's SEU model assumed them to be measured on an 
interval scale. Since its inception, the SEU theory, which is clearly 
the most general formulation based on the principle of expectancy, has 
dominated as the theory describing human choice behavior under 
uncertainty and risk. 
All the above theories of human choice behavior under uncertainty 
originated as normative theories to prescribe how rational human beings 
should behave. However, the theories were subsequently proposed as 
descriptive theories applicable to most individuals in a majority of 
normal decision situations (Thaler 1980). Peterson and Beach (1967) 
suggested in their work on intuitive statistics that any normative 
theory provides a good approximation for the psychological theory of 
inference. Such an approach was supported more strongly by Barclay, 
Beach and Braithwaite (1971), who stated that one should begin with a 
normative model and adjust its form or parameters to develop a 
descriptive model. Today, expectancy theories really play the dual role 
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of normative as well as descriptive theories. 
The close relationship between all four expectancy theories was 
shown explicitly by Coombs, Bezembinder, and Goode (1967), who argued 
that the distinction among the expectancy theories resulted from the 
difference in the assumption of whether the utility for money is a 
linear or nonlinear function of objective value, and whether the 
subjective probability is a linear or nonlinear function of objective 
probability. Thus, a theory assuming linear utility and linear 
subjective probability will coincide with the EV theory. Similarly the 
other three theories can be conceptualized as presented in TABLE II 
below. 
Research on the SEU theory has faced two major problems: the 
measurement of utility and the measurement of subjective probability 
(Edwards 1961). Most of the experiments presented the subjects with 
simulated or real gambles involving outcomes in terms of monetary gains 
or losses with specified probabilities, and measured their response as 
preference, indifference, or actual choice. Observation of human 
behavior in certain situations like the purchase of insurance indicated 
preference for risk aversion and a concave utility function (Borch 
1972). At the same time the unabated sale of lottery tickets indicated 
preference for risk taking and a convex utility function. The 
contradictory experimental evidence led Rapoport and Wallsten (1972) to 
conclude that the SEU theory can be accepted with one set of bets and 
rejected with another differently constructed set. However, Goodman et 
al. (1976) asserted that the SEU model gives a good global fit to choice 
data and particularly for simple gambles. 
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TABLE II 
INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG THE EXPECTANCY THEORIES 
"U" AS A FUNCTION OF "V" 
LINEAR NONLINEAR 
"SP" AS A FUNCTION 
OF "P" 
LINEAR EV EU 
NONLINEAR SEV SEU 
The use of the expectancy logic also can be found in prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1981). In 
proposing this theory they identified two additional findings which 
violate SEU theory - the certainty effect and the reference effect. The 
certainty effect reflected people's general preference for a certain 
outcome over an uncertain one. The reference effect referred to the use 
of status quo, adaptation level or expectation as the alternative 
reference points by individuals to assess the actual outcomes of an 
alternative as either gains or losses. They proposed that in a given 
decision situation, an individual will select one of these as the 
reference point, depending upon the way the information is presented to 
him. Using the reference, he would then perceive various outcomes as 
either gains (better than the reference point) or losses (worse than the 
reference point). The worth of an outcome will be judged, not by the 
utility of the objective value, but by the worth of the difference 
between the objective value and the chosen reference. For the sake of 
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convenience, this will be referred to as the relative utility (RU) of 
the outcome. 
They further suggested that the RU curve will be "S" shaped, convex 
in the loss zone and concave in the gains zone, with the point of 
inflection being the chosen reference point. The RU as a function of the 
difference between V and the reference point v0 is presented in Figure 1 
below. 
• Ref= • 
~vo~~--------
v 
Figure 1. Relative Utility as a Function of Value and the 
Reference Point 
In place of the subjective probability, Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 
1979) defined a term Decision Weight (WP), which is a monotonic function 
of P but is not a probability function. They suggested that very small 
probabilities will be overweighted (WP > P) and moderate and high 
probabilities will be underweighted (WP < P). WP as a function of Pis 
presented in Figure 2 below. 
WP 
, 
, 
p 
Figure 2. Decision Weight as a Function of Probability 
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Using the concept of decision weights (WP) in conjunction with the 
concept of relative utility (RU), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed 
their Prospect Theory as an alternative to the EU theory. The theory 
defines the value of the prospect, which will be referred to as 
subjectively weighted relative utility (SWRU), by the following 
equation: 
Where WPx is the decision weight and RUx the relative utility of 
the 'th outcome. X 
The major generalizations of the prospect theory are given below. 
A. Individuals treat gains differently from losses. They exhibit 
risk aversion in gain situations and risk preference in loss situations. 
B. Individuals exhibit preference for certainty over uncertainty by 
overweighting the probabilities of losses close to 0 or probabilities of 
gains close to 1. 
C. Whether the outcomes of a decision are perceived as gains or 
losses depends upon how the problem is presented. Further, such 
perceptions affect people's choices even though the final asset position 
is the same. 
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In summary, expectancy theories which have dominated the study of 
perceived risk are closely related. They all assume that risk 
originates from two basic components: P and V. They further assume that 
individuals form perceptions about these components as defined by SP and 
U. Expectancy theories suggest that the expectancy--computed by 
multiplying the uncertainties by the respective outcomes and adding over 
all possible outcomes--will be used by individuals as the evaluative 
criterion to choose among alternatives. 
Alternative Models of Decision Under Risk 
In practice expectancy theories have met with mixed success 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Certain types of consumer behavior such as 
the purchase of new products and brands, store-choice decisions and 
other decisions which are applied repeatedly, have been explained and 
predicted by expectancy theories (Anderson and Shanteau 1970; Bettman, 
Capon, and Lutz 1975a; Jacoby and Kaplan 1972). However, decisions such 
as the purchase of life and property insurance, lottery tickets, assets 
like house and car involve very high values of positive or negative J 
outcomes. In these cases, the expectancy theories often fail to explain~· v' 
I 
the risk perceptions and the behavior (Lanzetta and Driscoll 1968). J 
Several alternative reasons have been suggested to explain why the 
expectancy concept fails to capture all aspects of the consumer decision 
process. Empirical research has shown that individuals exhibit distinct 
preferences for certain types of outcomes and uncertainties over others. 
The following paragraphs will review these research findings. 
Individual Preferences for Broad versus 
Narrow Range of Outcomes 
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Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1956) were among the early researchers 
to discover that individuals consistently prefer either a broad or 
narrow range of outcomes on uncertain decision situations. The broad 
categorizers choose alternatives with a broad range of outcomes in the 
hope of maximizing desirable or positive consequences. In doing so, they 
risk the increased probability of negative outcomes. The narrow 
categorizers, on the other hand, choose alternatives with a narrow range 
of outcomes with the objective of minimizing the undesirable or negative 
consequences. In doing so, they risk the possibility of missing some 
excellent opportunities. Pettigrew (1958) developed a scale to classify 
individuals on the basis of their preference for broad versus narrow 
cognitive categories. Subsequently, several researchers have shown that 
the cognitive category width in fact reflects the choices of individuals 
in the real world (Bruner and Tajfel 1961; Popielarz 1967; Schiffman 
1972). 
Individual Preferences and Tolerances for Different 
Levels and Distributions of Uncertainty 
Edwards (1953, 1954a, 1954b) was one of the early researchers to 
show that individuals exhibit consistency in their preference/tolerance 
for high versus low levels of uncertainty or probability. Allais 
(1953), Edwards (1954c), Fisher (1906), and Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1968b) showed that individuals exhibit consistency in their preference/ 
tolerance for low versus high variance of the possible outcomes of an 
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alternative. They further showed that perceived risk increases with the 
variance of the outcomes. 
Several researchers used desire for certainty as an inverse 
construct of the tolerance for uncertainty. Brim and Hoff (1957) showed 
that the desire for certainty was inversely related to the level of 
• 
satisfaction. Kates (1962), Svenson (1979), and Weinstein (1979) found 
that individuals reflected their desire for certainty by being 
unrealistically optimistic and by denying the very existence of risk in 
decisions under uncertainty. 
With a view to overcome the inadequacies of the expectancy models 
in handling such preferences of individuals, several other theories have 
been proposed as substitutes. Coombs (1975), Coombs and Bowen (1971), 
Coombs and Huang (1970a, 1970b, 1974), and Coombs and Meyer (1969) have 
proposed portfolio theory, which suggests that the choices are made as a 
compromise between EV and optimization of risk in accordance with its 
preferred levels. Loomes and Sugden (1982) modified the concept of 
utility to incorporate choiceless utility as one part and choice related 
regret/rejoicing as the other. Their regret theory then proposed that 
individuals will try to maximize the expected value of the choiceless 
utility, modified by the rejoicing or the regret that may result by not 
choosing an optimal alternative. 
Slovic (1967) and Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968a, 1968b) argued 
that gambles or alternatives involving uncertain outcomes are 
multidimensional stimuli. Individuals weight each of these dimensions 
and combine the information to form the overall evaluation of an 
alternative. Thus, in a decision under uncertainty, the probabilities 
and the outcomes are considered as independent dimensions. Depending 
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upon the person's own preferences, different importance is given to the 
probabilities and the outcomes. Some people may choose an alternative 
because the value of one of the outcomes is attractive to them. 
Therefore, they may disregard the probabilities by giving them a very 
low weighting. At the same time, some people may choose the alternative 
primarily on the basis of probabilities and give low importance to the 
values of the outcomes. 
Taking the same problem of how people weight and combine 
information as the focus, Anderson (1974a, 1974b, 1974c) proposed 
information integration theory as a means for studying information 
processing by individuals. The theory uses simple algebraic models to 
describe the use of information in judgment, decision making, and 
various attitudinal and perceptual tasks. Anderson and Shanteau (1970) 
and Shanteau (1975) applied information integration theory to risky 
decision making as an alternative to the EU theory. 
The research on alternative models of behavior under risk discussed 
above indicates that the various expectancy theories are inadequate in 
explaining bahavior in several real life situations. The research also 
identifies several ways to overcome the inadequacies of the expectancy 
theories. These include superimposing expectancy models with individual 
preferences for certain outcomes or uncertainties as well as the use of 
other algebraic models. 
Decision Models Using The Construct of 
Perceived Risk 
Despite the fact that all the theories discussed in the previous 
section dealt with decisions involving uncertainty and risk, none of the 
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theories defined the constructs of risk and perceived risk explicitly. 
It is important to note that the concepts of perceived risk and expected 
utility are functions of the same two risk components that define an 
uncertain situation: the probability and the value of the outcomes. 
Expectancy may be conceptualized as representing the long term 
desirability of an alternative. Conversely, perceived risk may be 
conceptualized as representing the long term undesirability of the 
alternative. Expectancy theories in utility are based on the assumption 
that a typical individual will try to maximize the utility and, hence, 
choose the alternative with the highest assessed utility. Consistent 
with that, the perceived risk concept is based on the assumption that 
typical individual will try to minimize the perceived risk and hence 
choose the alternative with the lowest perceived risk. Several 
researchers in the area of perceived risk (Barach 1969; Bearden and 
Shimp 1982; Cox and Rich 1964; Peter and Ryan 1976; Popielarz 1967; 
Roselius 1971; Schiffman 1972; Sheth and Venkatesan 1968; Spence, Engel, 
and Blackwell 1970) have explored and established that individuals 
prefer and choose the alternative with minimum perceived risk. Perhaps 
because of this interrelationship, most research work has implied that 
expectancy is an indirect measure of perceived risk. However, few 
researchers have specifically investigated the construct of perceived 
risk and its dependence on the probability and the value components. 
These models presented below clearly show that perceived risk can be 
conceptualized in a manner similar to expected utility 
conceptualizations. 
Using a formulation consistent with both EU theory and information 
integration theory, Jacoby and Kaplan (1972) proposed a multiplicative 
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model of perceived risk as represented below: 
Perceived Risk = Subjective Expected Utility of the Undesirable Outcomes 
= -Ly ( UNCERTAINTYy * CONSEQUENCEy) 
Where y refers to a dimension of risk. 
They identified five independent risk dimensions: financial, 
performance, physical, psychological, and social. Thus, considering 
just one financial demension of risk, the model of perceived risk can be 
written as below: 
Perceived Financial Risk = Subjective Expected Utility of Negative 
Financial Outcomes 
= - ~ (SP * U ) X X X 
Where x refers to the x'th outcome of the chosen alternative. 
Berlyne (1960) and Hansen (1972) have explained the theoretical 
reasons for expecting the risk components to multiply. The uncertainty 
and the outcomes together constitute the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for risk to be present and the absence of either one of them 
will eliminate the risk. Therefore, the multiplicative model correctly 
describes the relationship between the risk components and perceived 
risk. Bettman (1975) used a similar model of perceived risk in 
investigating information integration by consumers under risky 
situations. 
As in the case of multiplicative models of expected utility, the 
multiplicative models of perceived risk also have had a mixed success in 
explaining and predicting consumer risk perceptions across all decision 
situations. 
With a view to overcome the inadequacies of the expectancy 
approach, Pollatsek and Tversky (1970) proposed a theory of risk and 
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suggested that perceived risk is a linear function of expected value and 
the variance of the gamble outcomes. Slavic (1967) and Payne (1975), on 
the other hand, used the earlier multidimensional stimulus approach and 
concluded that perceived risk is primarily a function of the probability 
of losing. 
The above discussion brings out the close relationship between the 
constructs of utility and perceived risk. Therefore, it is consistent 
that the multiplicative expectancy models have had mixed success in 
predicting either the utility or the risk perceptions of individuals. 
Several important generalizations can be made from the previous 
discussion. 
A. In decisions under uncertainty, people could be conceptualized 
as evaluating the alternatives by assessing either the utility or the 
perceived risk involved in each alternative. 
B. Utility and the perceived risk are closely related constructs 
which express respectively the desirability and the undesirability of an 
alternative in decisions under uncertainty. 
C. People make choices so as to maximize the expected utility or to 
minimize the perceived risk. 
D. Both the utility and perceived risk of an alternative are 
functions of the various possible outcomes of a decision and their 
probabilities. 
E. The interrelationship between expected utility and perceived 
risk can be expressed as below: 
Perceived Risk Involved in an Alternative 
= - Subjective Expected Utility of the Alternative 
F. The expectancy logic, which involves multiplying the outcome 
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values by their probabilities and adding them over all possible 
outcomes, has been svown to be a very powerful and intuitively appealing 
concept in both utility and perceived risk areas. Despite several known 
exceptions, expectancy theories continue to be the most generally 
accepted normative and descriptive theories of human choice behavior 
under uncertainty and risk. 
G. Several choice situations have been identified in which the 
multiplicative expectancy models fail to describe the perceptions of 
utility as well as risk. This has resulted in a search for appropriate 
alternative models. 
F. The research has so far not thoroughly explored when and why the 
expectancy models fail to describe human choice behavior under 
uncertainty and risk. 
A Possible Explanation of When and Why 
the Expectancy Models Fail 
In order to understand the successful application of expectancy 
theories in some situations and their failure in the others, it is 
necessary to go back to the basic logic and justification behind the use 
of expectancy as a decision criterion by buyers. The intuitive 
justification for using expectancy (say EV) as the choice criterion is 
the law of large numbers (Borch 1972, p.l4). In a large number of 
trials, the probabilities of the various possible outcomes represent the 
relative frequency with which the outcomes will actually occur. Thus, 
if a gamble is played a large number of times, the actual average 
outcome in the long run will equal the expected value of the gamble. 
Therefore, a rational decision maker will base his choice on what will 
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be the actual outcome in the long run, that is, the expected value. In 
effect, the concept of expected value makes an almost exact prediction 
of the actual outcome and, thereby, reduces the decision under 
uncertainty involving several repeated applications of the chosen 
alternative, to a decision under certainty (Borch 1972, p.l4). 
The other expectancy theories: EU, SEV, SEU, and prospect theory 
are based on the same basic principles and are in fact reincarnations of 
the expected value theory. The four theories differ from one another in 
the manner in which they take into account the nonlinear perceptions of 
the decision makers, of the two risk components--probabilities and 
values of the outcomes. Thus, the extent of acceptance and use of the 
expectancy theories by buyers will depend upon whether the chosen 
alternative is to be applied repeatedly a large number of times or not. 
It is surprising that the validity of such a critical assumption has not 
been verified before applying the theories to all types of decisions 
involving uncertainty and risk. 
The preceding discussion suggests that expectancy theories offer a 
rational basis for predicting consumer behavior in situations in which 
the chosen alternative would be applied repeatedly a large number of 
times. Such decisions will be referred to as "policy decisions", in 
which the chosen alternative is applied as a policy on several 
subsequent occasions. Therefore, in policy decisions, buyers will tend 
to use expectancy theories in forming their risk perceptions and 
subsequent behavior. 
In contrast, "single decisions," in which the chosen alternative is 
applied only once, clearly violate the "large number of repeat 
applications" assumption implicit in the use of expectancy theories. In 
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such decisions, the expectancy does not predict what is actually likely 
to happen. Because the expectancy predicts only an average outcome over 
a large number of repeated applications of a decision, it has little 
relevance and practical correspondence in single decisions involving 
just one application tg a decision. Thus, in such single decision cases 
expectancy theories do not have a unique claim as the most appropriate 
models to predict human choice behavior. 
In fact the very awareness that it is a single decision may cause 
the decision maker to use alternative decision models, such as 
minimizing the maximum possible loss, maximizing the minimum likely 
gain, or satisfying a minimum level of need. In situations where such 
concern for specific outcomes does not exist, some individuals may still 
use expectancy logic as a way of evaluating the alternatives. However, 
in many such applications, the expectancy logic loses its basic meaning 
as a predictor of the long term outcome and reduces to just one way of 
summarizing the probabilistic information. Therefore, in single 
decisions, the buyers will tend not to use expectancy theories in 
forming their risk perceptions and expectancy theories can be 
anticipated to fail in making correct predictions of human perceptions 
and behavior. 
The distinction between single and policy decisions can be seen 
vividly through Bernoulli's (1954) St. Petersberg paradox. The 
experiment involved giving people two alternatives from which to choose. 
The first alternative offered one million dollars with certainty. The 
second alternative involved a gamble in which a coin would be tossed. 
If a head turned up, the person would receive two dollars. Instead if 
tail turned up, there would be a second toss. If the head turned up in 
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the second toss, the person would receive "2 raised to the power of 2", 
i.e., four dollars. Thus, if the head turned up for the first time in 
the n'th toss, the person would receive "2 raised to the power of n" 
dollars. The game would continue till the head turns up for the first 
time and the person received the payment. It can be shown that the EV 
of the gamble is infinity. However, despite that, most people chose the 
alternative of getting one million dollars with certainty. 
Bernoulli gave the nonlinear utility for money as the exlanation 
for this phenomenon. While that is one valid explanation, another 
plausible explanation is that the second alternative allowed the 
decision maker to play the gamble only once. Thus, it violated the 
assumption of a large number of repetitions implicit in the use of 
expectancy theory. As such, it was wrong to expect people to base their 
choice on the expected value criterion. Had the people been offered the 
chance to play the gamble a large number of times and then take the 
average payoff, they may have realized that the average can be far 
bigger than one million dollars and therefore, their choice might have 
been different and consistent with the EV theory. 
The Construct of "Repeated Applications of a Decision" 
The above discussion indicates that real world decisions under 
uncertainty can be differentiated on the construct of "repeated 
applications of a decision", that is, the number of times the decision 
with uncertain outcomes is applied repeatedly to identical situations. 
Single decisions will be those where the decision is applied just 
once. Policy decisions will be those where the choice is made only once 
and is applied repeatedly a large number of times to identical 
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situations. 
This classification can be applied to customer purchase situations 
which are of critical interest to marketers (The word "customer" is used 
here in the most general sense to include industrial, organizational, 
institutional, and household consumers.). Below, several examples are 
presented to clarify the single decision- policy decision distinction. 
In the gambling setting, a single decision would be whether to play 
or not to play a gamble involving just one toss of a coin. If a head 
turns up, the player gets $ 1,000 and if a tail turns up, the player 
loses $ 500. Even though the EV of this gamble is a $ 250 gain, a 
person may or may not agree to play it, depending upon whether he can 
bear the loss and upon the utility of the positive outcome to him. 
Thus, the EV criterion is likely to have very little relevance to the 
actual outcome in this case. 
The purchase of a personal computer, a home, a car, and other such 
large investment items are examples of single decisions in household 
buying. The purchase of a plant and machinery, costly equipment, etc. 
are examples of single decisions in industrial buying. 
A policy decision in a gambling setting would be the choice to play 
or not to play a gamble 100 times. Each play would involve a toss of a 
coin with a gain of $ 10 for head and a loss of $ 5 for tail. Once 
again, the EV of the decision is a $ 250 gain. However, due to the 
large number of repeat applications of the decision to toss, one can 
almost be certain to win about $ 250. Thus, a majority of individuals 
may use the EV criterion in this situation to make their decision. 
The purchase of a large number of units of any item is an example 
of a policy decision in a marketing setting. Thus, the purchase of 
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electric bulbs, Venetian blinds, or door handles for a home exemplifies 
household consumer policy decisions. The purchases of furniture, office 
equipment, and stationery are examples of industrial policy decisions. 
A large number of real life decisions, however, do not fall in 
either of these two pure categories and can be called "mixed decisions". 
One important segment of mixed decisions includes those decisions which 
are applied repeatedly over time. Thus, in the gambling setting, the 
100 toss gamble described above, with an option to quit any time during 
the game, would be an example of a mixed decision. Similarly, 
practically most repeat purchase decisions by industries and householes,~otdLS 
--~-::::: 
for items such as raw materials, supplies, and services to be supplied 
in several lots over a period of time, are examples of mixed decisions 
in marketing situations. These decisions offer the buyer the added 
freedom to change the decision during its multiple implementations. 
In these mixed decisions, the decision maker has two options: 
either to make a separate decision for every repeat purchase, or to make 
one policy decision and apply it repeatedly. Brand loyalty, store 
loyalty and other such habitual behavioral patterns are examples of 
consumers voluntarily giving up their freedom to choose independently 
every time in favor of a policy decision. 
Many environmental pressures encourage buyers to reduce mixed 
decisions to policy decisions. Marketers and their intermediaries 
prefer to have a long term relationship with their customers. They 
offer several advantages to brand loyal customers as opposed to one time 
buyers. Marketers also prefer bulk orders to reap the economies of 
scale. Other factors such as the limited availability of time and the 
existence of better alternative ways of spending time also encourage 
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individuals to reduce their decision making load. 
Researchers in the information processing field (Kahneman 1973; 
Lindsay and Norman 1972; Norman and Bobrow 1975; Simon 1969; Slovic 
1972) would ascribe this behavior to the limited information processing 
capacity and expertise which people possess. These limitations require 
them to reduce complex tasks to simple ones--likeJaking one policy 
decision in place of several independent decisions. Thaler (1980) 
explained this behavior through the concepts of psychological price, 
precommitment as a means of self control, and opting not to choose in 
order to minimize regret, guilt, responsibility, and psychic costs. 
Situations in which the mixed decisions cannot be reduced to policy 
decisions, or situations in which consumers choose the first option of 
making a separate decision every time become the cases of single 
decisions. Thus, mixed decisions are rea~ly policy decisions with the 
added freedom to revise and change the decision during its 
implementation period. Therefore, it can be argued that in mixed 
decisions buyers will still tend to use expectancy logic, but to a 
lesser extent as compared to the policy decisions, in forming their risk 
perceptions and final choices. 
The above discussion also suggests that when faced with one single 
decision and one policy decision, both having equal EV, people will 
perceive different amounts of risk in the two situations. In the policy 
decision, the EV will accurately measure the actual average outcome of 
each alternative. Thus, the use of EV will lower the uncertainty felt 
by the decision maker. On the other hand, the single decision will have 
at least one, if not more outcomes, which are inferior to the EV of the 
comparable policy decision. Further, if an undesirable outcome occurs 
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in a single decision case, the decision maker will not have any 
possibility of "getting even" through subsequent repetitions as is 
possible in policy decisions. Such a short term perspective will result 
in a much greater concern in the mind of the decision maker about the 
single decision as compared to the policy decision. Since perceived 
risk measures the undesirability of an alternative, the inferior 
outcomes will make the single decision alternatives less desirable than 
the policy decision alternatives. 
From another perspective, each application of the policy decision 
will have the same number of possible outcomes as the ,comparable single 
decision. The outcomes of the total policy decision will be generated 
from the permutations and combinations of the outcomes of each of its 
repeat applications. Thus, a policy decision will always have a much 
larger number of possible outcomes forming a distribution. Therefore, 
the policy decision will have a much smaller variance of the outcomes as 
compared to the variance of the outcomes in the single decision. Coombs 
c 
and Pruitt (1960), Edwards (1954), Lichtenstein (1965), Slavic and 
Lichtenstein (1968), and VanderMeer (1963) have shown that the 
perceived risk increases with the variance of the outcomes. Therefore, 
it can be expected that people will perceive higher risk in a single 
decision as compared to a policy decision with equal expected value. 
In the case of mixed decisions, the freedom to revise the decision 
will result in the people perceiving lower risk in making the decisions 
as compared to policy decisions. Thus, the people will perceive the 
highest risk in single decisions, moderate risk in policy decisions, and 
the lowest risk in mixed decisions. 
Much of the experimental research done on expectancy theories as 
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descriptive models of human choice has used simulated gambling 
alternatives as the setting. Unfortunately, choice among gambles has 
little resemblance to purchase decisions faced by buyers. The gambling 
settings used in the research do not require the decision maker to make 
a prior investment or commitment of a valuable resource. Further, the 
gambling outcomes involve highly tangible gains as well as losses. 
Customer purchase decisions differ in both areas. First, the 
customer has to commit financial and other resources in purchasing a 
product. Further, in most purchase decisions, the losses are tangible 
in financial terms, whereas the gains are often in terms of intangible 
benefits. This is true in both industrial as well as household 
purchases. For example, in purchasing capital equipment, an industrial 
buyer faces the risk of technological obsolescence. If the equipment in 
fact becomes obsolete shortly after purchase, the loss can be assessed 
in terms of the money invested. However, if it serves its full term and 
purpose, the gain is real but often left intangible. Theoretically the 
financial value of the gain can be determined, but usually such 
assessment is not made. Similarly, when a household customer purchases 
a car and it turns out to be unsuitable or defective, the loss can be 
assessed in financial terms. On the other hand, if it runs 
satisfactorily for ten years, the gain is often assessed only in terms 
of intangible factors such as satisfaction. Therefore, the 
generalizability of the findings of the gambling experiments to buyer 
behavior in marketing situations could be questionable. 
Purchasing situations are more like gambles involving some outcomes 
with tangible losses and and a null or no-profit-no-loss outcome. Even 
such gambles cannot simulate the intangible benefits that are involved 
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in purchase decisions. Even if such gambles are accepted as imperfect 
approximations to purchase situations, researchers (Bettman and Kakkar 
1977; Dawes 1975; Hershey, Kunreuther, and Schoemaker 1982) have shown 
that the information integration is significantly influenced by the 
nature of tasks involved. As such, it can be expected that the perceived 
risk in otherwise identical decisions will be different in the gambling 
setting as compared to the purchasing setting. This view is supported by 
MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1984) who give such differences as the 
justification for using marketing settings to improve the 
generalizability of the findings. 
Among several risk dimensions identified by the researchers (Jacoby 
and Kaplan 1972; Zikmund and Scott 1973a), financial and social risks 
often play a dominant role in influencing buyer behavior. Of these, the 
financial risk plays a more important role, especially in industrial 
buying, which was the setting chosen for the second experiment of this 
study. Moreover, of the two, only the financial dimension can be 
quantified. Such quantification was essential to test the hypotheses 
concerning the expectancy approach. Therefore, the dissertation focused 
on only one dimension of perceived risk-- the financial risk. 
Specific Hypotheses of the Dissertation 
The dissertation tested the above ideas in the form of five 
hypotheses which are presented below: 
HYPOTHESIS Al : 
In purchase situations involving policy decisions (Situation 2 and 
Situation 4 of Table 1), consumers will tend to use a multiplicative 
expectancy model in forming their risk perceptions. Such a model can be 
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represented as: 
Perceived Risk = - Subjectively Expected Utility 
Where SPx is the subjective probability and Ux is the utility of the 
value of the x'th outcome of an alternative. 
HYPOTHESIS A2 : 
In purchase situations involving mixed decisions (Situation 5 of 
Table I), consumers will tend to use a multiplicative expectancy model 
to a lesser extent as compared to the policy decisions, in forming their 
risk perceptions. Such a model can be represented as: 
Perceived Risk = Subjectively Expected Utility 
Where x represents the x'th outcome of an alternative. 
HYPOTHESIS A3 : 
In purchase situations involving single decisions (Situation 1 and 
Situation 3 of Table I), consumers will tend not to use a multiplicative 
expectancy model in forming their risk perceptions and instead will tend 
to use other nonmultiplicative decision heuristics and choice criteria. 
The multiplicative model can be represented as: 
Perceived Risk = - Subjectively Expected Utility 
= - I (SP * u ) X X X 
Where x represents the x'th outcome of the chosen alternative. 
The hypothesis suggests that the above model will not apply to 
single decision situations. 
HYPOTHESIS A4 : 
Consumers will perceive the highest risk in single decisions, 
moderate risk in policy decisions, and the lowest risk in mixed 
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decisions with equal expected values as shown by the following 
• 
I 1" enequa J.ty: 
Perceived Risk > Perceived Risk > Perceived Risk 
(Single Decisions) (Policy Decisions) (Mixed Decisions) 
HYPOTHESIS AS : 
In respect to decisions under uncertainty which are identical in 
all other respects, consumers will perceive a different amount of risk 
in the gambling setting as compared to the risk perceived in the 
industrial purchasing setting. 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
The dissertation tested theory-based hypotheses about the causal 
relationship between the construct of repeated application of a decision 
under uncertainty and its perceived risk. In order to establish such a 
causal relationship, an experimental study was performed in a laboratory 
setting, using homogeneous subjects and strong manipulations of the 
independent variables. 
This research was planned to meet two objectives. One objective 
was to make the findings of this research comparable with earlier 
research work done using gambling settings. This was accomplished by 
operationalizing the variables in a gambling setting. The other 
objective was to partially overcome the external validity inadequacies 
of the use of gambling settings by operationalizing the variables also 
in a marketing setting. Thus, the study involved two experiments: one 
simulated gambling experiment and the other an industrial purchasing 
experiment. 
Industrial purchasing situations are characterized by several 
important factors which influence the behavior of individuals in an 
organizational setting. Extensive research done in the area of 
industrial buyer behavior has identified these factors and their 
respective role in shaping the purchase behavior. It was necessary to 
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control these factors effectively in the experiment, so that the 
observed differences in risk perceptions reflect the effect of the 
independent variables alone. Similarly, it was essential to control the 
factors influencing the gambling situations in the first experiment. 
The design of the experimental tasks to be performed by the 
subjects had to meet several requirements. In policy and mixed decision 
situations, it was important to ensure that the outcomes of the several 
repeated applications of the decision were independent of each other. 
In order to make the decisions comparable across situations the EVs of 
the policy decisions had to equal the EVs of the corresponding mixed and 
single decisions. Further, the multiple ratings of perceived risk given 
by each respondent had to be independent of each other. The nature of 
the hypotheses being tested made it desirable that information 
integration theory approach and functional measurement technique be used 
to test them. This techniques can be used most conveniently with a full 
factorial design of the P * V values as stimuli for each respondent. 
Therefore, such a design was chosen. 
The chapter is organized in several sections. The first section 
discusses the basic nature of the research and the experimental settings 
that were most suitable for it. The second section presents an 
extensive review of the industrial buying literature and identifies 
several factors that have an important influence on industrial buyer 
behavior. Further, the section explains how these factors were 
controlled in the experiment. Similarly, the third section identifies 
factors influencing behavior in gambling situations and explains how 
they were controlled in the experiments. The fourth section explains 
several conditions and constraints that the experimental tasks had to 
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meet and states how these considerations were taken care of in the 
planned experiments. On the basis of the preceding discussion, the 
fifth section specifies the important parameters of the experimental 
design used in this research. The sixth section explains the reason why 
the information integration theory approach was chosen for design and 
analysis of this study. It also explains the basic principles of the 
functional measurement technique, which is an integral part of the 
integration theory. The seventh section explains the specific tests 
used for the various hypotheses of the study. The instruments used for 
this study are presented in Appendix. 
Nature of Research and the Choice of Setting 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the dissertation tested 
theory based hypotheses about the causal relationship between the 
"repeated applications of a decision" under uncertainty as the 
independent variable, and the formation and the level of the perceived 
risk by the decision maker as the dependent variables. Therefore, this 
research could be classified as theory application as opposed to effects 
application (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1981, 1982). Several aspects 
of research methodology emerged from this. It was desirable to use an 
experimental design as opposed to survey or observation, since it 
enabled drawing causal inferences. A controlled laboratory setting 
which met the basic requirements of the theory and the hypotheses being 
tested was preferred since it can effectively control type II error. 
Further, in theory application research, the hypotheses are to be 
subjected to a falsification test. Therefore, homogeneous subjects and 
strong manipulations of independent variables were used to magnify the 
effects of the treatments, since such conditions offer the toughest 
possible test to the theory. 
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As mentioned earlier, it was planned to conduct two experiments: 
one gambling experiment and one industrial purchasing experiment. While 
theoretically both industrial and household purchasing settings would 
have been equally suitable for this research, some critical constraints 
made the choice weigh in favor of an industrial purchasing situation. 
In order to be able to test the hypotheses, it was necessary that the 
treatments differed only on the construct of repeated application of the 
decision and were otherwise identical in all other respects. Thus, it 
was necessary to create decision situations of equal expected value 
(EV). This was achieved by specifying both the probabilities and the 
outcomes in quantitative terms. Such quantified decisions are much more 
realistic in an industrial purchasing setting. Therefore, simulated 
organizational purchasing situations were used as the setting of the 
second experiment. 
The generalizability and usefulness of the research is to some 
extent unaffected by the choice of industrial rather than consumer 
purchasing setting. The major distinction between individual and 
organizational buying decisions arises due to the existence of a formal 
organization. Otherwise, even organizations are made up of individuals 
with all their characteristics that influence their behavior as 
consumers (Webster and Wind 1972, p.9-10). On the other hand, household 
purchases are also influenced by several less formal organizations like 
family and reference groups (Fern and Brown 1984). 
Identification and Control of Important Influences 
in the Industrial Purchasing Experiment 
Identification of Important Influences in the 
Industrial Purchasing Experiment 
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Organizational buying behavior can be defined as a complex process 
of decision making by which formal organizations become aware of their 
need for products and identify, evaluate, and choose among alternative 
brands and suppliers, in their effort to achieve their own objectives 
(Webster and Wind 1972, p.2). Several comprehensive models have been 
proposed by researchers in their effort to capture the essence of 
organizational buying behavior (Cyert and March 1963; Johnston and 
Spekman 1982; Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; Robinson and Stiden 1967; 
Sheth 1973; Webster 1965; Webster and Wind 1972). 
A number of critical organizational buying influences can be 
identified using these models and other research work done on more 
narrow aspects of organizational buying. First, organizational buying 
is a process that passes through several distinct phases or stages 
(Clawson 1957; Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; Webster 1965; Webster and 
Wind 1972). One generalized conceptualization of these stages is: need 
identification, establishment of objectives and specifications, 
identification of buying alternatives, evaluation, and selection of the 
supplier (Webster and Wind 1972, p.31). 
Further, organizational buying tasks can be classified by their 
degree of newness to the organization. These include: new task, limited 
rebuy and straight rebuy (Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; Sheth 1973; 
Webster and Wind 1972; Zaltman and Bonoma 1977). The meticulousness and 
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the number of buying stages through which an organization goes increase 
with the newness of the task. 
Organizational buying typically involves several individuals who 
participate in and influence various stages of the buying process to a 
varying extent. Such a set of individuals is commonly referred to as 
the decision making unit (DMU) or the buying center. Thus, the buying 
center varies in its composition as well as in its role as the 
initiator, influencer, decider, buyer, and user during the progressive 
stages of the buying process (Sheth 1973; Webster and Wind 1972). 
Organizational buying is subject to the following major influences: 
environmental, organizational, interpersonal, and individual (Webster 
1965; Wind 1968). The environmental influence consists of physical, 
technological, economic, political, legal and cultural factors. These 
factors often take institutional forms such as suppliers, customers, 
government, labor force, trade associations, professional organizations, 
competitors and social institutions (Thomas and Grashof 1982; Webster 
and Wind 1972). 
Organizational influence consists of factors like the locus of 
buying responsibility or centralization versus decentralization of 
authority, composition of the buying center, size of the organization, 
and organizational goals and priorities (Sheth 1973; Webster and Wind 
1972; Wind 1966; 1971). Several task oriented models exist such as the 
minimum price model, the lowest cost model, the rational buyer model 
(Copeland 1924), the materials management model, the reciprocal buying 
model, the constrained choice model, and the source loyalty model 
(Copeland 1924; Cyert and March 1963; Harding 1966; Wind 1970). These 
models attempt to capture the influence of organizational goals and 
constraints on buying behavior (Webster and Wind 1972). Four of the 
important findings of these studies are given below: 
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1. Organizational decision makers are busy individuals; they are 
satisfisers rather than optimizers. As such, whenever possible they 
evolve satisfactory policies for efficient handling of repetitive 
decisions. Source loyalty is one expression of such an effort(Cyert and 
March 1963; Harding 1966; Wind 1970). 
2. New suppliers are considered when the buying situation is a new 
task or when one or more of the new suppliers have been successful in 
convincing the organization that the problem needs to be re-defined, 
goals enhanced or new solutions sought(Robinson, Faris, and Wind 1967; 
Sheth 1973; Webster and Wind 1972; Zaltman and Bonoma 1977). 
3. Experience and learning result in adaptation of the goals, the 
attainment rules, and the search rules (Webster 1965; Wind 1968). 
4. Several organizational factors (including goals, centralization, 
and size) and situational factors (including the newness of the buying 
task, time pressure, level of risk involved) combine to determine the 
extent of autonomous or joint decision making that would be involved in 
the buying process (Sheth 1973; Wind 1966, 1971). 
The involvement of two or more individuals brings into the picture 
the third factor of interpersonal influence (Krapfel 1982; Thomas 1982). 
Conceptualizations such as exchange theory (Homans 1961), consensus 
theory (Parsons 1951), the homeostasis model (Newcomb 1953), the 
behavioral theory of communication (Ackoff 1958), and game theory 
(Rapoport 1965) have attempted to explain and predict the various 
patterns of behavior resulting from the interactions of individuals 
(Webster and Wind 1972, 75-87). 
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Individual influences enter into organizational buying through the 
goals, the motives, and the limitations of the individuals participating 
in the process. Therefore, factors such as personality, role set, 
motivation, cognition, learning, preferences, perceived risk, and risk 
reduction strategies come into play and influence the behavior of each 
individual, just as in the case of any consumer behavior situation 
(Webster and Wind 1972). 
More importantly, the organizational and the individual influences 
interact to create unique patterns of behavior. Several non-task models 
such as the self-aggrandizement model, ego-enhancement model, perceived 
risk model (Bauer 1960; Cox 1967; Levitt 1965), dyadic interaction model 
(Evans 1963; Tosi 1966), lateral relationship model, buying influence 
model (Weigand 1968), and diffusion process model (Webster 1969), have 
been proposed to explain the individual behavior in an organizational 
buying process. The only generalizable finding of this research is that 
in different situations, different factors assume a more prominent role 
in deciding the behavior. 
The interaction of organizational and individual factors also 
causes different individuals to wield varying degrees of influence in 
the decision making process (Silk and Kalwani 1982). The 
conceptualizations of the linking-pin role (Likert 1961; Wind and 
Robertson 1982) and the gate-keeper role (Pettigrew 1975) are really 
efforts to identify the most influential persons in the buying 
organization. 
One result of the involvement of several individuals is 
organizational conflict. Various methods of conflict resolution 
employed in these situations can be classified as bargaining, problem 
solving, persuasion, and politicking ( Cyert and March 1963; Sheth 
1973). 
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Some researchers have attempted to relate organizational 
characteristics with the supplier selection criteria used by them. 
Cardozo and Cagley (1971); Crow, Olshavsky, and Summers (1980); Dickson 
(1966); Gronhaug (1975, 1977); Hakan and Wootz (1975); Scott and Wright 
(1976); Westing, Fine, and Zenz (1969); Wind (1970); and Wind, Green, 
and Robinson (1968) have investigated the importance of vendor 
attributes, bid characteristics and supplier selection strategies used 
by organizations. 
Control of the Influencing Factors in the 
Industrial Purchasing Experiment 
The preceding discussion identifies several critical factors that 
have an important influence on the organizational buying process. Since 
the dissertation measured the effect of the construct of repeated 
applications of a decision alone, all other factors had to be carefully 
controlled in the industrial purchasing experiment. A simulated 
organizational buying situation was used in which the respondents were 
asked to play the role of the decision maker. The following paragraphs 
explain how various factors were controlled in the industrial purchasing 
experiment. 
The general economic and political environment was specified as 
positive and conducive to industrial growth. The organization was 
specified as operating in the competitive high-tech electronics industry 
where responsible risk taking was essential for survival and growth. 
Since this was in fact the actual industrial environment at the time of 
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the study, such specification only reinforced the natural effect the 
environment had on the subjects. Further, careful selection of 
homogeneous subjects located in geographical proximity ensured effective 
control of the environmental influence. 
The organizational influences were controlled by specifying a 
medium size, private company with highly decentralized style of 
management which encouraged innovation and responsible risk-taking. The 
managers were specified as busy and hard pressed for time, as is true in 
any industry. 
The restrictive effects of interpersonal influences were controlled 
by specifying a young, growing and motivated management team in a 
supportive environment that was free from undesirable politics. 
Individual influences were controlled by specifying that the 
managers were in a profit sharing plan and were eager to grow with the 
company. Thus, the conflict between individual and organizational goals 
was minimized. 
The decision involved selection of a supplier and a brand for the 
purchase of certain capital equipment required for the manufacturing 
department. Each decision had two possible outcomes: a financial loss 
resulting from the technical failure of the product and a null or 
no-profit-no-loss outcome resulting from satisfactory performance of the 
product over its life span. The risk resulted from the uncertainty as 
to which outcome would occur in the case of a specific purchase. The 
decision process was specified as being in the final stage where full 
information about the alternatives had been already obtained. The 
experimental task was to evaluate the alternatives and assess the risk 
involved in choosing each alternative. The purchase situation was 
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specified as a new task situation, thereby controlling the effect of 
prior experience. The decision making unit (DMU) or buying center was 
specified as consisting of a single decision maker, the subject. This 
was consistent with the evaluation and choice phase of the decision in 
many real organizations. 
All the controls on the above mentioned background variables were 
exercised by a carefully worded narration of a purchase situation in 
which the subjects were asked to play the role of the purchase 
manager. 
Identification and Control of Important Influences 
in the Simulated Gambling Experiment 
The major factors that influence gambling decisions can also be 
classified into three categories: the environmental, the situational and 
the personal factors. 
The situational factors were controlled by specifying that the 
subject was facing a gambling situation. As discussed earlier, consumer 
purchase situations are characterized by tangible losses and intangible 
gains as their possible outcomes. With a view to make the gamble as 
similar to a purchase situation as possible, each gamble involved two 
outcomes: a financial loss of specified value (V) with probability 
(P) and a no-profit-no-loss outcome with probability (1-P). 
It is recognized that such gambles are not very realistic and 
people would not enter into such a gamble on their own. On the other 
hand, such gamble is one of the nearest approximations to actual 
purchase decisions. Moreover, such situations have been used by 
researchers in studying individual choice behavior under uncertainty 
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(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The experiment specified that the question 
was not whether to play such a gamble or not. Instead, the experimental 
task was to assess the amount of risk perceived by the subject if he or 
she were to play such a gamble. 
The selection of homogeneous subjects was the only indirect partial 
control on the environmental factors. Otherwise, the environment and the 
personality were treated as background variables so that their residual 
effects were randomized. 
Design of the Experiaental Tasks 
The basic objective of the research was to investigate the effect 
of the construct of "repeated applications of a decision" on the 
formation and the level of risk perceived by the decision maker. Two 
experiments were conducted: one a gambling experiment and the other a 
simulated industrial purchasing experiment. Each experiment was be 
designed as a "Repeated Applications of a Decision by Probability (P) by 
Value (V)" full factorial experiment. The repeated applications 
construct was manipulated at two levels in the gambling experiment 
creating single and policy decision situations, and at three levels in 
the industrial purchasing experiment creating single, policy, and mixed 
decision situations. The mixed decision situation was not 
operationalized in the case of the gambling setting because, given the 
freedom available in the mixed decisions, the respondents would tend to 
stop playing the gamble which had one negative and one null outcome and 
no positive outcomes. The following discussion identifies several 
important characteristics and constraints that had to be satisfied and 
explains how the experimental tasks were designed to satisfy these 
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requirements. 
Choice of Decision Outcomes 
Some of the important characteristics of purchase situations were 
discussed in the section on the construct of repeated applications of a 
decision of the Literature Review chapter. As explained there, most of 
the purchase situations are characterized by tangible losses and 
intangible gains. As such, the experimental tasks had to be so designed 
that they preserved these characteristics to the best extent possible. 
This could be easily achieved in the industrial purchasing 
experiment. Each subject was given several alternative decisions as 
stimuli. Each stimulus decision had two possible outcomes. One outcome 
was a financial loss V with a probability of occurrence P. The other 
outcome was a no-profit-no-loss result (Value V = 0) with probability 
1-P. Thus, each stimulus could be completely described by specifying 
two parameters: the financial loss involved (V) and its probability of 
occurrence (P). 
Similarly, two outcome gambles with probabilities and outcomes 
identical to those used in the industrial purchasing experiment were 
used as the stimuli in the gambling experiment. As explained in the 
previous section, even though such gambles are unrealistic, they have 
been used by researchers in studying choice behavior under uncertainty. 
Levels of Probability (p) and Value (V) 
For several reasons which will be elaborated upon later in this 
chapter, it was desirable to use the functional measurement technique to 
test the hypotheses of this research. This technique can be used most 
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conveniently with a full factorial design of P * V stimuli for each 
subject. It was also necessary to create at least three levels for each 
of the two factors. Therefore, it was decided to create four levels for 
each factor in both the experiments. Thus, each respondent was 
subjected to P*V = 4*4 = 16 different decision stimuli. 
Preserving the Independence of the Multiple 
Risk Evaluations 
In order to ensure that the assessment of risk in each of the 
sixteen stimuli was done independently of the others, it was desirable 
to present them as different alternatives (gambles or product brands) to 
satisfy the same basic need or purpose. This could be easily done in 
the gambling experiment since the outcomes of different gambles are 
inherently independent of one another. However, the situation was 
different in the industrial purchasing setting. Since all possible 
combinations of P and V levels were used in creating the stimuli, their 
EVs were not of comparable magnitudes as can be seen from Table III and 
Table IV. Therefore, the sixteen stimuli would have looked unrealistic 
as representing alternatives for one purchase decision in the industrial 
purchasing experiment. 
If, on the other hand, the stimuli were presented as sixteen 
independent decisions, it was possible that the experiment would be 
perceived by the subjects as equivalent to a case of repeated 
application of a decision. In other words, since the subjects would be 
making several decisions at the same time, they might believe that a 
consistent use of expectancy criterion across all decisions would 
minimize the overall risk involved in the total exercise. Such an 
TABLE III 
PROBABILITIES (P), VALUES (V) AND EXPECTED 
VALUES (EV) OF THE SIXTEEN STIMULI 
USED IN SINGLE DECISIONS 
-------------------------------------------------
Pi .1 .4 .6 .9 
Vi 
4000 400 1600 2400 3600 
6000 600 2400 3600 5400 
9000 900 3600 5400 8100 
36000 3600 14400 21600 32400 
TABLE IV 
PROBABILITIES (P), VALUES (V) AND EXPECTED VALUES 
(EV) OF THE SIXTEEN STIMULI USED IN POLICY 
AND MIXED DECISIONS INVOLVING N (100) 
REPEAT APPLICATIONS OF EACH 
DECISION 
-------------------------------------------------
Pi .1 .4 .6 .9 
Vi 
40 4 16 24 36 
60 6 24 36 54 
90 9 36 54 81 
360 36 144 216 324 
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interpretation would clearly defeat the purpose of the experiment. 
In order to handle these constraints, it was decided to present the 
sixteen stimuli of the industrial purchasing setting in three groups of 
8, 4, and 4 stimuli respectively, as shown in Table III and Table IV. 
Each group consisted of stimuli of comparable EVs which were presented 
as alternatives. The three groups were presented as three sets of 
alternatives to three different purchase decisions. The grouping of the 
stimuli made the decision situations more realistic. Limiting the 
number of groups to three avoided the total task being perceived as an 
inherent case of repeated application of a decision. 
Values of Outcomes for Single, Policy, 
and Mixed Decisions 
As discussed earlier, in the gambling experiment the construct of 
repeated applications of a decision had two levels: single decisions and 
policy decisions. In the industrial purchasing experiment the construct 
of repeated applications had three levels: single decisions, policy 
decisions, and mixed decisions. In single decision situations there was 
only one application of the decision which may result in a financial 
loss with a specified probability. In policy and mixed decision 
situations there were a large number (N) of applications of the 
decision. Each of these applications could result in a financial loss 
with a specified probability. In order to make the single decisions 
comparable with the policy and the mixed decisions, it was necessary 
that the three had equal expected values. 
In the case of a single decision, 
EV = Probability * Value. 
In the case of a policy and a mixed decision involving N repeat 
applications of the decision, 
EV = N * Probability * Value of One Application 
The two EVs would be equal only if, 
V(Single Decision) = N * V(One Application of Policy Decision) 
= N * V(One Application of Mixed Decision) or 
V(One Application of Policy or Mixed Decision) 
= 1/N * V(Single Decision) 
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Therefore, the financial loss involved in each application of the 
policy and the mixed decision had to be N times smaller than the loss 
involved in the corresponding single decision, i.e. V/N. The value of N 
was chosen as 100, which was considered as a strong enough manipulation 
of the construct of repeated applications of a decision. 
Independence of the Outcomes in Policy 
and Mixed Decisions 
The design of the experiment had to ensure that in policy and mixed 
decisions the outcomes of the N applications of the decision were 
independent of each other. In the gambling experiment, the single 
decision situation involved playing just one game of a gamble which 
could result in a loss V with probability P. The policy decision 
situation involved playing N games of gamble, each of which could result 
into a loss of V/N with probability P. Since gambles are inherently 
independent of each other, they automatically met the condition of 
independence of outcomes. 
In the industrial purchasing experiment, the single decision 
involved the purchase of capital equipment, which could result in a 
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financial loss V with probability P. Because just one item was 
involved, the loss could be ascribed to any reason such as technical 
failure. The policy and the mixed decisions in the industrial buying 
experiment involved the purchase of N units of a piece of equipment-
special purpose electric bulbs. Each of these units could result in a 
financial loss of V/N with probability P. The outcomes of the N 
purchases had to be independent of each other. This was achieved by 
ascribing the loss to technical failure of the equipment caused by 
external and random reasons. Failure of one unit of equipment due to 
such external reasons is completely independent of the possible failure 
of other units of same equipment. Therefore, such a setting met the 
requirement of independence of the outcomes. Once again this was 
realistic considering the fact that the loss involved in each item was 
only V/N. In order to avoid confounding, it was necessary to use the 
same cause of loss in both single and policy decision situations. 
Therefore, "possible catestrophic failure of the equipment" which 
rendered it virtually worthless, was uniformly used as the cause of 
financial loss across all three types of decisions in the industrial 
purchasing experiment. 
Experimental Design 
Based on the discussion on the design of the experimental tasks, 
the following paragraphs give the design details of the two experiments 
of this dissertation. 
Stimulus Design 
The independent variables or treatments in each of the two 
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experiments consisted of three factors: the repeated application of the 
decision (single versus policy versus mixed decision), the probabilities 
of occurrence for each outcome, and the values of the outcomes. These 
treatments were arranged in "repeated applications by P by V" full 
factorial design. The two levels of the repeated application construct 
in the gambling experiment, and the three levels of the construct in the 
industrial purchasing experiment formed five unique situations as shown 
in Table I in the first chapter. Table V presents details of the 
treatments used in the study. 
Dependent Variables 
Perceived risk was the main dependent variable in the experiment. 
It was measured directly as the overt response of the subjects to the 
treatments. Two measures of perceived risk were used. Researchers have 
used semantic differential scales of 5-points (Roselius 1971), 7-points 
(Peter and Ryan 1976), 9-points (Brooker 1983; Jacoby and Kaplan 1972), 
11-points (Schaninger 1976), 16-points (Cunningham 1967), and a 
continuous scale divided into 100-points after the rating (Troutman and 
Shantau 1976), to measure the risk involved in or the preference for an 
alternative in a decision under uncertainty. It was decided to use 
100-point continuous semantic differential scales with symmetric labels 
to measure "perceived financial risk" involved in each decision. These 
100-point scales were chosen with the expectation that they would 
provide sufficient accuracy in the measurement of risk. Continuous 
scales were used to ensure that the scales were simple in appearance and 
in use, but still required some thinking on the part of the respondent 
before rating the risk perceived in each decision. One scale used 
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TABLE V 
TREATMENTS USED IN THE STUDY 
Experiments Gambling 
Factors in Each Experiment 
Repeated Applications of a Decision : 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Probabilities of Loss (Pi): 
Level 1 
Level 2 
Level 3 
Level 4 
Single Decision 
Policy Decision 
.1 
.4 
.6 
.9 
Values of Outcomes i.e. Losses (Vj): 
For Sinsle Decision 
Level 1 $ 4,000 
Level 2 $ 6,000 
Level 3 $ 9,000 
Level 4 $ 36,000 
For Polic:r and Mixed Decisions 
Level 1 $ 40 
Level 2 $ 60 
Level 3 $ 90 
Level 4 $ 360 
Number of Repeated Applications of a Decision 
Single Decision 1 
Policy and Mixed Decision 100 
Industrial Purchasing 
Single Decision 
Policy Decision 
Mixed Decision 
.1 
.4 
.6 
.9 
$ 4,000 
$ 6,000 
$ 9,000 
$ 36,000 
$ 40 
$ 60 
$ 90 
$ 360 
1 
100 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
labels which were similar to those used by Jacoby and Kaplan (1972), 
except for the addition of the word "very". The scale is presented 
below: 
Very Low Financial 
Risk 
Very High Financial 
Risk 
I •••• , •••• I •... , ••.• I .••• , .•.. I ...• , •..• I •.•• , •.•. I 
0 100 
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With a view to increase the accuracy of the ratings, a second scale 
was used to measure the "perceived importance of avoiding the financial 
risk" as an alternative measure of perceived risk. The scale is 
presented below: 
Very Unimportant to 
Avoid the Financial 
Risk 
Very Important to 
Avoid the Financial 
Risk 
l .... , .•.• ! ••.• , •... I .•.. , .... l .... , .... t •••• , •••• l 
0 100 
Control Variables 
As discussed in the section on the nature of research and the 
choice of settings, in the case of the gambling experiment, the 
situational influences were controlled by specifying the gamble faced by 
the subject. The environmental influences were partially controlled 
through the choice of a homogeneous sample. The residual environmental 
effects and the personal influences were treated as background 
variables. 
In the case of the organizational purchase situation, the 
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environmental, organizational, interpersonal, and personal influences 
were controlled throrgh careful narration of the simulated situation 
faced by the subject. Residual effects of these influences were treated 
as background variables. 
Subjects 
Graduate students were used as the subjects for this experiment. 
Of the total 75 subjects used, 35 were MBAs, 13 were PhD students in 
business, 17 were engineers, 8 were science majors, and 2 were from the 
mathematical sciences. Such a population fitted ideally the experiment 
involving a simulated industrial purchasing situation. The other 
experiment involving a gambling situation could use any homogeneous set 
of subjects. Thus, both experiments could be adequately conducted using 
graduate students as the subjects. Such a choice of subjects also 
ensured their homogeneity with respect to several background variables 
and environmental effects discussed earlier. 
A nonprobability convenience sample of the subjects was used for 
the practical reason of feasibility. Such sampling is considered 
adequate for theory based research of this kind. 
Fifteen subjects were used in each of the five decision situations, 
thus making a total sample size of 75 respondents. Each subject was 
randomly assigned to one of the five decision situations. Within each 
situation, each subject was sequentially presented with the sixteen 
different stimuli decisions resulting from the combination of four 
levels of P and V each. Each subject was asked to assess the risk 
involved in each of the sixteen stimuli decisions. To avoid any 
ordering effects, the stimuli were presented in a random order. This 
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was achieved by printing the sixteen stimuli descriptions on sixteen 
separate sheets of paper and collating them together in a random order. 
Two alternative measures of perceived risk were taken for each of the 
sixteen decisions from each respondent. 
The instruments and the experimental procedure were pilot tested on 
a small sample of subjects from the same population to ensure that no 
unforeseen problems existed. 
Manipulation Checks 
The mixed decision situation of the study has several similarities 
to the two extreme cases of the single and the policy decision 
situations. Therefore, it was decided to use manipulation checks to 
verify whether the subjects (facing the mixed decision situation) were 
able to distinguish the mixed decision as a distinct category from 
single and policy decisions. This manipulation check was used only for 
those 15 subjects who faced the mixed decision situation in the 
industrial purchasing experiment. After completing all other tasks, 
these subjects were presented with narrations of single and policy 
decision situations. They were then asked to rate their perception of 
how similar the mixed decision situation was to the single and to the 
policy decision situation separately. A 100-point semantic differential 
scales were used for this purpose. 
Very Similar to 
Policy Decision 
The scales are shown below: 
Very Dissimilar to 
Policy Decision 
I ..•• , .••. l •... , ..•• l •.•. , .•.. I ••.• , .••. l .•.• , .••. I 
0 100 
Very Similar to 
Single Decision 
Very Dissimilar to 
Single Decision 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
0 100 
Scenarios 
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The experiments required each subject to read the narration of one 
of the five decision situations in which he or she was placed. 
Thereafter, the subject read the details of each of the sixteen 
decisions arranged in a random order. After reading each decision he was 
asked to rate the level of risk perceived if that alternative was 
chosen. After completing the "perceived financial risk" ratings for all 
sixteen decisions, the subject was asked to go over the decisions for 
the second time to rate the "importance to him of avoiding the financial 
risk involved" in each decision alternative. 
The gambling experiment asked the subjects to assume that they were 
faced with a gamble of the specified consequences. The single decision 
situation involved playing each gamble only once, whereas, the policy 
decision situation involved playing each gamble 100 times. Within each 
decision situation sixteen different gambles were described by 
specifying the probability and the value of financial loss in each 
gamble. 
The industrial purchasing experiment described a hypothetical 
company and the environmental, organizational, interpersonal, and 
personal factors influencing its operations. Each subject was asked to 
play the role of the purchase manager of that company. The single 
decision situation involved the purchase of a single item of a capital 
equipment. The policy decision situation involved the purchase of 100 
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special purpose electric bulbs. The mixed decision situation involved 
entering into a contract to purchase 100 special purpose electric bulbs 
in 10 lots of 10 each to be supplied over a one year period. The risk 
in all the three situations resulted from the possibility of a 
catastrophic technical failure of the product. The sixteen decision 
alternatives were described by specifying the probability and the value 
of the financial loss in each case. Detailed instruments used for the 
study are presented in the Appendix. 
Method of Analysis 
The Unsuitability of Correlation and Multiple 
Regression Approaches 
The research investigated, as its primary goal, the effect of the 
construct of the repeated applications of a decision on the models of 
information integration used by buyers in forming their risk 
perceptions. More specifically, the research focused on whether or not 
buyers use multiplicative models of information integration in combining 
Probability (P) and Value of Outcomes (V) information to form their risk 
perceptions in decisions differing on the repeated applications 
construct. 
Formal models of judgment have been investigated by researchers in 
the past mainly through the correlation, and through the multiple 
regression techniques. Brunswick (1940) was one of the early 
researchers to suggest the use of the multiple regression model to 
investigate dependence relationships between variables. The model 
assumes that the decision maker's final judgment concerning the 
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criterion or dependent variable is a linear function of the cues or the 
independent variables upon which the judgment is based. The independent 
variables themselves either may have objective measures or may be scaled 
by the decision maker. This model has been used by several researchers 
in exploring dependence relationships (Dawes and Corrigan 1974; Slavic 
and Lichtenstein 1971). 
The linear regression model has been fairly successful in 
reproducing the policy of the decision maker. In other words, given 
values of independent and dependent variables, a linear regression 
equation can be constructed which will capture the decision maker's cue 
utilization policy and predict the responses approximately at the actual 
level. However, the approach does have several inadequacies and 
problems associated with it. It has been shown that the linear 
regression model may fit well even if it does not provide an accurate 
description of the decision maker's cognitive process. This is because 
the model is very robust and hence insensitive to nonlinearity (Yntema 
and Torgerson 1961) and to variations in beta weights (Dawes and 
Corrigan 1974; Wainer 1976). The multiple regression or correlation 
approach uses r-square as an index of the goodness of fit to judge 
whether a particular combination rule is an adequate descriptor of the 
respondent's behavior. However, Anderson (1974d) has pointed out that 
degree of fit is inappropriate for judgments of model validity. These 
characteristics make it difficult to falsify a linear regression model. 
Thus, an apparent good fit of the model does not necessarily mean that 
it correctly describes the cognitive process. 
One important objection to the regression approach concerns the 
manner in which the constructs are measured. Questioning the respondents 
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to measure their cognitive variables yields data about their cognitive 
structure rather than their cognitive processes (Bettman, Capon, and 
Lutz 1975b). This happens because, in most regression studies, the 
dependent and the independent variables are measured at the same point 
in time. Therefore, such studies in fact describe the cognitive 
structure of the respondent at that point of time. Such studies do not 
require the respondents to actually integrate information and record the 
results. Therefore, regression data cannot be used to draw causal 
inferences about the relationships between independent and dependent 
variables describing the cognitive processes. 
Another problem typical of the linear regression approach is that 
it is necessary to assume in advance the nature of the scale on which 
the dependent variables are measured. The problem becomes even more 
serious in case of multiplicative models (as is the case with the 
expectancy theories) in which the dependent variables must be assumed to 
be measured on ratio scales. This condition is not fully met by the 
commonly-used semantic differential scales. Finally, the correlational 
approach is ill-suited to the study of the differences among the 
combination rules used by different individuals. The researcher must 
devise a model to represent each possible combination rule which might 
occur and assume that the model with the highest correlation is the most 
appropriate one (Bettman, Capon, and Lutz 1975b). In that sense, the 
regression approach requires a strictly deductive approach to 
understanding the cognitive processes. Birnbaum (1973) has shown that 
the regression approach is more likely to yield erroneous results when 
scaling problems are present. 
89 
Suitability of the Information Integration 
Theory Approach 
Anderson (1968, 1974b, 1974c) proposed information integration 
theory as the means of constructing and testing simple algebraic models 
describing the cognitive algebra used by individuals to combine the 
information from multiple stimuli in various judgemental and decision 
making tasks. Since this approach ideally suited the nature of this 
research, the information integration approach was used in designing the 
study and in analyzing its findings. The following paragraphs briefly 
describe the basic principles of the information integration theory as 
applied to this research. For more detailed information the reader may 
refer to Anderson (1981, 1982). 
The information integration theory conceptualizes the process of 
information integration in three stages: stimulus valuation, stimulus 
integration, and overt response formation. The formation of perceived 
risk through the integration of probabilistic information can be 
considered as an example of such process (Figure 3). 
P ------(~~;-----> SP >--------> 
v ---------------> u (Z2 ) (I) 
RK -------------> R (Mean of 
(M) R1, R2) 
External Stimulus Psycho- Stimulus Implicit Overt Measured 
Stimuli Valuation logical Integration Value of Response Perceived 
Functions Values of Function Perceived Function Risk 
Stimuli Risk 
Figure J. Stages in the Formation of Risk Perceptions 
through Integration of Probabilistic 
Information 
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Thus, in decisions under uncertainty, buyers receive the 
Probability (P) and the Value of Loss (V) as two external and measurable 
stimuli. These stimuli are received and processed by the stimulus 
valuation function (Z) into their psychological values namely, 
Subjective Probability (SP) and Utility (U) respectively. In the next 
stage, these psychological stimuli (SP and U) are combined by the 
stimulus integration function (I) into the Implicit Value of Perceived 
Risk (RK). This implicit response is then externalized by the overt 
response function (M) into a Measurable Value of Perceived Risk (R). In 
this research, the implicit value of perceived risk RK was measured by 
two overt response measures of perceived risk (R1 and R2) which were 
combined into their mean value (R). Thus, the primary focus of the 
research was to investigate the nature of the relationship between SP, 
U, and RK all of which are unobservable psychological variables. 
However, such investigation requires the resolution of three interlocked 
problems, corresponding to the three stages of information integration: 
1 Measuring the psychological values of the stimuli 
2 Measuring the psychological values of the response 
3 Determining the psychological law or the stimulus integration 
function I 
Empirical investigation has shown (Anderson 1981) that stimulus 
integration often obeys simple algebraic rules such as adding, 
subtracting, averaging, and multiplying the stimulus information to 
arrive at a response. Such models assume that the various psychological 
variables involved can be measured on numerical scales. In the 
traditional regression or correlation approaches, the testing of these 
models starts with development of scales for the psychological variables 
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as the first step. These scales are then used to measure the variables 
and test the relationships hypothesized by the theory and the models. 
While such an approach has worked in the physical sciences, it has met 
with little success in psychological investigations. 
In contrast, the knowledge about the cognitive algebra used by 
individuals allows the functional measurement technique to provide a 
joint solution to all the three problems. Functional measurement is 
based on the premise that the stimulus integration function implicitly 
contains the measurement scales for the psychological stimuli SP and U 
and the psychological response RK. In other words, the development of 
the scales for the psychological variables and the investigation of the 
integration function are intimately and integrally related aspects of 
one single process. Therefore, if the integration function is confirmed 
as being valid, then it can be used to scale the psychological variables 
because it is the function that makes the data on the observable 
stimulus and response variables fit the functional form. Thus, the term 
functional measurement is derived from the basic principle of this 
approach that the measurement of psychological variables can be achieved 
through the investigation of the form of the integration function. 
Application of Information Integration Approach 
to the Investigation of Multiplicative Models 
The focus of the research was on the investigation of the validity 
of multiplicative as opposed to nonmultiplicative models of information 
integration in decisions differing on the repeated applications 
construct. Because the study used two outcome decisions with one 
negative and one null outcome, the multiplicative integration function 
can be represented as: 
RKij = SPi * Uj 
Where SPi and Uj are the psychological values of Pi and Vj 
respectively (Figure 3). 
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The Linear Fan Theorem proposed by Anderson (1981) states that if 
the multiplicative model is true, and if the observable response R is a 
linear function of RK, then (a) the appropriate factorial plot of the 
data will form a fan of straightlines, (b) the row means of the 
factorial design will be estimates of the subjective values of the row 
stimuli on linear scales, and (c) the column means of the factorial 
design will be estimates of the subjective values of the column stimuli 
on linear scales. 
The theorem can be proved quite easily. The assumption that the 
observable response R is a linear function of RK means: 
R · · = Co + c1 * RK · · 1J 1J 
Using the multiplicative model above, it can be written as: 
Rij = Co + c1 * SPi * Uj 
Thus, for a given value of Uj, the values of Rij (on y axis) for 
different values of SPi (on x axis) will plot as straight lines with c0 
as the intercept and c1 * Uj as the slope. Therefore, different values 
of Uj would produce different straight lines all with an identical 
intercept of c0 but with different slopes, forming a linear fan. 
All that is needed for such a plot is the values of SPi. However, 
obtaining a linear function of SPi would also suffice. In the design of 
this study both i and j took values from 1 to 4. Therefore, taking the 
mean of Rij values over all j's in each row i it can be written: 
Mean Ri. = <114> r j Rij 
= (1/4 > L" j co + c1 * SPi * 
= Co + cl * SPi * 
= Co + c 2 * SPi 
Where, c2 = c1 * (Mean U). 
(Mean U) 
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uj 
Thus, row means of Rij (i.e., Mean Ri.> values are linear functions 
of the row stimuli. By symmetry, the same holds for the column means. 
Thus, using row means of the observed values (Rij) of perceived 
risk as the estimates of the unobservable SPi values, a plot of Mean Ri. 
vs Rij for various values of j should produce a linear fan. The linear 
fan theorem thus provides a simple way to test the validity of 
multiplicative models. All that is required is to run an experiment and 
plot the data. An observed linear f~n accomplishes three simultaneous 
goals: 
1 It supports the multiplicative model. 
2 It supports the linearity of the observed response scale with 
respect to the unobservable psychological response. 
3 It provides linear scales for the stimulus variables. 
Even though such a graphical test is simple to administer, it is a 
very stringent test. Thus, for a data set even if one point deviates 
from the linear fan pattern, the multiplicative model is rejected. Such 
test is almost sure to reject the multiplicative model in most practical 
problems due to the fact that only rarely will a data set exactly 
conform to a multiplicative model. Further, such a test is not able to 
verify how closely a data set fits the multiplicative model except by an 
eyeball inspection. Therefore, the graphical test has to be 
supplemented by a more precise statistical test using analysis of 
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variance (ANOVA). This is achieved by constructing an ANOVA table for 
the observed values of perceived risk Rij with the treatments organized 
in two factors V and P. The two factor interaction term is split into a 
Linear * Linear or Bilinear component and the residual. The bilinear 
component represents the linear fan pattern; the residual represents 
deviations from the linear fan. Therefore, a complete test in favor of 
multiplicative model requires a significant bilinear component and a 
nonsignificant residual. 
Shanteau (1984b) has discussed in detail the various conditions 
that must be met to confirm or reject multiplicative models of 
information integration. The conditions are summarized for single 
subject and group level ANOVA results as presented in Table VI. Thus, 
for single subject data, the multiplicative model is confirmed if the 
main effects of V and P are significant and the interaction V * P is 
significant. Further it is necessary that only the bilinear component of 
the interaction is significant and the residual component is 
nonsignificant. The multiplicative model is rejected if the interaction 
V * P is nonsignificant. In such a case the main effects of V and P may 
or may not be significant. In the case of group data, the conditions 
are similar. However, there is no single residual term to test for 
nonlinearity because each term must be tested against its own 
interaction with the subjects (Anderson 1974a). Among the several 
residual components the Linear * Quadratic, Quadratic * Linear, and 
Quadratic * Quadratic components must be necessarily nonsignificant in a 
multiplicative model. As far as the remaining residual components are 
concerned, it is desirable, but not necessary, that the remaining 
residual components are also nonsignificant. 
v 
p 
L 
Q 
c 
L * L 
s 
NS 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
TABLE VI 
NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR 
CONFIRMING OR REJECTING MULTIPLICATIVE 
MODELS OF INFORMATION INTEGRATION 
main effect of the Value of Loss Vi 
main effect of the Probability of Loss Pj 
linear component 
quadratic component 
cubic component 
Bilinear component of the interaction 
significant 
nonsignificant 
Source • Single Subject ANOVA 
for Multiplicative 
Model's 
Group ANOVA 
for Multiplicative 
Model's 
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.Confirmation Rejection • Confirmation Rejection 
v 
p 
v * p 
Components of V * P 
L * L 
(Bilinear) 
Non-Bilinear 
Residual 
L * Q 
Q * L 
Q * Q 
Remaining Interaction. 
Components Taken 
Individually 
s S or NS 
s S or NS 
s NS 
s 
NS 
s S or NS 
s S or NS 
s NS 
s 
NS 
NS 
NS 
.Desirable but 
.not necessary 
.to be NS 
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From an experimental perspective, the functional measurement 
approach involves constructing an experiment in which the independent 
variables are manipulated to generate stimuli. The subjects are exposed 
to these stimuli and allowed to form their responses. The overt 
responses are measured on a numerical scale. These responses are then 
analyzed to develop a scale for the dependent psychological variables 
and at the same time to validate the model. 
The functional measurement techniques typically use full factorial 
design, quantitative response measures, and monotone rescaling 
procedures for the dependent response variables. Neither a quantitative 
response nor a factorial design are strictly necessary (Friedman, 
Carterette, and Anderson 1968), but they have strong advantages. 
Further, they have been used in most of the work to date. The technique 
also makes use of analysis of variance, although for a somewhat 
different purpose than the usual test of significance (Anderson 1969a). 
The functional measurement approach overcomes many of the 
shortcomings and inadequacies of the linear regression approach. The 
technique explores relationships between variables without making any 
assumptions about the scaling of the dependent variables. Further, it 
allows direct test of the theoretical model and, more importantly, tests 
for significant deviations from the model. The functional measurement 
approach analyzes the different patterns of results in the ANOVA to 
identify the different combination rules used by respondents. Further, 
the ANOVA task directly studies the actual integration of cognitive 
components. 
The functional measurement technique has been successfully used in 
studies involving validation and scaling of cognitive processes 
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(Anderson and Shanteau 1970; Bettman 1975; Bettman, Capon, and Lutz 
1975a, 1975b; Lanzetta and Driscoll 1968; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1968a; 
Troutman and Shanteau 1976; Tversky 1967a, 1967b). 
The preceding discussion shows that the functional measurement 
technique was ideally suited for this research. It also explains the 
basic principles and the method of analysis used by this technique. 
Table VII presents the nomencleature for all the important variables 
involved in the study designed on the basis of the information 
integration theory approach. 
Tests Used for the Research Hypotheses 
Based on the preceding discussion, the tests used for the various 
research hypotheses of the study are explained below. The study 
obtained two measures of perceived risk: Rlmij and R2mij• Rlmij 
measured the "perceived financial risk" and R2mij measured the 
"importance of avoiding the financial risk". The mean value of the two 
measures (denoted by R .. ) was computed and used as an overall measure 
ml.J 
of perceived risk. All the research hypotheses were tested using the 
overall measure of perceived risk so obtained. Thus, the two measures 
of perceived risk were treated as two replications of the experiment for 
the purpose of analysis. The internal consistency of the two measures 
of perceived risk was tested by computing, separately for each decision 
situation, their correlation and the significance of the replicates 
interactions with the three treatement factors in the analysis of 
variance. The section is organized in two subsections: one covering the 
hypotheses concerning the process of information integration and the 
other covering the hypotheses concerning the level of perceived risk in 
i = j = 
m = 
pmi = 
vmj = 
N = 
R1m .. = l..J 
R2mij = 
Rmij = 
ym = 
SPmi = 
umj = 
RKmij = 
TABLE VII 
NOIIENCLATURE FOR THE DEPENDENT AND THE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES INVOLVED IN THE STUDY 
subscript used to indicate different levels of P (1 to 4) 
subscript used to indicate different levels of V (1 to 4) , 
subscript used to identify one of the five unique situations 
defined by the type of experiment .and the type of treatment 
(1 to 5) 
probability 
value of the outcome (financial loss) 
number of repeat applications of the policy decision 
externally measured perceived financial risk 
••••••••••••••••• direct measure 
perceived importance of avoiding the 
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externally measured 
financial loss ••••••••••••••••• indirect measure 
mean of Rlmij and R2mij 
mean of Rmij for situation m 
subjective probability 
utility of the financial loss involved 
psychological value of perceived risk response 
EXPERIMENTS 
1. Gambling Experiment 
External 
Repetitions N 
Stimuli 
Response 
Computed 
Psychological 
Stimuli SPmi 
u . 
Response Rf~ij 
2. Industrial Purchasing 
Experiment 
External 
Repetitions N 
Stimuli 
Response 
Computed 
Psychological 
Stimuli 
Response 
TABLE VII (Continued) 
REPEATED APPLICATION OF THE DECISION 
Single 
Decision 
SITUATION 1 
(m=1) 
1 
pli 
v1j 
R11ij 
R21 . · l.J 
~1ij 
1 
SITUATION 3 
(m=3) 
Policy 
Decision 
SITUATION 2 
(m=2) 
100 
p2i 
v2j 
R1 2 .. l.J R22 .. l.J 
R2ij 
Y2 
SP2i 
u2j 
RK2 . · l.J 
SITUATION 4 
(m=4) 
100 
p4i 
v4j 
R14 · · l.J 
R24· · l.J 
R4ij 
y4 
Mixed 
Decision 
SITUATION 5 
(m=S) 
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different decision situations. 
Models of Information Integration Used by Buyers 
in Different Decision Situations--
Hypotheses Al, A2, and A3 
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Hypotheses Al, A2, and A3 predict the information integration 
models or the cognitive algebra used by buyers in forming their risk 
perceptions in different decision situations. The information 
integration theory approach and the functional measurement technique 
were used to test these hypotheses using analysis of variance. 
Specifically, the computer program package FM#l developed by Shanteau 
(1984a) was used. The structure of the group and the single subject 
ANOVA tables to be obtained from the data analysis is indicated in Table 
VIII. The three hypotheses were tested separately in the gambling and in 
the industrial purchasing experiments. The following paragraphs 
describe the method of testing the research hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Al predicts that in the case of policy decisions, buyers 
will tend to use multiplicative expectancy models in. forming their risk 
perceptions. This hypothesis would be confirmed if the group ANOVA 
supported a multiplicative model and a majority of the single subject 
ANOVAs also supported the use of multiplicative models by the subjects. 
Hypothesis A2 predicts that in the case of mixed decisions, buyers 
will tend to use multiplicative models to a lesser extent as compared to 
the policy decisions. This hypothesis would be confirmed if, at the 
single subject level, the number of subjects using multiplicative models 
was still large but was less than that in the policy decision situation. 
At the group level, such data should support a multiplicative model. 
TABLE VIII 
STRUCTURE OF THE GROUP AND THE SINGLE 
SUBJECT ANOVA TABLES 
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(A) Structure of the group ANOVA for each of the 5 Decision Situations 
Source 
He an 
Subjects (S'S) 
v 
S'S * V 
p 
S'S * P 
v * p 
S'S * V * P 
Replicates (RPLS) 
S'S * RPLS 
V * RPLS 
S'S * V * RPLS 
P * RPLS 
S'S * P * RPLS 
V * P * RPLS 
S'S * V * P * RPLS 
Total 
Components of V * P 
Linear * Linear (L) 
S'S * L * L 
L * Quadratic (Q) 
S'S * L * Q 
L * Cubic (C) 
S'S * L * C 
Q * L 
S'S * Q * L 
Q * Q 
S'S * Q * Q 
Q * c 
S'S * Q * C 
C * L 
S'S * C * L 
c * Q 
S'S * C * Q 
c * c 
S'S * C * C 
Degrees of Freedom (DF) 
1 
14 
3 
42 
3 
42 
9 
126 
1 
14 
3 
42 
3 
42 
9 
126 
480 
1 
14 
1 
14 
1 
14 
1 
14 
1 
14 
1 
14 
1 
14 
1 
14 
1 
14 
TABLE VIII (Continued) 
(B) Structure of the Single Subject ANOVA for Each of the 75 Subjects 
Source 
Mean 
v 
p 
v * p 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of Freedom (DF) 
1 
3 
3 
9 
16 
32 
Components of V * P 
Linear * Linear 
Residual 
Figure 4. 
SPmi 
1 
8 
Linear Fan of Subjective Probabilities (SPm. as 
Estimated by Mean Rmi.> versus Perceived iisk 
<Hmij) for Various Values of Utility (Umj> in 
Mu1t1plicative Models 
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Hypothesis A3 predicts that in the case of single decisions, buyers 
will tend not to use multiplicative expectancy models in forming their 
risk perceptions. This hypothesis would be confirmed if the group ANOVA 
as well as a majority of the single subject ANOVAs rejected the 
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multiplicative models in favor of nonmultiplicative models. 
Graphical analysis was also used at the group level to test for the 
linear fan in support of the multiplicative model. The, hypotheses A1 
and A2 would be confirmed if the group data produced linear fan as 
indicated in Figure 4. Hypothesis A3 would be confirmed if the group 
data did not produce a linear fan as indicated in Figure 4. 
Level of Risk Perceived by Buyers in Different 
Decision Situations - Hypotheses A4 and AS 
Hypothesis A4 predicts that buyers will perceive the highest risk 
in single decisions, moderate risk in the policy decisions, and the 
lowest risk in the mixed decisions with equal expected values. This 
hypothesis was tested separately in the gambling and in the industrial 
purchasing experiments, with the single, the policy, and the mixed 
decision situations being represented as the treatments. The structure 
of the ANOVA tables for the two experiments is presented in Table IX. 
The significance of the treatment effects was tested by the F test. 
Further, the Least Significant Difference (LSD) test was used to test 
the differences in the mean perceived risk (Ym) under the different 
treatments (Steel and Torrie 1980). The hypothesis (A4) would be 
supported if the tests confirmed the following inequalities as 
statistically significant. 
Perceived Risk 
Gambling Single 
Decision (Y1 ) 
Perceived Risk 
Industrial Single 
Decision (Y3 ) 
> 
> 
Perceived Risk 
Gambling Policy 
Decision (Yz) 
Perceived Risk 
Industrial Policy 
Decision (Y4 ) 
> 
Perceived Risk 
Industrial Mixed 
Decision (Y5 ) 
TABLE IX 
STRUCTURE OF THE ANOVAS FOR THE TWO 
EXPERIMENTS OF THE STUDY 
(A) Structure of the Gambling Experiment ANOVA 
Source 
Mean 
Subjects 
Treatments 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of Freedom (DF) 
1 
29 
1 
929 
960 
Treatments 
1 Single Decision 
2 Policy Decision 
(B) Structure of the Industrial Purchasing Experiment ANOVA 
Source Degrees of Freedom (DF) Treatments 
Mean 1 1 Single Decision 
Subjects 44 2 Policy Decision 
Treatments 2 3 Mixed Decision 
Error 1393 
Total 1440 
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Hypothesis AS predicts that consumers will perceive a different 
amount of risk in the gambling setting as compared to the perceived risk 
in the industrial purchasing setting. This hypothesis was tested by 
constructing an ANOVA table for the total study with the five decision 
situations being represented as the treatments. The structure of the 
ANOVA is presented in Table X. The significance of the treatment 
effects was tested by the F test. Further, the LSD test was used to 
test the differences in the mean perceived risk (Ym) under the different 
treatments. The hypothesis would be supported if the tests confirm the 
following inequalities as statistically significant. 
Perceived Risk Perceived Risk 
Gambling Single Decision (Yl) ~ Industrial Single Decision (Y3) 
Perceived Risk Perceived Risk 
Gambling Policy Decision (Y2) I Industrial Policy Decision (Y4) 
TABLE X 
STRUCTURE OF THE ANOVA FOR THE TOTAL STUDY 
Source 
He an 
Subjects 
Treatments 
Error 
Total 
Degrees of Freedom (DF) 
1 
74 
4 
2321 
2400 
Treatments 
1 Gambling Single Decision 
2 Gambling Policy Decision 
3 Industrial Single Decision 
4 Industrial Policy Decision 
5 Industrial Mixed Decision 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the study and the tests of the 
various research hypotheses. The internal consistency of the two 
measures of perceived risk was tested through correlation and analysis 
of variance in each of the five decision situations. The strong 
correlations and the nonsignificance of most of the replicates' 
interactions indicated that the two measures were internally consistent. 
The research hypotheses of this study stated and developed in the 
Introduction and the Literature Review chapters can be grouped into two 
categories. Hypotheses Al, A2, and A3 form the first category and 
predict the information integration models or the cognitive algebra used 
by buyers in forming their risk perceptions in different purchase 
situations. These hypotheses were tested at the group as well as at the 
individual subject level. Of these, Hypotheses Al and A3 were tested in 
both the experiments: the gambling experiment and the industrial 
purchasing experiment. Hypothesis A2 could be tested only in the 
industrial purchasing experiment. The results offer strong evidence in 
support of all the three hypotheses. In policy decision situations, the 
subjects tended to use multiplicative expectancy models in forming their 
risk perceptions. On the other hand, in single decision situations the 
subjects tended not to use multiplicative models in forming their risk 
106 
107 
perceptions. In mixed decisions, the subjects tended to use expectancy 
models to a lesser extent than in the policy decisions. 
Hypotheses A4 and AS relate to the level of risk perceived by 
buyers in different purchase situations and form the second category of 
hypotheses. Both these hypotheses were tested at the group level. Of 
these, Hypothesis A4 was tested separately in the gambling and in the 
industrial purchasing experiments. The results offered strong support 
to the hypothesis. The subjects perceived the highest risk in single 
decisions, moderate risk in policy decisions and the lowest risk in 
mixed decisions of equal expected value. Hypothesis AS was tested by 
comparing the two single decision situations and the two policy decision 
situations of the study separately. The results strongly supported the 
hypothesis. The subjects perceived different amounts of risk in the 
gambling and in the industrial purchasing situations. 
The confirmation of first four hypotheses in both the experiments, 
considered collectively can lead to the conclusion that the use of 
either setting does not affect the information integration process or 
the relative levels of risk both of which primarily depend upon the 
nature of the decision involved. However, the confirmation of the fifth 
hypothesis suggests that the actual level of perceived risk does change 
with the use of different settings. Therefore, when the research 
objective is to predict the actual level of risk perceived, the gambling 
settings should not be used as substitutes to the industrial purchasing 
settings. 
This chapter is organized in eight sections. The first section 
presents the results of the internal consistency tests for the two 
perceived risk measures. The next five sections discuss the results of 
the five hypotheses of the dissertation in sequence. The seventh 
section discusses the results of the graphical analysis for the first 
three hypotheses. The eighth section summarizes the results. 
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Table XI presents the summary of the important F ratios extracted 
from the ANOVA tables for the group data in each of the five decision 
situations and the results of the tests of significance conducted on the 
F ratios. 
Table XII presents a summary of important F ratios extracted from 
the ANOVA tables for the single subject data for each of the five 
decision situations and the results of the tests of significance 
conducted of the F ratios. 
The discussion in this chapter is primarily based on Table XI and 
Table XII. All significance tests were conducted by using .05 as the 
critical value for a Type I error. 
Interna1 Consistency Tests for the Two 
Perceived Risk Measures 
Correlation coefficients were computed separately in each of the 
five decision situations for the two perceived risk measures, Rlmij and 
R2mij" Their values for Situations 1 to 5 were 0.79904, 0.92184, 
0.62051, 0.95469, and 0.93462 respectively, providing evidence of the 
internal consistency of the two measures. The lowest value was observed 
in the industrial single decision situation which was treated as a 
random occurrence since there were no specific reasons that could be 
ascribed to it. Consistent with these results, in the group ANOVAs for 
the five decision situations only one of the fifteen terms of 
interaction between the replicates and the treatment factors was 
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significant (F .05,DF=3,42 = 4.3739). Thus, the statistical tests 
offered a strong support for the internal consistency of the two 
measures of perceived risk. 
Information Integration Models Used by Buyers 
in Policy Decisions : Hypothesis Al 
Hypothesis Al states that in purchase situations involving policy 
decisions, buyers will tend to use multiplicative expectancy model in 
forming their risk perceptions. Such a model can be represented as: 
Perceived Risk (RKij) = - Subjectively Expected Utility 
=- SP· * U· 1 J 
Using the principles of the information integration theory 
(Anderson 1962b) and the functional measurement technique (Shanteau 
1984b), Table VI in the Methodology chapter presented the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for confirming or rejecting the multiplicative 
model for single subject and group ANOVAs. Using those conditions the 
results of the tests for Hypothesis Al are discussed below. 
Gambling Experiment - Policy Decision Situation 
(Situation No. 2 in Tables XI and XII) 
In the case of the gambling policy decision situation at the group 
level (Table XI), the main effects of Value of the Outcomes (V) and 
Probability (P) were significant, the interaction (V*P) was significant 
and was concentrated only in the bilinear component. All other 
components of the interaction were individually nonsignificant. The 
data thus satisfied all the conditions for confirming a multiplicative 
model. Thus, in the gambling policy decision, the multiplicative 
TABLE XI 
RESULTS OF ANOVA FOR FIVE DECISION SITUATIONS 
AT GROUP LEVEL 
V =main effect of the Value of Loss (Vj) 
P = main effect of the Probability of Loss (Pi) 
L = linear component 
Q = quadratic component 
C = cubic component 
s = significant at .05 
E = exponent of 10 (= 10 raised to the power of) 
Experiment Gambling Industrial Purchasing 
Situation Single Policy Single Policy Mixed 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 
Sou- DF 
rce 
(A) F Ratios and Significance of Various Treatment Effects 
v 3,42 53.2461 s 102.2981 s 93.5263 s 79.4581 s 73.2318 s 
p 3,42 82.8776 s 70.1957 s 91.8943 s 103.1414 s 68.9453 s 
V*P 1,126 .6097 2.9224 s 1.4295 7.7970 s 15.1071 s 
L*L 1,14 .2257 5. 7292 s .3068 10.9564 s 51.2987 s 
L*Q 1,14 2.5183 .1856 2.8114 1.5561 .1770 
L*C 1,14 .2337 2.8096 .9269 .2489 1.6749 
Q*L 1,14 1.2587 3.5101 4. 3571 .6203 3.0693 
Q*Q 1,14 .1112 .0436 .6421 1.5000 .0418 
Q*C 1,14 2.2826 1.4557 1.3696 8.8641 s 3.5306 
C*L 1,14 .0758 1.2317E-3 1.6780 .0620 7.6111E-4 
C*Q 1,14 .1143 2.5187 .3954 .0108 6.0308 s 
C*C 1,14 .0752 1.6781 .8109 3.8025 .3654 
(B) Mean Perceived Risk (Ym) 
56.119 46.696 51.167 34.567 21.438 
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F .05 
Ratios 
Required 
for 
Signifi-
cance 
2.84 
2.84 
1.88 
4.60 
4.60 
4.60 
4.60 
4.60 
4.60 
4.60 
4.60 
4.60 
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TABLE XII 
RESULTS OF ANOVA FOR FIVE DECISION SITUATIONS 
AT SINGLE SUBJECT LEVEL 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
E = exponent of 10 (= 10 raised to the power of ) 
Models: M = Multiplicative MS = Multiplicative Superimposed by 
NM = Nonmultiplicative Non-bilinear Interactions 
Source v p v * p L * L Residue Model 
DF 3,16 3,16 9,16 1,16 8,16 
F .05 3.24 3.24 2.54 4.49 2.59 
1 Gambling Experiment - Single Decision Situation 
1 6.53 s 35.86 s 1.01 .01 1.14 NM 
2 6.03 s 12.79 s .28 .56 .24 NM 
3 .65 2.08 .20 9.87E-4 .23 NM 
4 2.86 2.37 .11 .32 .09 NM 
5 66.66 s 22.56 s 1.69 2.65 1.55 NM 
6 18.29 s 19.95 s 1.03 5.65 s .45 NM 
7 7.26 s 6. 71 s .36 .08 .39 NM 
8 13.08 s 12.68 s .57 2.25 .36 NM 
9 16.32 s 33.28 s 2.29 10.55 s 1.26 NM 
10 4.73 s 10.54 s .98 4.64 s .52 NM 
11 1.96 4.53 s .28 .90 .20 NM 
12 9.87 s 86.50 s .64 .53 .65 NM 
13 1.50 38.67 s .88 .10 .97 NM 
14 388.07 s 128.35 s 3.90 s 19.12 s 1.99 M 
15 1391.08 s 697.49 s 235.20 s 2058.66 s 7.26 s MS 
2 Gambling Experiment - Policy Decision Situation 
1 13.25 s 84.17 s 2.78 s 11.35 s 1.70 M 
2 187.23 s 95.20 s 3.13 s 21.44 s .84 M 
3 420.03 s 131.22 s 3.76 s 17.91 s 1.99 M 
4 229.03 s 98.03 s 9.27 s 50.45 s 4.12 s MS 
5 423.72 s 120.56 s 10.51 s 88.30 s .79 M 
6 634.97 s 170.27 s 13.98 s 115.18 s 1.33 M 
7 20.10 s 85.97 s 2. 72 s 5. 72 s 2.34 M 
8 53.87 s 41.36 s 2.66 s 5.64 s 2.28 M 
9 337.31 s 108.75 s 8.28 s 66.71 s .97 M 
10 515.06 s 140.15 s 10.76 s 87.57 s 1.16 M 
11 8.07 s 65.41 s 1.17 3.28 .90 NM 
12 21.65 s 134.17 s 1.13 3.47 .83 NM 
13 6.43 s 43.81 s .52 1.54 .39 NM 
14 11.91 s 53.48 s 1.02 1.85 .92 NM 
15 7.30 s 25.08 s .88 .75 .90 Nr-1 
112 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
E = exponent of 10 (= 10 raised to the power of ) 
Models: M = Multiplicative MS = Multiplicative Superimposed by 
NM = Nonmultiplicative Non-bilinear Interactions 
Source v p v * p L * L Residue Model 
DF 3,16 3,16 9,16 1,16 8, 16· 
F .05 3.24 3.24 2.54 4.49 2.59 
3 Industrial Purchasing Experiment - Single Decision Situation 
1 12.78 s 42.09 s .60 .64 .59 NM 
2 6.95 s 9.09 s .15 1.35E-3 .17 NM 
3 6.95 s 8.46 s .83 1.33 .77 NM 
4 27.19 s 18.91 s .58 1.67 .44 NM 
5 1.62 2.52 1.26 .79 1.32 NM 
6 4.35 s 4.67 s .10 .so .05 NM 
7 .73 6.61 s .70 .38 .74 NM 
8 10.72 s 1.92 .as 1.24 .81 NM 
9 32.77 s 40.53 s .57 3.25 .23 NM 
10 33.25 s 64.34 s .38 .03 .43 NM 
11 13.58 s 53.12 s .85 .17 .93 NM 
12 1.98 1.91 .14 .01 .15 NM 
13 5.55 s 8.99 s .38 .17 .41 NM 
14 5.22 s 59.16 s 1.19 1.21 1.19 NM 
15 39.40 s 26.18 s 6.38 s 26.13 s 3.91 s M 
4 Industrial Purchasing Experiment - Policy Decision Situation 
1 70.18 s 17.57 s 3.74 s 18.98 s 1.83 M 
2 1006.33 s 371.30 s 107.36 s 965.25 s .12 M 
3 71.65 s 50.51 s 6.58 s 48.72 s 1.31 M 
4 23443.78 s 8798.44 s 2689.56 s 24186.24 s 2.47 M 
5 176.01 s 177.83 s 18.54 s 146.24 s 2.57 M 
6 96.51 s 119.73 s 2. 78 s 20.81 s .52 M 
7 130.50 s 267.56 s 4.89 s 38.45 s .70 M 
8 71.65 s 50.51 s 6.58 s 48.72 s 1.31 M 
9 7821.40 s 3405.58 s 831.06 s 7463.67 s 1.98 M 
10 1638.46 s 764.20 s 210.59 s 1890.57 s .59 M 
11 41.87 s 360.39 s 7.21 s 55.56 s 1.17 M 
12 112.96 s 280.26 s 5.98 s 49.68 s .52 M 
13 666.07 s 207.13 s 17.63 s 148.13 s 1.31 M 
14 7.16 s 21.05 s 1.73 9.62 .74 NM 
15 2.25 8.41 s 1.18 2.41 1.03 NM 
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TABLE XII (Continued) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
E = exponent of 10 (= 10 raised to the power of ) 
Models: M = Multiplicative MS = Multiplicative Superimposed by 
NM= Nonmultiplicative Non-bilinear Interactions 
Source v p v * p L * L Residue Model 
DF 3,16 3,16 9,16 1,16 8,16 
F .OS 3.24 3.24 2.54 4.49 2.59 
5 Industrial Purchasing Experiment - Mixed Decision Situation 
1 32.80 s 39.22 s 2.07 15.32 .42 NM 
2 71.72 s 66.85 s 5.03 s 38.40 s .86 M 
3 25.90 s 48.53 s 1.01 6.61 s .31 NM 
4 7.55 s 9.15 s .09 .44 .os NM 
5 10.66 s 28.44 s 1.16 9.82 s .07 NM 
6 49.54 s 101.65 s 3.30 s 22.46 s • 91 M 
7 39.12 s 318.18 s 6.84 s 54.55 s .88 ~~ 
8 72.61 s 83.93 s 1.99 2.89 1.88 NM 
9 41.72 s 78.90 s 1.92 9.40 s .99 NM 
10 87.71 s 55.85 s .63 4. 71 s .12 NM 
11 5.03 s 29.67 s .48 2.98 .17 NM 
12 65.17 s 64.61 s 2.26 6.39 s 1.75 NM 
13 61.78 s 205.81 s .92 .27 1.00 NM 
14 52.47 s 130.68 s 2.83 s 23.49 s .24 M 
15 32.32 s 31.34 s 1.45 11.07 s .25 NM 
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expectancy model offered a good fit at the group level. 
Applying the criteria to the single subject ANOVAs (Table XII), in 
the case of 10 out of total 15 subjects, the main effects of V and P as 
well as the interaction V*P were significant. Of these, 9 subjects had 
the interaction concentrated only in the bilinear component with the 
residual nonsignificant indicating a good fit of the multiplicative 
expectancy model. In the case of one subject, both the bilinear as well 
as the non-bilinear components of the interaction were significant, 
indicating the superimposition of higher order interactions on the 
multiplicative model. In the case of the remaining 5 subjects, only the 
main effects of V and P were significant with the interaction V*P 
nonsignificant, indicating the use of nonmultiplicative models. 
Industrial Purchasing Experiment - Policy 
Decision Situation (Situation No. 4 
in Tables XI and XII) 
In the case of industrial policy decision situation at the group 
level (Table XI), the main effects of V and P were significant. The 
interaction V*P was also significant. Among the components of the 
interaction, the bilinear component was significant and the Linear * 
Quadratic, Quadratic * Linear, and Quadratic * Quadratic components were 
nonsignificant. Thus, all important conditions necessary for confirming 
a multiplicative model were satisfied. However, ideally the strongest 
support for a multiplicative model is provided when all non-bilinear 
components of the interaction are nonsignificant. This condition was 
met with one exception. In addition to the bilinear component one more 
component of the interaction, namely the Quadratic * Cubic component 
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also was significant. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the case 
of industrial policy decision the multiplicative expectancy model 
offered a good fit at the group level. However the model was 
superimposed by a higher order non-bilinear interaction. 
At the single subject level (Table XII), the main effects of V and 
P as well as the interaction V*P were significant for 13 subjects. In 
all 13 cases the interaction was concentrated only in the bilinear 
component and the residue was nonsignificant indicating a good fit of 
the multiplicative expectancy model. In the case of the remaining 2 
subjects, the interaction V*P was nonsignificant indicating the use of 
nonmultiplicative models. Of these two subjects, one had both the main 
effects of V and P significant. The other had only the main effect of P 
significant. 
Overall, it can be concluded that Hypothesis Al was strongly 
supported in the gambling and the industrial policy decisions at the 
group level as well as at the individual level, indicating that the 
subjects tended to use the multiplicative expectancy model in forming 
their risk perceptions in policy decisions. 
Information Integration Hode1s Used by Buyers 
in Mixed Decisions : Hypothesis A2 
Hypothesis A2 states that in purchase situations involving mixed 
decisions, buyers will tend to use the multiplicative expectancy model, 
but to a lesser extent as compared to the policy decisions in forming 
their risk perceptions. Such a model can be represented as: 
Perceived Risk (RKij) = - Subjectively Expected Utility 
=- SP· * U· 1 J 
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In other words, the hypothesis predicts that at the group level the 
multiplicative model will apply. At the single subject level the number 
of subjects conforming to the multiplicative model should be large but 
lesser than that in single decision situation. The various tests 
conducted for Hypothesis A2 are discussed below. 
Industrial Purchasing Experiment - Mixed Decision 
Situation (Situation No. 5 of Tables XI and XII) 
In the case of industrial mixed decision situation at the group 
level (Table XI), the main effects of V and P were significant. The 
interaction V*P was also significant. Among the components of the 
interaction, the bilinear component was significant and the Linear * 
Quadratic, Quadratic * Linear, and Quadratic * Quadratic components were 
nonsignificant. Thus, all important conditions necessary for confirming 
a multiplicative model were satisfied. However, ideally the strongest 
support for a multiplicative model is provided when all non-bilinear 
components of the interaction are nonsignificant. This condition was 
met with one exception. In addition to the bilinear component, one more 
component of the interaction (namely the Cubic * Quadratic component) 
also was significant. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the case 
of industrial mixed decision the multiplicative expectancy model offered 
a good fit at the group level. However, the model was superimposed by a 
higher order non-bilinear interaction. 
At the single subject level, Table XII shows that in the case of 
four subjects the main effects of V and P as well as the interaction V*P 
were significant. Further, in all four cases the interaction was 
concentrated in the bilinear component and the residue was 
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nonsignificant indicating a good fit of the multiplicative expectancy 
model. In the case of the remaining 11 subjects, only the main effects 
of V and P were significant and the interaction V*P was nonsignificant 
indicating the use of nonmultiplicative models. 
Overall, it can be concluded that Hypothesis A2 was supported by 
the use of multiplicative model at the group level and by the mixed use 
of expectancy as well as nonmultiplicative models by the respondents at 
the single subject level. Therefore, it can be inferred that in mixed 
decision situations the subjects used multiplicative expectancy models 
to a lesser extent as compared to the policy decisions. 
In the case of 15 subjects who faced the mixed decision situation, 
manipulation checks were used to investigate whether the subjects were 
able to distinguish the mixed decision as a distinct category from the 
other two extreme categories of policy and single decisions. The 
similarity scores of the mixed decisions when compared to the policy and 
the single decisions on a 100 point scale (0 = Very Similar, 100 = Very 
Dissimilar) for the 15 subjects, along with with the average ratings of 
the group, are presented in Table XIII. Their average similarity scores 
of 68.73 for policy decisions and 42.00 for single decisions show that 
all subjects did see the mixed decisions as a category distinct from 
both the policy and the single decisions. 
Information Integration Models Used by Buyers 
in Single Decisions : Hypothesis A3 
Hypothesis A3 states that in purchase situations involving single 
decisions, buyers will tend not to use expectancy models and instead use 
other nonmultiplicative heuristics. The multiplicative expectancy model 
TABLE XIII 
PERCEIVED SIMILARITY OF MIXED DECISIONS TO 
POLICY AND SINGLE DECISIONS 
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1 Given below are the scores obtained from the 15 subjects who faced the 
mixed decision situation. 
2 These subjects rated the perceived similarity of mixed decision 
situation with policy and single decison situations separately. 
3 The similarity was rated on a 100 point scale with 0 indicating Very 
Similar and 100 indicating Very Dissimilar. 
4 Nonmultiplicative model was confirmed in cases where no model is 
mentioned. 
5 The model of information integration indicated by each subject is 
given in the last column. 
M = Multiplicative model confirmed 
NM = Multiplicative model rejected in favor of Nonmultiplicative 
models. 
Subject No. Similarity of Mixed Decision to Information 
Policy Decision Single Decision Integration Model 
1 90 15 NM 
2 15 80 M 
3 84 10 NM 
4 88 20 NM 
5 90 15 NM 
6 25 90 M 
7 30 85 M 
8 82 30 NM 
9 97 25 NM 
10 90 40 NM 
11 70 30 NM 
12 90 20 NM 
13 60 40 NM 
14 40 90 M 
15 80 40 NM 
Group Average 68.73 42.00 M 
Average for Subjects Using Model 
M 27.50 86.25 
NM 83.72 25.91 
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can be represented as: 
Perceived Risk (RKij) = - Subjectively Expected Utility 
= 
The hypothesis suggests that the above model will not apply to 
single decision situation. The various tests conducted for Hypothesis A3 
are discussed below. 
Gambling Experiment - Single Decision Situation 
(Situation No. 1 of Tables XI and XII) 
In the case of gambling single decision situation, at the group 
level (Table XI), only the main effects of V and P were significant and 
the interaction V*P was nonsignificant. Thus, the data provided a strong 
evidence against the applicability of the multiplicative expectancy 
model in support of nonmultiplicative models. 
At the single subject level (Table XII), for 13 subjects the 
interaction V*P was nonsignificant indicating the use of 
nonrnultiplicative models. Of these, nine subjects had significant 
effects for both V and P. Two subjects had only a significant main 
effect for P. The remaining two subjects did not have significant main 
effects. In the case of two subjects, the main effects of V and P and 
the interaction V*P were significant. For one of these subjects, the 
interaction was concentrated only in the bilinear component, thereby 
indicating the use of multiplicative expectancy model. In the case of 
the other subject, in addition to the bilinear component the residue was 
also significant indicating the superimposition of higher order 
non-bilinear interactions on the multiplicative model. 
Industrial Purchasing Experiment - Single Decision 
Situation (Situation No. 3 of Tables XI and XII) 
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In the case of industrial single decision situation at the group 
level (Table XI), only the main effects of V and P were significant and 
the interaction V*P was nonsignificant. Thus, the data provided a 
strong evidence against the multiplicative expectancy model in support 
of nonmultiplicative models. 
At the single subject level (Table XII), in the case of 14 out of 
the total 15 subjects the interaction V*P was nonsignificant indicating 
strong evidence in support of nonmultiplicative models. Of these, nine 
subjects had both the main effects of V and P significant. Two subjects 
had only one main effect significant. The remaining two subjects had 
nonsignificant main effects. For one subject, the main effects of V and 
P were significant and the interaction V*P was also significant. 
However, the interaction was not concentrated only in the bilinear 
component. Instead, the bilinear component as well as the residueal 
were significant, indicating the superimposition of higher order 
non-bilinear interactions on the multiplicative model. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the Hypothesis A3 was strongly 
supported in the gambling and the industrial purchasing decisions at the 
group level as well as at the single subject level, indicating that the 
subjects tended not to use multiplicative expectancy model in single 
decision situations. 
The data provides considerable insight into the nature of the 
actual nonmultiplicative models of information integration used by 
subjects in single decision situations. The group ANOVA as well as a 
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majority of the single subject ANOVAs had significant main effects of V 
and P, and a nonsignificant interaction V*P. Thus, the ANOVAs meet the 
necessary conditions for confirming either an additive or an averaging 
model (Shanteau 1984b). In the context of decisions under uncertainty, 
the two components of Probability (P) and Value of the Outcomes (V) are 
both necessary to describe risk meaningfully. The presence of loss 
without an associated probability (or vice versa) is not a conceivable 
situation. As such, the possibility of an averaging model can be ruled 
out in this context. Therefore, it can be concluded that in single 
decisions, a majority of the subjects used an additive model of 
information integration in forming their risk perceptions. Such a model 
can be represented as below: 
Perceived Risk (RKij) = Co + c1 * SPi + Cz * Uj 
Where c0 , c1 , and c2 are constants. 
Comparison of Perceived Risk Levels in Single, 
Policy, and Mixed Decisions : Hypothesis A4 
Hypothesis A4 states that buyers will perceive the highest risk in 
single decisions, moderate risk in policy decisions, and the lowest risk 
in mixed decision situations with equal expected values as shown by the 
following inequality: 
Perceived Risk 
(Single Decision) 
> Perceived Risk > 
(Policy Decision) 
Perceived Risk 
(Mixed Decision) 
This hypothisis was tested separately in the two experiments. In 
the gambling experiment the mean perceived risk levels in the single and 
the policy decisions were compared. In the industrial purchasing 
experiment the mean perceived risk levels in the single, the policy and 
122 
the mixed decisions were compared in pairs. The results of various 
tests conducted for Hypothesis A4 are discussed below. 
Gambling Experiment 
Table XIV presents the ANOVA table for the total gambling 
experiment with the single and the policy decision situations 
represented as two treatments. The results of the F test are also 
presented. The F test showed that the treatment effects were 
statistically significant indicating that the mean perceived risk in the 
single decision situation was significantly higher than that in the 
policy decision situation as represented by the following inequality: 
Mean Perceived Risk 
Gambling Single Decision CY1 ) > 
Mean Perceived Risk 
Gambling Policy Decision CY2 > 
Thus, the data offered strong evidence in support of Hypothesis A4. 
Industrial Purchasing Experiment 
Table XV presents the ANOVA table for the total industrial 
purchasing experiment with the single, the policy, and the mixed 
decision situations represented as three treatments. The results of the 
F test and the LSD tests are also presented. The F test showed that the 
treatment effects were statistically significant. The LSD tests showed 
that the mean perceived risk in the single decision situation was 
significantly higher than that in the policy decision situation. 
Further, the mean perceived risk in the policy decision situation was 
significantly higher than that in the mixed decision situation. These 
results can be represented by the following inequality: 
TABLE XIV 
ANOVA FOR THE GAMBLING EXPERIMENT 
DF = degrees of freedom 
SS = sum of squares 
MS = mean sum of squares 
Treatments 
1 Single Decision Situation 
2 Policy Decision Situation 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Source DF ss 
Mean 1 2,537,021.8000 
Subjects 29 171,884.2288 
Treatments 1 21,310.3000 
Error 929 577' 704.6712 
Total 960 3,307,921.0000 
F Test: F 
.o5,DF=l,929 = 3.84 
F treatment = 34.2688 
Therefore, REJECT H0 
In favor of 
Mean Risk Rating 
56.119 
46.696 
MS 
2,537,021.8000 
5,927.0424 
21,310.3000 
621.8564 
> 3.84 
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F 
9.5312 
34.2688 
TABLE XV 
ANOVA FOR THE INDUSTRIAL PURCHASING EXPERIMENT 
DF = degrees of freedom 
SS = sum of squares 
MS = mean sum of squares 
Treatments Mean Risk Rating 
1 Single Decision Situation 
2 Policy Decision Situation 
3 Mixed Decision Situation 
51.16 7 
34.567 
21.438 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Source DF ss MS 
Mean 1 1,837,734.8000 1,837,734.8000 
Subjects 44 140,732.0000 3,198.4545 
Treatments 2 213,079.1000 106,539.5500 
Error 1393 576,066.9000 413.5441 
Total 1440 2,767,612.0000 
F Test: F 
.05,DF=2,1393 = 3.00 
F treatment = 257.6256 > 3.00 
Therefore, REJECT H0 : Y3 = Y4 = Y5 
LSD Test: S(Yi-Yj)square = MSE (1/nl + l/n2) 
= 413.5441 (1/480 + 1/480) 
= 1. 7231 
S(Yi-Yj) = 1.3127 
(YrY4)/S(Yi-Yj) = (51.167-34.567)/1.3127 = 12.65 
(Y4-Y5)/S(Yi-Yj) = (34.567-21.438)/1.3127 = 10.00 
t 
.025,DF=l423 = 1.960 
t (Y3-Y4) observed = 12.65 > 1.960 
Therefore, REJECT H0 y3 = y4 
In favor of y3 > y4 
t (Y4-Y5) observed = 10.00 > 1.960 
Therefore, REJECT Ho y4 = Y5 
In favor of y4 > Y5 
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F 
7.7343 
257.6256 
Mean Perceived Risk 
Industrial Single 
Decision (Y3 ) 
Mean Perceived Risk 
> Industrial Policy > 
Decision (Y4 ) 
Mean Perceived Risk 
Industrial Mixed 
Decision (Ys) 
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Thus, the data offered strong evidence in suppory of Hypothesis A4. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the Hypothesis A4 was strongly 
supported in gambling as well as in industrial purchasing experiments, 
indicating that the subjects perceived the highest risk in single 
decisions, moderate risk in policy decisions, and the lowest risk in 
mixed decisions with equal expected values. 
Comparison of Perceived Risk in Gambling versus 
Industrial Purchasing Settings : Hypothesis AS 
Hypothesis AS states that, in decisons under uncertainty which are 
identical in all other respects, buyers will perceive different amounts 
of risk in a gambling setting as compared to the perceived risk in the 
industrial purchasing setting. 
This hypothesis was tested by comparing the mean perceived risk in 
t he gambling setting with that in the industrial purchasing setting. 
Two separate comparisons were made: one for the single decisions and one 
for the policy decisions. Table XVI presents the ANOVA table for the 
total study. In this ANOVA the five decision situations are represented 
as five treatments: gambling single, gambling policy, industrial single, 
industrial policy, and industrial mixed. The results of the F test and 
the LSD tests are also presented. 
The F test showed that the treatment effects were statistically 
significant. The LSD tests showed that the mean perceived risk in the 
gambling single decision situation was significantly higher than that in 
the industrial single decision situation. Similarly, the mean perceived 
DF = degrees of freedom 
SS = sum of squares 
TABLE XVI 
ANOVA FOR THE TOTAL STUDY 
MS = mean sum of squares 
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Treatments ym Mean Risk Rating 
1 Gambling Single Decision Situation 
2 Gambling Policy Decision Situation 
3 Industrial Single Decision Situation 
4 Industrial Policy Decision Situation 
5 Industrial Mixed Decision Situation 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Source DF ss 
Mean 1 4,233,075.9000 
Subjects 74 312,616.2636 
Treatments 4 376,069.3000 
Error 2321 1,153,771.5364 
Total 2400 6,075,533.0000 
F Test: F 
.05,DF=4,2321 = 2.37 
y1 
y2 
y3 
y4 
Y5 
56.119 
46.696 
51.167 
34.567 
21.438 
MS 
4,233,075.9000 
4,224.5441 
94,017.3250 
497.1010 
F treatment = 189.1312 > 2.37 
Therefore, REJECT H0 : Y1 = Y2 = Y3 = Y4 = Y5 
LSD Test: = MSE (1/n1 + lln2) 
F 
8.4983 
189.1312 
S(Yi-Yj)square 
= 497.1010 (1/480 + 1/480) = 2.0712 
S(Yi-Yj) = 1.4393 
(Y1-Y3)/S(Yi-Yj) (56.119-51.167)/1.4393 = 3.4406 
(Y2-Y4)/S(Yi-Yj) = (46.696-34.567)/1.4393 = 8.4270 
Single: 
Policy: 
t 
.025,DF=2321 = 1.960 
Single: t (Yl-Y3 ) observed = 3.4406 > 1.960 
Therefore, REJECT H0 y1 = y3 
In favor of yl > y3 
Policy: t (Y2-Y4) observed = 8.4270 > 1.960 
Therefore, REJECT Ho Y2 = y4 
In favor of y2 > y4 
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risk in the gambling policy decision situation was significantly higher 
than that in the industrial policy decision situation. 
Overall, it can be concluded that in decisions under uncertainty, 
the subjects perceived different amounts of risk in a gambling setting 
as compared to the perceived risk in the industrial purchasing setting. 
Further, it can be also concluded that the subjects perceived higher 
risk in gambling situations as compared to industrial purchasing 
situations of equal expected value. 
Graphical Analysis for Hypotheses AI, A2, and A3 
Table XVII presents the values of Mean Ri. (as the estimates of 
SPi) and the corresponding observed perceived risk Rij (as the estimates 
of RKij) for different values of Vj (representing the levels of Uj) for 
the five decision situations of the study. Figures 5 to 9 present the 
plots of Mean R1 on the x-axis and the observed perceived risk R· . for 
.... • ~J 
the group data on the y-axis for the each of the five decision 
situations. In the case of gambling policy decision situation (Figure 
6), the plot resembles a linear fan indicating a multiplicative model. 
In the case of industrial policy decision situation (Figure 8), the plot 
resembles a linear fan indicating a multiplicative model, with the 
exception that plots for V levels of 40 and 60 the lines intersect. In 
the case of industrial mixed decision situation (Figure 9), the plot 
resembles a linear fan indicating a multiplicative model. In the 
gambling single decision situation (Figure 5), and in the industrial 
single decision situation (Figure 7), the plots do not resemble a linear 
fan indicating the use of nonmultiplicative models. 
128 
TABLE XVII 
VALUES OF MEAN Ri AND CORRESPONDING OBSERVED 
PERCEIVED RISK Rij FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF Vj 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
i Ri. as j 1 2 3 4 
Estimate 
of SPi 
1 Gambling Experiment - Single Decision Situation 
Vj (in $) 4,000 6,000 9,000 36,000 
1 34.483 21.233 24.967 34.533 52.200 
2 52.350 40.900 47.167 52.000 69.333 
3 62.967 53.167 57.467 60.367 80.867 
4 74.675 61.900 68.733 72.000 96.067 
2 Gambling Experiment - Policy Decision Situation 
Vj (in $) 40 60 90 360 
1 22.967 11.900 15.633 22.333 42.000 
2 42.292 27.133 30.267 45.867 65.900 
3 51.583 36,733 41.833 53.533 74.233 
4 69.942 50.733 58.633 74.167 96.233 
3 IndustrialPurchasing Experiment - Single Decision Situation 
Vj (in $) 4,000 6,000 9,000 36,000 
1 29.517 15.033 23.767 30.500 48.767 
2 46.350 37.333 41.367 43.233 63.467 
3 57.783 46.467 51.633 56.300 76.733 
4 71.017 58.667 66.333 65.567 93.500 
4 IndustrialPurchasing Experiment - Policy Decision Situation 
Vj (in $) 40 60 90 360 
1 16.917 8.000 12.167 18.267 29.233 
2 28.067 18.433 17.700 26.700 49.433 
3 37.725 22.100 28.333 36.533 63.933 
4 55.558 37.300 40.633 53.600 90.700 
5 IndustrialPurchasing Experiment - Mixed Decision Situation 
Vj (in $) 40 60 90 360 
1 9.417 4.833 7.567 9.700 15.567 
2 18.133 10.600 14.867 19.600 27.467 
3 25.042 15.400 21.733 27.900 35.133 
4 33.158 21.033 29.800 35.767 46.033 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Figure 5. Gambling Single Decision Situation: Plot of 
Subjective Probability (SPi) versus 
Perceived Risk (Rij) for Various 
Levels of Utility {Uj) 
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Figure 6. Gambling Policy Decision Situation: Plot of 
Subjective Probability (SPi) versus 
Perceived Risk (Rij) for Various 
Levels of Utility {Uj) 
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Figure 7. Industrial Single Decision Situation: Plot of 
Subjective Probability (SPi) versus 
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Figure 8. Industrial Policy Decision Situation: Plot of 
Subjective Probability (SPi) versus 
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Levels of Utility {Uj) 
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As discussed by Anderson (1981), graphical analysis has limited use 
in testing the models of information integration because it is 
practically impossible to obtain a perfect linear fan to confirm the 
multiplicative models. Such plots are even less revealing for group 
data, because in such analysis different individuals using different 
models of information integration are pooled together to predict one 
common model. The deviations observed in the data plots discussed above 
must be considered in that perspective. 
Summary of the Results 
In summary, the results provided evidence which strongly supports 
all five hypotheses of the dissertation. Thus, in policy decision 
situations the subjects tended to use the multiplicative expectancy 
model of information. In single decision situations the subjects tended 
not to use the multiplicative model. In mixed decisions situations the 
subjects tended to use the multiplicative model, but to a lesser extent 
as compared to the policy decision situation. The subjects perceived 
the highest level of risk in single decisions, moderate risk in policy 
decisions, and the lowest risk in mixed decisions. Further, the 
subjects perceived higher risk in the gambling experiment as compared to 
the industrial purchasing experiment across single as well as policy 
decision situations. The next chapter will discuss these findings of 
the study. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
D1scuss1on of the F1ndings 
The basic objective of the dissertation was to test theory-based 
hypotheses regarding the use of multiplicative expectancy models of 
information integration by buyers as the decision makers in forming 
their risk perceptions in decisions under uncertainty. A summary of the 
results discussed in the previous chapter is presented in Table XVIII. 
The results strongly supported the first hypothesis (Al) that in 
policy decisions which involve several repeated applications of a single 
decision, the decision makers may tend to use a multiplicative 
expectancy model in combining Probability (P) and Value of Loss (V) 
information to form their risk perceptions. The multiplicative model 
was confirmed at the group level in the case of the gambling policy 
decision situation. This was further supported by 9 out of total 15 
subjects conforming to the multiplicative model at the single subject 
level. The multiplicative model was also strongly supported at the 
group level in the case of industrial policy decision situation. 
However, the data indicated slight superimposition of higher order 
non-bilinear interactions. At the single subject level, 13 out of total 
15 subjects confirmed a multiplicative model which provides further 
supporting evidence for the hypothesis. On the basis of these results 
it can be concluded that the study offered strong evidence in support of 
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TABLE XVIII 
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Experiment Gambling Industrial Purchasing 
Situation Single Policy Single Policy Mixed 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 
Hypothesis A3 Al A3 A1 A2 
Information Integration Models at Group Level 
Nonmultiplicative YES YES 
Multiplicative YES YES YES 
Information Integration Models at Single Subject Level (No. of Subjects) 
Nonmultiplicative 13 5 14 2 11 
Multiplicative 1 9 13 4 
Multiplicative 1 1 1 
Superimposed by 
Non-bilinear 
Interaction 
ComEarison of Perceived Risk Levels 
Mean Perceived Risk y1 Y2 y3 y4 Y5 
Hx:Eothesis A4 
Gambling Experiment y1 > Y2 
Industrial Purchasing Experiment y3 > y4 > Y5 
Hx:Eothesis A5 
Single Decision Situations y1 > y3 
Policy Decision Situations Y2 > y4 
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the first hypothesis. 
In a similar manner, the results supported the third hypothesis 
(A3) that in single decisions which involve just one application of a 
decision, the decision makers may tend not to use multiplicative 
expectancy models in combining Probability (p) and Value of Loss (V) 
information to form their risk perceptions. In the gambling single 
decision situation, the multiplicative model was strongly rejected at 
the group level. Further, in the case of 13 out of total 15 subjects, 
the multiplicative model was rejected, indicating the use of 
nonmultiplicative models. In the indulstrial single decision situation, 
the multiplicative model was strongly rejected at the group level. 
Moreover, at the single subject level the multiplicative model was 
rejected in the case of 14 out of total 15 subjects. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the study offered strong evidence in support of the 
third hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis (A2) predicts that in the case of mixed 
decisions, the decision makers will tend to use multiplicative 
expectancy model of information integration to a lesser extent as 
compared to the policy decision situation. In the industrial mixed 
decision situation, the multiplicative model was strongly supported at 
the group level. However, the model showed some superimposition of 
higher order non-bilinear interactions. At the single subject level, 
the multiplicative model was supported in the case of 4 subjects. In 
the case of the remaining 11 subjects the multiplicative model was 
rejected indicating the use of nonmultiplicative models. On the basis 
of these results it can be concluded that the study offered strong 
supportive evidence for the second hypothesis. 
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The first three hypotheses discussed above concerned the model or 
the process of information integration used by buyers in forming their 
risk perceptions in different decision situations. Therefore, the 
results which support all the three hypotheses can be considered as 
confirming the basic logic which was used in the derivation of these 
hypotheses. Thus, in the case of single decisions, which offer just one 
chance for the actual outcome to be favorable or unfavorable, the 
concept of expectancy has little practical meaning. This may be due to 
the fact that expectancy predicts only the average outcome of a decision 
under uncertainty, which can turn into a reality only in the long run 
after a large number of repeated applications of the decision. 
Therefore, as shown by the study, in single decisions the subjects may 
have tended to reject the expectancy approach as a meaningful criterion 
in evaluating an alternative and instead use nonmultiplicative models in 
forming their risk perceptions. 
On the other hand, in the case of policy decisions, which involve 
several repeat applications of one single decision, the concept of 
expectancy offers a meaningful tool to predict the actual longterm 
outcome of a decision with a high degree of accuracy. Therefore, the 
subjects may have tended to use multiplicative expectancy models in 
forming their risk perceptions in policy decisions. 
Mixed decisions really lie on the continuum between the two extreme 
cases of single and policy decisions. They are like policy decisions 
with the added freedom to change the decision during its multiple 
implementations spread over time. Depending on the perceived ease with 
which such freedom can be actually exercised, different individuals may 
be using totally different models of information integration in 
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evaluaiing the risk in these decisions. Thus, individuals who used 
nonmultiplicative models could be those who perceived the decisions as 
very easy to change. As such, they considered only the first one or few 
implementations as the relevant span of the decision and handled them in 
a manner similar to single decisions. On the other hand, individuals 
who used multiplicative models could be those who perceived the 
decisions as very difficult to change and handled them in a manner 
similar to the policy decisions. The data on the perceived similarity 
of the mixed decisions to single or policy decisions presented in Table 
XIII indicates the possibility of such an explanation. Of the 15 
subjects who faced the mixed decision situation, four used a 
multiplicative model of information integration. Their average 
similarity scores were 27.50 for the policy decision and 86.25 for the 
single decision indicating that they perceived the mixed decisions as 
being more similar to policy decisions than single decisions. In 
contrast, the remaining 11 subjects, who used nonmultiplicative models, 
perceived the mixed decisions as being more similar to single decisions 
(Similarity Score = 25.91) than policy decisions (Similarity Score = 
83.72). 
Many real life mixed decisions can be seen as examples of such 
situations. Thus, a very large company with strong bargaining position 
is likely to treat a long term repeat order placed on a small supplier 
as the case of a single decision of value equal to only the first supply 
quantity, rather than as a policy decision covering the total contracted 
quantity, due to the belief that the decision can always be easily 
changed. However, the same company may treat another contract with a 
large corporation with a severe penalty clause more like a policy 
decision than a single decision. Clearly, more conclusive inferences 
will require further research in the area. 
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The study offered strong evidence in support of the fourth 
hypothesis (A4) that the decision makers may perceive the highest risk 
in single decisions, moderate risk in policy decisions, and the lowest 
risk in mixed decisions. In the gambling experiment the mean perceived 
risk was significantly higher in the single decision situation as 
compared to that in the policy decision situation. In the industrial 
purchasing experiment the mean perceived risk in the single decision 
situation was significantly higher than that in the policy decision 
situation. Similarly the mean perceived risk in the policy decision 
situation was significantly higher than that in the mixed decision 
situation. These results support the logic which was used in the 
derivation of this hypothesis. The subjects may have perceived the 
highest risk in single decisions because in such decisions the total 
risk is concentrated in its one single implementation. Therefore, the 
high value of the negative consequences involved in such decisions 
resulted in their being perceived as highly risky ones. In contrast, 
policy decisions involve several implementations of a decision. Each 
implementation offers one chance for the outcome to be desirable or 
undesirable. In such a situation, it is possible to predict almost 
exactly the longterm average outcome of the several implementations of 
the decision by using expectancy model. Moreover, the estimated mean 
outcome has much smaller variance in the case of policy decisions as 
compared to the single decisions. This may have resulted in the policy 
decisions being perceived as less risky than single decisions. 
Therefore, the subjects perceived moderate risk in policy decisions. 
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Mixed decisions are really policy decisions with the further added 
freedom to change the decision during its multiple implementations. 
Therefore, the real risk involved in such decisions is limited to only 
the first one or few implementations of the decision. Consequently, 
such mixed decisions may have been perceived as the least risky ones. 
The study strongly supported the fifth hypothesis (AS) that the 
decision makers may perceive a different amount of risk in a gambling 
setting as compared to the industrial purchasing setting. The results 
clearly showed that the subjects perceived a significantly greater 
amount of risk in the gambling experiment as compared to the industrial 
purchasing experiment across both single and policy decision situations. 
One possible explanation of this finding is that the gambles, which 
involved one negative and one null outcome, were so undesirable that the 
subjects perceived them as highly risky ones. On the contrary, in the 
industrial purchasing setting, probably due to the intangible gains 
involved in the financially null outcome, similar odds were perceived as 
perfectly normal and acceptable ones resulting in low perceived risk. 
It is also possible that the subjects expected gambles to be inherently 
riskier than purchase situations purely due to the contextual 
differences between the two settings. In any event the most critical 
conclusion is that the level of perceived risk is significantly affected 
by the type of the setting used in the study. 
One basic purpose behind introducing the gambling experiment in the 
study was to test whether the type of setting makes a significant 
difference in the prediction of the level of perceived risk and of the 
information integration models used by buyers. Such knowledge is of 
great importance to researchers because gambling settings are inherently 
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simpler and hence easier to operationalize. They are also the most 
commonly used settings in the past research on decisions under 
uncertainty. Therefore, any understanding about the effect of the 
setting can facilitate more judicious use of the gambling and the 
purchasing settings in future marketing research. The confirmation of 
the first, the third, and the fourth hypotheses in both the gambling and 
the industrial purchasing settings suggests that the process of 
information integration and the relative level of perceived risk are 
more critically dependent upon the nature of the decision (single, 
policy, or mixed) and are less affected by the setting used. However, 
some differences were observed between the two settings in respect of 
the strength with which the multiplicative model was accepted or 
rejected. 
The single subject analysis showed that the multiplicative model 
was used by more subjects in the industrial policy decision situation 
(13 subjects) as compared to the gambling policy decision situation (9 
subjects). Similarly the multiplicative model was rejected in favor of 
nonmultiplicative models by more subjects in the industrial single 
decision situation (14 subjects) as compared to the gambling single 
decision situation (13 subjects). Though relatively small, the 
direction of these differences suggests that the marketing settings may 
be preferable to a gambling settings in research on buyer risk 
perceptions. 
Thus, when the research goal is only to study the process and the 
models of information integration either setting could be used in the 
study though marketing settings may be more preferable. However, the 
confirmation of the fifth hypothesis indicates that when the research 
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goal is to estimate the actual level of perceived risk, gambling 
settings may not be used as a substitute for more rigorous industrial or 
other purchasing settings. 
Conclusions 
This study used simulated industrial purchasing situations as the 
setting in one of the two experiments. Therefore, the findings can be 
considered as indicative of actual industrial buyer behavior. To the 
extent such generalization can be made, the various specific conclusions 
that can be drawn on the basis of the findings of this study are stated 
below: 
1. Industrial purchase decision situations can be meaningfully 
classified into single, policy, and mixed decision situations. 
2. When faced with policy decisions, buyers may tend to use 
multiplicative expectancy models in combining the probability and value 
information to form their risk perceptions. 
3. When faced with single decisions, buyers may tend not to use 
multiplicative expectancy models and instead tend to use 
nonmultiplicative models of information in forming their risk 
perceptions. 
4. In mixed decisions, some buyers may use the multiplicative 
expectancy models while some others may use nonmultiplicative models of 
information integration. 
5. Buyers may perceive the highest risk in the single decisions, 
moderate risk in the policy decisions, and the lowest risk in the mixed 
decisions with equal expected values. 
6. The type of experimental setting may not critically affect the 
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information integration process used by buyers in forming their risk 
perceptions. Thus, gambling settings may be used in place of rigorous 
industrial purchasing settings without much distortation of the findings 
when the research objective is only to study the process of information 
integraion. 
7. The actual level of perceived risk may be significantly affected 
by the experimental setting used. Therefore, gambling settings may not 
be used as substitutes to more rigorous industrial purchasing settings 
when the research objective is to estimate the level of risk perceived 
risk in a decision situation. 
Limitations of the Study 
Important limitations of the study are explained below: 
(1) The basic objective of the study was to investigate the effect 
of the construct of the repeated applic~tions of a decision on the 
formation and the level of perceived risk in marketing exchange 
situations. However, for several reasons explained earlier, the study 
used an industrial purchasing setting in the second experiment. While 
such a setting was appropriate to test the basic theory based hypotheses 
of the research, it does put certain limitations on the extent to which 
the findings can be generalized. Thus, the findings of the research can 
be more easily extended to industrial as opposed to consumer purchase 
behavior. Further research using consumer purchase situations may be 
required before more specific conclusions can be drawn about consumer 
purchase behavior. 
(2) Another limitation of the study was the use of graduate student 
subjects. Even though the subjects were suitable for the theoretical 
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nature of the research, most of them had had only a limited exposure to 
industrial purchasing tasks and practices. Therefore, further research 
using actual purchasing agents as the subjects may have to be conducted 
to draw specific conclusions about the industrial buyer behavior. 
(3) The study included only one type of mixed decision. However, 
the intermediate category of mixed decisions covers a very wide spectrum 
of decision situations that are very practical in nature. For example, 
such decisions may include a longterm contract which can be canceled 
with or without a penalty or a series of similar small value single 
decision spread over time. As such, the findings of this study about 
the mixed decisions should considered more as illustrative than 
conclusive. Only a multi-study program of research can develop 
sufficient knowledge about risk perceptions in a variety of mixed 
decisions. 
(4) The construct of the repeated application of a decision was 
operationalized at only two levels: single decisions with just one 
application and policy decisions with 100 applications. The findings 
indicated that the construct is an important determinant of the 
information integration model used and the level of risk perceived in a 
decision. Further studies using several levels of the construct would 
be necessary to establish its absolute and relative levels which make a 
significant difference in people's information integration process and 
the level of perceived risk. 
(5) Several personality, environmental, and situational factors 
which affect the risk perceptions of buyers were treated as background 
variables in the study. Only partial control could be exercised on such 
variables even in a laboratory setting. Their residual effects have 
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been assumed to be randomozed in the study. 
In the author's view, these limitations were unavoidable. However, 
it is his belief that, to be of any practical use, the constructs and 
effects studied must be able to overcome such experimental limitations. 
In other words, any effects which can be easily affected by such 
unavoidable experimental limitations are unlikely to be of any practical 
use. The strong support found for all of the hypotheses of this study 
can be considered as a valuable contribution to the knowledge on 
perceived risk in that perspective. 
Implications of the Study 
As discussed earlier, practically every marketing exchange involves 
decision making under uncertainty and hence risk. In most cases, buyers 
do have at least some idea about the two components of risk namely, the 
values of the outcomes and their probabilities of occurrence. Buyers 
combine the information about the two risk components to form their risk 
perceptions. Perceived risk acts as a motivator of several prepurchase 
activities and as an inhibitor of actual purchase decisions. Therefore, 
it is important for the marketers to know: (a) How buyers integrate the 
risk-related information to form their risk perceptions and (b) What 
level of risk the buyers perceive in different types of purchase 
situations. 
The present study indicated that purchase decisions can be 
meaningfully classified into single, policy, and mixed decision 
situations from the buyer's view point. Marketers can use this 
knowledge to find out the category in which their products are 
classified by the buyers in a specific market segment. It is important 
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that the classification is done based on the buyers' perceptions and not 
on the marketer's own logic. Otherwise, wrong interpretations could 
lead to disastrous marketing strategies. The study further shows that 
buyers may perceive the highest level of risk in single decisions, 
moderate risk in policy decisions, and the lowest risk in mixed 
decisions. Thus, a marketer whose products are perceived as single 
purchase decisions by the buyers must make special efforts to help his 
buyers overcome or handle the perceived risk involved in the purchase. 
Such conscious effort may reduce the time spent by the buyers in the 
risk handling activities and to that extent affect sales in a positive 
manner. Such effort could also help reduce consumer dissonance. On the 
other hand, a marketer of products falling in the policy or the mixed 
decision categories may not need to spend much effort on risk related 
promotions. 
This study focused on the investigation of when buyers use the 
multiplicative expectancy model in forming their risk perceptions and 
when they use nonmultiplicative models. The results show that buyers 
may tend to use multiplicative models in policy decisions and 
nonmultiplicative models in single decisions. Thus, a marketer of 
products falling in the policy decision category would do well so long 
as the subjectve expected utility of his offering is comparable to that 
of other competitors' offerings. In other words, a higher value of loss 
involved in his product can be totally overcome by a proportionately low 
probability of its occurrence. On the contrary, such.compensation of 
one component of risk by the other might not be possible if the product 
falls in the single decision category where nonmultiplicative models 
apply. In such a single decision category product, if it is known that 
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the buyers give maximum weightage to the value of possible loss and very 
little importance to its probability of occurrence, a marketer would do 
well to limit the maximum loss involved in his offering even at the cost 
of increasing its probability of occurrence. In other words, he should 
offer a product with a smaller amount of potential losse involved even 
if the product is less reliable than competing products. The relative 
importance of the probability and the value of the loss may be totally 
reversed in another product-market requiring a different marketing 
strategy. Obviously, such and more specific conclusions can be drawn 
only after investigating the exact nature of the nonmultiplicative 
model. 
Marketers can also try to change the consumer perceptions about 
decisions typically considered as single decisions and, hence, more 
risky ones. Such changed perceptions can be achieved by changes in 
basic product offerings which convert a single decision into a policy or 
even a mixed decision. Thus, automobile manufacturers who offer cars to 
the customers on lease with an option to purchase the vehicle anytime 
during the lease period are, in fact, converting a large single decision 
into a mixed decision and thereby reducing the perceived risk 
substantially. Similar conscious actions are possible in practically 
every marketing activity which can effectively use the knowledge about 
consumer risk perceptions to mutual advantage. Knowledge about the 
buyers' thought process in forming their risk perceptions in purchase 
decisions is thus an invaluable tool that can be used in many different 
ways. 
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GAMBLING SINGLE - Page 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The present study was developed to investigate how people form 
their risk perceptions in different types of decisions under 
uncertainty. 
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The following pages will describe several gambling situations. You 
will be asked to record the amount of financial risk you perceive in 
playing each game. 
Please read the situations carefully. Then carry out the various 
experimental tasks as you would, if you were actually faced with each 
gambling situation. 
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THE GAMBLE 
In real life we come across situations where the odds are heavily 
against us and the best we can do is to minimize our losses. Given a 
choice, we will not enter such situations on our own. However, often we 
are required to face such situations with no way to avoid them. 
Enclosed are descriptions of several such gambles. Each gamble can 
result in two possible outcomes. One outcome will involve a net 
financial loss of a given magnitude with a specified probability of its 
occurrence (P). The other outcome will involve a no-profit-no-loss 
situation with balance probability (1-P) so that the two probabilities 
add up to 1. Thus, each situation can be fully described by specifying 
only the first outcome, i.e. the extent of financial loss and its 
probability. 
Please note that you do not have an option to decide whether to 
play the gamble or not. You only have to record the amount of financial 
risk you perceive in playing each gamble, if you~ required to~ 
it. 
The possible amounts of financial loss for the gambles vary from 
$ 4,000 to $ 36,000. The probabilities of such loss vary from 0.1 to 
0.9. 
GAMBLING SINGLE - Page 3 
The assessments of all the gambles are enclosed as Set 1. First 
please read all the instructions given below. Then come back to the 
instructions sequentially and carry out the specified tasks. 
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(1) Please read the assessments of the gambles one by one. After 
reading each assessment, estimate in your mind the total financial risk 
which you perceive in playing that gamble ONCE. 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very low risk and 100 indicating very high risk. 
VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
I •••• , •••. I .•.• , .••• I •••. , •••• I •••• , •••• I •••• , .••. l 
(3) Now record your perceived risk by putting a slash (/) on the 
scale line at a point which most accurately represents the amount of 
financial risk which you perceive in playing that gamble ONCE. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================== 
The financial losses vary from $ 4,000 to $ 36,000. 
The probabilities of loss vary from 0.1 to 0.9 
The total financial risk is concentrated in onlt ONE game of the gamble. 
As such the result of your assessment will tota ly depend upon the 
result of that ONE game of the gamble. 
======================================================================== 
(5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 1. 
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Another set of the assessments of the gambles are enclosed as 
Set 2. Once again, first please read all the instructions given below. 
Then come back to the instructions sequentially and carry out the 
specified tasks. 
(1) Please read the assessments of the gambles one by one. After 
reading each assessment, estimate in your mind the importance to you of 
avoiding the financial risk involved in playing the gamble ~· 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very unimportant to avoid the financial risk and 100 
indicating very important to avoid the financial risk. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• ! •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
(3) Now record the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk 
by putting a slash (/) on the scale line at a point which most 
accurately represents how important it is to you to avoid the financial 
risk involved in playing that gamble ONCE. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================== 
The financial losses vary from $ 4,000 to $ 36,000. 
The probabilities of loss vary from 0.1 to 0.9 
The total financial risk is concentrated in only ONE game of the gamble. 
As such the result of your assessment will totally depend upon the 
result of that ONE game of the gamble. 
======================================================================== 
(5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 2. 
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Sample Decision and Scale for "Perceived Financial Risk" in Set 1 
GSRl 
In the case of this gamble, there is 
10 PERCENT 1 o.hance of losing $ 36,000, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the financial risk you perceive in playing this gamble ~ 
on the following scale. 
VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
~ISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
Sample Decision and Scale for "Importance of Avoiding the Risk" in Set 2 
GST1 
In the case of this gamble, there is 
10 PERCENT chance of losing $ 36,000, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk involved 
in playing this gamble ONCE on the following scale. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The present study was developed to investigate how people form 
their risk perceptions in different types of decisions under 
uncertainty. 
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The following pages will describe several gambling situations. You 
will be asked to record the amount of financial risk you perceive in 
playing each game. 
Please read the situations carefully. Then carry out the various 
experimental tasks as you would, if you were actually faced with each 
gambling situation. 
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THE GAMBLE 
In real life we come across situations where the odds are heavily 
against us and the best we can do is to minimize our losses. Given a 
choice, we will not enter such situations on our own. However, often we 
are required to face such situations with no way to avoid them. 
Enclosed are descriptions of several such gambles. Each gamble can 
result into two possible outcomes. One outcome will involve a net 
financial loss of a given magnitude with a specified probability of its 
occurrence (P). The other outcome will involve a no-profit-no-loss 
situation with balance probability (1-P) so that the two probabilities 
add up to 1. Thus, each situation can be fully described by specifying 
only the first outcome i.e. the extent of financial loss and its 
probability. The rules of the game require that each gamble is played 
ONE HUNDRED TIMES. 
Please note that you do not have an option to decide whether to 
play the gamble or not. You only have to record the amount of financial 
risk you perceive in playing each gamble ONE HUNDRED TIMES if you ~ 
required !£ ..E!!x. it. 
The possible amounts of financial loss for the gambles vary from 
$ 40 to $ 360. The probabilities of such loss vary from 0.1 to 0.9. 
GAMBLING POLICY - Page 3 
The assessments of all the gambles are enclosed as Set 1. First 
please read all the instructions given below. Then come back to the 
instructions sequentially and carry out the specified tasks. 
171 
(1) Please read the assessments of the gambles one by one. After 
reading each assessment, estimate in your mind the total financial risk 
which you perceive in playing that gamble ONE HUNDRED TIMES. 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very low risk and 100 indicating very high risk. 
VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
(3) Now record your perceived risk by putting a slash (/) on the 
scale line at a point which most accurately represents the amount of 
financial risk which you perceive in playing that gamble ONE HUNDRED 
TIMES. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================== 
The financial losses per game vary from to $ 360. 
The probabilities of loss vary from to 
The total financial risk results from playing ONE HUNDRED GAMES OF A 
GAMBLE. As such the result of your assessment will depend upon how those 
ONE HUNDRED GAMES OF THE GAMBLE collectively turn out to be. 
======================================================================== 
(5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 1. 
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Another set of the assessments of the gambles are enclosed as 
Set 2. Once again, first please read all the instructions given below. 
Then come back to the instructions sequentially and carry out the 
specified tasks. 
(1) Please read the assessments of the gambles one by one. After 
reading each assessment, estimate in your mind the importance to you of 
avoiding the financial risk involved in playing that gamble ONE HUNDRED 
TIMES. 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very unimportant to avoid the financial risk and 100 
indicating very important to avoid the financial risk. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
(3) Now record the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk 
by putting a slash (/) on the scale line at a point which most 
accurately represents how important it is to you to avoid the financial 
risk involved in playing that gamble ONE HUNDRED TIMES. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================== 
The financial losses per game vary from $ 40 to $ 360. 
The probabilities of loss vary from to 
The total financial risk results from playing ONE HUNDRED GAMES OF A 
GAMBLE. As such the result of your assessment will depend upon how those 
ONE HUNDRED GAMES OF THE GAMBLE collectively turn out to be. 
======================================================================== 
(5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 2. 
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Sample Decision and Scale for "Perceived Financial Risk" in Set 1 
GPRl 
In the case of this gamble, EVERY TIME there is 
10 PERCENT chance of losing $ 360, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the financial risk you perceive in playing this gamble ONE 
HUNDRED TIMES on the following scale. 
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VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
Sample Decision and Scale for "Importance of Avoiding the Risk" in Set 2 
GPTl 
In the case of this gamble, EVERY TIME there is 
10 PERCENT chance of losing $ 360, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk involved 
in playing this gamble ONE HUNDRED TIMES on the following scale. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The present study was developed to investigate how managers form 
their risk perceptions in different types of industrial purchase 
situations. 
The following pages will describe an industrial purchase situation. 
You will be asked to play the role of the purchase manager of a company. 
Your task is to record the extent of financial risk which you perceive 
in buying the required products from each alternative supplier. 
Please read the situations carefully. Then carry out the various 
experimental tasks as you would if you, as a manager, were actually 
faced with each decision situation. 
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A B C CORPORATION 
ABC Corporation is a medium-sized private company in the business 
of manufacturing high technology electronic components and marketing 
them to computer manufacturers. In 1984 the company had sales of $ 200 
Million and profits of$ 10 Million. The company's manufacturing plant is 
located in a medium-sized city in New Jersey. Most of its suppliers and 
customers are also in the Northeastern states. The general economic and 
political climate in the country is conducive to excellent growth in the 
industry. However, the electronic component industry faces intense 
competition among established and new manufacturers. 
During the last five years, the new president-- the son of the 
company's founder-- has built a strong and highly decentralized 
organization of motivated managers, who are encouraged to try new ideas 
and take full responsibility for the results. As such, even though 
committees are used to exchange ideas, most decisions are made by the 
individual managers responsible for the function. This style of 
management has proved to be very effective, due to the small size of the 
organization. Management personnel often feel hard pressed for time and 
somewhat understaffed due to the fast growth of the business. 
The company believes that its employees, especially the managers, 
are its most valuable assets and encourages them to make a career in the 
company. Most of the managers are in their late thirties and have joined 
the company with a view to stay for several years. The company offers a 
profit sharing plan to all its managers, which encourages them to 
realize that achieving the company's profit objectives also means 
achieving their own personal objectives. The resultant motivation and 
sense of belonging, combined with excellent growth prospects, have led 
to the development of an effective management team that encourages 
innovation and responsible risk-taking, while being practically free of 
any undesirable politics. 
Assume that you have been the purchasing manager for ABC Corporation 
for the last three years. You are totally satisfied with the company and 
are planning to stay there indefinitely. 
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Recently the engineering department has developed a new electronic 
component which has excellent demand and profit potential in the market. 
Therefore, the company has decided to start trial production of the new 
component in the next few months. 
In order to undertake the production of this component, three 
different new machine tools must be purchased. You have obtained 
quotations from several suppliers for these machines. 
One major risk in buying these machines is the possibility of a 
machine's "catastrophic failure". Such a catastrophic failure occurs 
when all safety systems of the machine fail and a surge of electric 
current burns the electronic circuitry of the machine. The chances of 
such a failure are especially high in the first three months of a 
machine's operation. In the unfortunate event of such a catastrophic 
failure, the machine will have to be scrapped and a large part of the 
money invested in buying the equipment would be lost. For each 
supplier's machine, the extent of the financial risk due to such 
catastrophic failure depends upon the price, the design features and the 
safety systems used in the machine. 
With a view to make comparisons possible, your department has made 
an assessment of the chances that a machine from a given supplier will 
have a catastrophic failure after the purchase and the extent of 
financial loss that will be incurred as a result. Of course, the other 
possibility is that the machine will prove suitable for its full term 
and, in that case, there will be no financial loss involved. 
These assessments show that the possible amounts of financial loss 
vary from $ 4,000 to $ 36,000. The probabilities of such loss vary from 
0.1 to 0.9. 
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The assessments of the machines offered by various suppliers are 
enclosed as Set 1. First please read all the instructions given below. 
Then come back to the instructions sequentially and carry out the 
specified tasks. 
(1) Please read the supplier assessments one by one. After reading 
each assessment, estimate in your mind the total financial risk which 
you perceive in buying the machine from that supplier. 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very low risk and 100 indicating very high risk. 
VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
--RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
(3) Now record your perceived risk by putting a slash (/) on the 
scale line at a point which most accurately represents the amount of 
financial risk which you perceive in buying the machine from that 
supplier. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================= 
The financial losses vary from $ 4,000 to $ 36,000. 
The probabilities of loss vary from 0.1 to 0.9 
The total financial risk is concentrated in buying only ONE MACHINE. As 
.. such the result of your assessment will depend upon how that ONE chosen 
MACHINE turns out to be. 
======================================================================= 
(5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 1. 
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Another set of the assessments of the machines offered by various 
suppliers are enclosed as Set 2. Once again, first please read all the 
instructions given below. Then come back to the instructions 
sequentially and carry out the specified tasks. 
(1) Please read the supplier assessments one by one. After reading 
each assessment, estimate in your mind the importance to you of avoiding 
the financial risk involved in buying the machine from that supplier. 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very unimportant to avoid the financial risk and 100 
indicating very important to avoid the financial risk. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
(3) Now record the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk 
by putting a slash (/) on the scale line at a point which most 
accurately represents how important it is to you to avoid the financial 
risk involved in buying the machine from that supplier. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================== 
The financial losses vary from $ 4,000 to $ 36,000. 
The probabilities of loss vary from 0.1 to 0.9 
The total financial risk is concentrated in buying only ONE MACHINE. As 
such the result of your assessment will depend upon how that ONE chosen 
MACHINE turns out to be. 
======================================================================== 
{5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 2. 
179 
INDUSTRIAL SINGLE - Page 6 
Sample Decision and Scale for "Perceived Financial Risk" in Set 1 
ISRl 
MACHINE A 
In the case of this supplier, there is 
10 PERCENT chance of losing $ 36,000, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the financial risk you perceive in buying the machine from 
this supplier on the following scale. 
VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
Sample Decision and Scale for "Importance of Avoiding the Risk" in Set 2 
ISTl 
MACHINE A 
In the case of this supplier, there is 
10 PERCENT chance of losing $ 36,000, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk involved 
in buying the machine from this supplier on the following scale. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
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INTRODUCTION 
The present study was developed to investigate how managers form 
their risk perceptions in different types of industrial purchase 
situations. 
The following pages will describe an industrial purchase situation. 
You will be asked to play the role of the purchase manager of a company. 
Your task is to record the extent of financial risk which you perceive 
in buying the required products from each alternative supplier. 
Please read the situations carefully. Then carry out the various 
experimental tasks as you would if you, as a manager, were actually 
faced with each decision situation. 
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A B C CORPORATION 
ABC Corporation is a medium-sized private company in the business 
of manufacturing high technology electronic components and marketing 
them to computer manufacturers. In 1984 the company had sales of $ 200 
Million and profits of$ 10 Million. The company's manufacturing plant is 
located in a medium-sized city in New Jersey. Most of its suppliers and 
customers are also in the Northeastern states. The general economic and 
political climate in the country is conducive to excellent growth in the 
industry. However, the electronic component industry faces intense 
competition among established and new manufacturers. 
During the last five years, the new president-- the son of the 
company's founder-- has built a strong and highly decentralized 
organization of motivated managers, who are encouraged to try new ideas 
and take full responsibility for the results. As such, even though 
committees are used to exchange ideas, most decisions are made by the 
individual managers responsible for the function. This style of 
management has proved to be very effective, due to the small size of the 
organization. Management personnel often feel hard pressed for time and 
somewhat understaffed due to the fast growth of the business. 
The company believes that its employees, especially the managers, 
are its most valuable assets and encourages them to make a career in the 
company. Most of the managers are in their late thirties and have joined 
the company with a view to stay for several years. The company offers a 
profit sharing plan to all its managers, which encourages them to 
realize that achieving the company's profit objectives also means 
achieving their own personal objectives. The resultant motivation and 
sense of belonging, combined with excellent growth prospects, have led 
to the development of an effective management team that encourages 
innovation and responsible risk-taking, while being practically free of 
any undesirable politics. 
Assume that you have been the purchasing manager for ABC Corporation 
for the last three years. You are totally satisfied with the company and 
are planning to stay there indefinitely. 
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Recently the engineering department has developed a new electronic 
component which has excellent demand and profit potential in the market. 
Therefore, the company has decided to start trial production of the new 
component in the next few months. 
The quality control department has decided to use high prec1s1on 
testing instruments to carry out quality inspection for these new 
components. They require three ~ types of special purpose electric 
bulbs for use in the testing instruments. ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS of 
each type will be required and all bulbs will have to be purchased at 
one time. These bulbs are produced with special materials and glass to 
emit steady light of specified intensity and wavelength. Therefore, they 
are costly as compared to normal electric bulbs used for domestic or 
industrial lighting. However, in all other respects, these bulbs are 
similar to most other electric bulbs. They have an average life 
expectancy of 3000 hours. The major risk in buying these bulbs is the 
possibility of a bulb having a "catastrophic failure". Such a 
catastrophic failure occurs when a bulb burns out prematurely within the 
first 50 hours of its use. Once burned out, the bulb has to be discarded 
thereby incurring a financial loss. 
You have obtained quotations from several suppliers for these 
special purpose electric bulbs. After studying the technical 
specifications and prices, your department has made an assessment of the 
chances that a bulb from a given supplier will have a catastrophic 
failure by burning out prematurely and the extent of financial loss that 
will be incurred by having to scrap it. Of course the other possibility 
is that the electric bulb will serve its full term and in that case 
there will be no financial loss involved. Obviously these assessments 
reflect only the average quality and suitability of each supplier's 
electric bulbs. 
These assessments show that the possible amounts of financial loss 
for one bulb vary from $ 40 to $ 360. The probabilities of such loss 
vary from 0.1 to 0.9. 
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The assessments of the special purpose electric bulbs offered by 
various suppliers are enclosed as Set 1. First please read all the 
instructions given below. Then come back to the instructions 
sequentially and carry out the specified tasks. 
(1) Please read the supplier assessments one by one. After reading 
each assessment, estimate in your mind the total financial risk which 
you perceive in buying ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in one lot from that 
supplier. 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very low risk and 100 indicating very high risk. 
VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
l .... , ••.. l .... , •.•. l ••.• , .•.• l •..• , •.•• I •... , .•.• I 
(3) Now record your perceived risk by putting a slash (/) on the 
scale line at a point which most accurately represents the amount of 
financial risk which you perceive in buying ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS 
in one lot from that supplier. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================== 
The financial losses per bulb vary from $ 40 to $ 360. 
The probabilities of loss vary from 0.1 to 0.9 
The total financial risk results from buying ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS 
all in one lot. As such the result of your assessment will depend 
upon how those ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS collectively turn out to be. 
======================================================================== 
(5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 1. 
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Another set of the assessments of the special purpose electric 
bulbs offered by various suppliers are enclosed as Set 2. Once again, 
first please read all the instructions given below. Then come back to 
the instructions sequentially and carry out the specified tasks. 
(1) Please read the supplier assessments one by one. After reading 
each assessment, estimate in your mind the importance to you of avoiding 
the financial risk involved in buying ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in one 
lot from that supplier. 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very unimportant to avoid the financial risk and 100 
indicating very important to avoid the financial risk. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
(3) Now record the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk 
by putting a slash (/) on the scale line at a point which most 
accurately represents how important it is to you to avoid the financial 
risk involved in buying ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in one lot from that 
supplier. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================== 
The financial losses per bulb vary from to $ 360. 
The probabilities of loss vary from to 0.9 
The total financial risk results from buying ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS 
all in one lot. As such the result of your assessment will depend upon 
how those ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS collectively turn out to be. 
======================================================================== 
(5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 2. 
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Sample Decision and Scale for "Perceived Financial Risk" in Set 1 
IPRl 
BULB TYPE A 
In the case of this supplier, FOR EACH BULB there is 
10 PERCENT chance of losing $ 360, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the financial risk you perceive in buying ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC 
BULBS from this supplier on the following scale. 
VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
I •••• , •••• l ,• ••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• I •..• , •••• I •••• , .••• 1 
Sample Decision and Scale for "Importance of Avoiding the Risk" in Set 2 
IPTl 
BULB TYPE A 
In the case of this supplier, FOR EACH BULB there is 
10 PERCENT chance of losing $ 360, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk involved 
in buying ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS from this supplier on the following 
scale. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
I •..• , •••• l .... , ••.. l •... , .•.. l •... , ..•. l •••. , .•.. l 
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INTRODUCTION 
The present study was developed to investigate how managers form 
their risk perceptions in different types of industrial purchase 
situations. 
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The following pages will describe an industrial purchase situation. 
You will be asked to play the role of the purchase manager of a company. 
Your task is to record the extent of financial risk which you perceive 
in buying the required products from each alternative supplier. 
Please read the situations carefully. Then carry out the various 
experimental tasks as you would if you, as a manager, were actually 
faced with each decision situation. 
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A B C CORPORATION 
ABC Corporation is a medium-sized private company in the business 
of manufacturing high technology electronic components and marketing 
them to computer manufacturers. In 1984 the company had sales of $ 200 
Million and profits of$ 10 Million. The company's manufacturing plant is 
located in a medium-sized city in New Jersey. Most of its suppliers and 
customers are also in the Northeastern states. The general economic and 
political climate in the country is conducive to excellent growth in the 
industry. However, the electronic component industry faces intense 
competition among established and new manufacturers. 
During the last five years, the new president-- the son of the 
company's founder-- has built a strong and highly decentralized 
organization of motivated managers, who are encouraged to try new ideas 
and take full responsibility for the results. As such, even though 
committees are used to exchange ideas, most decisions are made by the 
individual managers responsible for the function. This style of 
management has proved to be very effective, due to the small size of the 
organization. Management personnel often feel hard pressed for time and 
somewhat understaffed due to the fast growth of the business. 
The company believes that its employees, especially the managers, 
are its most valuable assets and encourages them to make a career in the 
company. Most of the managers are in their late thirties and have joined 
the company with a view to stay for several years. The company offers a 
profit sharing plan to all its managers, which encourages them to 
realize that achieving the company's profit objectives also means 
achieving their own personal objectives. The resultant motivation and 
sense of belonging, combined with excellent growth prospects, have led 
to the development of an effective management team that encourages 
innovation and responsible risk-taking, while being practically free of 
any undesirable politics. 
Assume that you have been the purchasing manager for ABC Corporation 
for the last three years. You are totally satisfied with the company and 
are planning to stay there indefinitely. 
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Recently the engineering department has developed a new electronic 
component which has excellent demand and profit potential in the market. 
Therefore, the company has decided to start trial production of the new 
component in the next few months. 
The quality control department has decided to use high prec1s1on 
testing instruments to carry out quality inspection for these new 
components. They require three~ types of special purpose electric 
bulbs for use in the testing instruments. These bulbs are produced with 
special materials and glass to emit steady light of specified intensity 
and wavelength. Therefore, they are costly as compared to normal 
electric bulbs used for domestic or industrial lighting. However, in all 
other respects these bulbs are similar to any other electric bulbs. The 
average life expectancy of a typical bulb is 3000 hours. 
ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS of each type will be required over a 
period of one year. It will be necessary to enter into a 
contract with the chosen supplier for the supply of one hundred special 
purpose electric bulbs in 10 lots of 10 bulbs each, spread over one 
year. Since these are special purpose electric bulbs, the 
suppliers expect that the company will in fact purchase the total 
contracted quantity of bulbs. Of course, if you are extreamely unhappy 
with the product of a supplier, you can terminate a contract any time. 
But such an action should be used sparingly and only in extreame 
circumstances. 
The major risk in buying these bulbs is the possibility of a bulb 
having a "catastrophic failure". Such a catastrophic failure occurs when 
a bulb burns out prematurely within the first 50 hours of its use. Once 
burned out, the bulb has to be discarded thereby incurring a financial 
loss. 
You have obtained quotations from several suppliers for these 
special purpose electric bulbs. After studying the technical 
specifications and prices, your department has made an assessment of the 
chances that a bulb from a given supplier will have a catastrophic 
failure by burning out prematurely and the extent of financial loss that 
will be incurred by having to scrap it. Of cource the other possibility 
is that the electric bulb will serve its full term and in that case 
there will be no financial loss involved. Obviously these assessments 
reflect only the average quality and suitability of each supplier's 
electric bulbs. 
These assessments show that the possible amounts of financial loss 
for one bulb vary from $ 40 to $ 360. The probabilities of such loss 
vary from 0.1 to 0.9. 
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The assessments of the special purpose electric bulbs offered by 
various suppliers are enclosed as Set 1. First please read all the 
instructions given below. Then come back to the instructions 
sequentially and carry out the specified tasks. 
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(1) Please read the supplier assessments one by one. After reading 
each assessment, estimate in your mind the total financial risk which 
you perceive in entering into a contract with the supplier to supply ONE 
HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in 10 LOTS of 10 BULBS each over a period of one 
year. 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very low risk and 100 indicating very high risk. 
VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
(3) Now record your perceived risk by putting a slash (/) on the 
scale line at a point which most accurately represents the amount of 
financial risk which you perceive in entering into a contract with that 
supplier to supply ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in 10 LOTS of 10 BULBS 
each over a period of one year. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================== 
The financial losses per bulb vary from $ 40 to $ 360. 
The probabilities of loss vary from 0.1 to 0.9 
The total financial risk results from entering into a contract to buy 
ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in 10 LOTS of 10 BULBS each over a period of 
one year. However, technically the contract can be terminated anytime 
during the year. As such the result of your assessment will depend upon 
the quality of only the number of bulbs which you actually purchase. 
======================================================================== 
(5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 1. 
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Another set of the assessments of the special purpose electric 
bulbs offered by various suppliers are enclosed as Set 2. Once again, 
first please read all the instructions given below. Then come back to 
the instructions sequentially and carry out the specified tasks. 
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(1) Please read the supplier assessments one by one. After reading 
each assessment, estimate in your mind the importance to you of avoiding 
the financial risk involved in entering into a contract with the 
supplier to supply ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in 10 LOTS of 10 BULBS 
each over a period of one year. 
(2) At the bottom of each assessment, a hundred point continuous 
scale is given. The two end points of the scale have been marked as 0 
indicating very unimportant to avoid the financial risk and 100 
indicating very important to avoid the financial risk. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• ! 
(3) Now record the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk 
by putting a slash (/) on the scale line at a point which most 
accurately represents how important it is to you to avoid the financial 
risk involved in entering into a contract with that supplier to supply 
ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in 10 LOTS of 10 BULBS each over a period of 
one year. 
(4) Please keep this sheet in front of your eyes and before rating 
each supplier please remember the following points: 
======================================================================== 
The financial losses per bulb vary from to $ 360. 
The probabilities of loss vary from to 
The total financial risk results from entering into a contract to buy 
ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in 10 LOTS of 10 BULBS each over a period of 
one year. However, technically the contract can be terminated anytime 
during the year. As such the result of your assessment will depend upon 
the quality of only the number of bulbs which you actually purchase. 
======================================================================== 
(5) Now please proceed to make the risk assessments for all the 
situations described in SET 2. 
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Sample Decision and Scale for "Perceived Financial Risk" in Set 1 
IMR1 
BULB TYPE A 
In the case of this supplier, FOR EACH BULB there is 
10 PERCENT chance of losing $ 360, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the financial risk you perceive in entering into a contract 
with this supplier to supply ONE HUNDRED ELECTRIC BULBS in 10 LOTS of 10 
BULBS each on the following scale. 
VERY LOW FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY HIGH FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
I •.•• , •••• I •••• , .••• I •••. , ••.. l ••.. , •••• l •••• , .••• l 
Sample Decision and Scale for "Importance of Avoiding the Risk" in Set 2 
IMTl 
BULB TYPE A 
In the case of this supplier, FOR EACH BULB there is 
10 PERCENT chance of losing $ 360, and 
90 PERCENT chance of incurring no financial loss. 
Rate the importance to you of avoiding the financial risk involved 
in entering into a contract with this supplier to supply ONE HUNDRED 
ELECTRIC BULBS in 10 LOTS of 10 BULBS each on the following scale. 
VERY UNIMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
0 
VERY IMPORTANT TO 
AVOID FINANCIAL 
RISK 
100 
I ...• , ..•• I .... , .•.. I .... , .••• I .••. , .•.• l •... , •.•. l 
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Suppose, a decision to buy 100 special purpose electric bulbs, ALL 
IN ONE LOT is called a "Policy Decision•. Now compare this policy 
decision with the decision situation you faced in the experiment. To 
what extent is the decision situation you faced in the experiment 
similar to the policy decision. Please indicate on the following scale 
by putting a slash (/) on the scale line at an appropriate place. 
VERY SIMILAR TO THE 
POLICY DECISION 
0 
VERY DISSIMILAR TO THE 
POLICY DECISION 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
Suppose, you were faced with a "Single Decision• situation which 
involves the purchase of just ONE special purpose electric bulb equal in 
price to the 100 electric bulbs you considered in the experiment. Now 
compare this single decision with the decision situation you faced in 
the experiment. To what extent is the decision situation you faced in 
the experiment similar to the single decision? Please indicate on the 
following scale by putting a slash (/) on the scale line at an 
appropriate point. 
VERY SIMILAR TO THE 
SINGLE DECISION 
0 
VERY DISSIMILAR TO THE 
SINGLE DECISION 
100 
1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 •••• , •••• 1 
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